cation of combined phenomena, the variation of the processes and the possible variety of purposes. It is to the simplicity and the ascertainable limitation of causes that, on the law of chances, one out of many conjectures may be right. Transfer all these considerations to moral science, in which both the first principle and final cause, cannot be specifically known, (without assumption, revelation, or the very inference to be drawn ;) in which the variety of combination and the complication is so multifarious; about which the metaphysics of all times have not struck forth a single spark of clear and permanent light. The knowledge of a life is insufficient to discover to the wisest man, with certainty, the final tendencies of his own character. The shrewdest reasoner is constantly deceived in estimating his own intents aright, not to talk of those of his acquaintances; he may believe himself a friend when he is plotting seduction; a patriot, while he is looking for power and place; a philosopher, while he is for his own special honor and glory, darkening those truths for which he pretends devotion. Again compare the tendencies of human desire, sentiment, and opinion in distant ages and countries. Look for the duties of man to his fellow, amid the clash of social conventions: look for his duties to his God among the collisions of national creeds. Lastly, look for the indications of the final intent of his Maker, in the awful contest between vice and virtue, piety and atheism; and setting revelation aside, question the inductive philosophy, what abyss of Hades or Tartarus has been prepared, to engulph in its dark abyss, a world so destitute of genuine goodness or disinterested piety; a world whose opinions of right, and whose altars-whose idolatries of wood and stone, of poetry and metaphysics can only be compared to the chaos of the poet of England "Where eldest Night And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold Of endless wars, and by confusion stand. We do not however, we repeat it, quarrel with the method; we admit, that had we possess on of that awful book, which contains the moral system, upon which the plans of the Most High are ordered through all worlds, we might, with Cuvier, reach, by a similar species of induction, at the precise philosophy of this. It is to the data we object, because they are demonstrably insufficient. Certain data, we admit: they were insufficient for Plato; and if we admit that they are become somewhat more available in later times, it is because conjecture is guided by the positive light of revelation. The very sceptic is indebted to the Gospel for the knowledge which he would turn against it. The entire scheme of operative principles, upon the mind of civilised man, are so modified by the principles and by the knowledge derived from revealed religion, that the principles of the science, which the noble lord would erect, must begin with it, or contrive to eliminate it in such a manner, as to replace his induction where it was found by Chrysippus and Diogenes. He might then be allowed consistently, to construct a law conformable to the eternal fitness of things; or discover the compendious and elastic religion of human tendencies. the theory of morals, to be collected from the civilised world, is Christian, when reduced to its principles, the law of opinion and the divine word: and any just reasoning must so derive it, by generalizing fairly. If this rule be rejected, the nature of man, in all ages modified by habit and convention, time, and place, admits of no precise analysis. The noble author's philosophy, when justly followed, must, in its first few steps, lead him to revelation, and he will there alone discover the system, that he hopes to discover by abstract speculation. It will then remain for his lordship to decide, whether to be content with what God has revealed, or fling aside the acknowledged record in order that he may have the honor to find one of his own. But Having entered so far upon this subject, we cannot leave it without guarding against the errors which are liable to be committed by such as take extreme views on either side Natural theology has its abuse and its use. Its abuse is frequent and most in jurious; it has furnished Deism with its most specious weapons. The Deist, following pretty nearly that track which the noble lord has traced out, has not only found that revealed religion is unnecessary, but fallacious. Having, by the light of unaided reason, discovered what he considers to be the attributes of God, he applies them as a test to the revelation which God has made of himself. Its use, well marked though limited. To the mind, rightly instructed in the real knowledge of God, by his own revelation of himself, there is, throughout the moral and physical world, an exhaustless illustration as well as corroboration of this knowledge. As the natural philosopher interprets according to the known analogies of science; so the Christian interprets by the known analogy of Christian truth. He sees, on the firmament above and on the earth below, a writing which he has been taught to interpret. He has first read the book, which his God has written for his special instruction, and thus educated he surveys the same hand upon the ample volume of the world. The philosopher, on the contrary, looks for God in a book which he can hardly comprehend,-Nature; and untaught by the errors of ages, tries to find the purposes which lie behind a moral system, which he can only guess at always ignotum per ignotius. But not content with this perversion, he resolves not to look to the light which has actually been provided for his imperfect vision, until he shall succeed in finding one for himself; until he shall have extracted from natural research that knowledge which it does not and never was designed to afford. Lord Brougham, towards the end of his discourse, observes, that the friends of revealed religion have been frequently opposed to natural religion, and comments with some severity on the supposed mistake. devised are not unsatisfactorily overthrown by the noble author himself. If Tully has found no certainty; if Plato is hardly specious; if Paley has flung aside the question; if Butler has only discussed another subject under the name of religion; if Clarke has found an utter confutation in his lordship's page, how can he accuse the Christian of want of due reflection, if he rejects the illusory pretension of a philosophy which is pernicious, because, in truth, it sets itself up in the place of religion! It is not the point in dispute; and is only a sophistical evasion to say that Ray, Clarke, Durham, Keill, and Paley were advocates for natural theology. In some of these great men's writings, there is a cautions adherence to the limits within which the investigation is rational; in some, as his lordship is quite aware, an admixture of error with partial truth; in most, a just subordination, preserved between real knowledge and mere theory, the inductive proofs of revelation and the speculations of theology. But such is not the practical objection of the "friends of revelation." It is not that the speculative theosophist may be an infidel or a Christian: but that a very large class, with whom no one is better acquainted than Lord Brougham, actually find an excuse for infidelity in those notions of natural religion which everyone can devise according to the precise measure of his own morality, out of a creed so vague to reason-so merely speculative in its data, and so arbitrary in the shape it may take, according to the notions or desires of the framer. Should the noble author, or any one else, ever happen to demonstrate, or by induction discover, a true, satisfactory, and self-consistent natural religion, we have no fear but that it will be found to harmonize with that gospel which has brought "life and immortality to light," because we shrewdly suspect they were to be brought to light in no other way; and we frankly acknowledge to his lordship that we should consider such a conformity its strongest proof, and the want of it the most decisive objection. And this leads us to the last of his lordship's points on this topic, viz. the assumption that natural religion is necessary to the proof of revelation. This we deny. There is no doubt but that among the many proofs of Christianity a very strong proof can be derived from the first truth, that there is a God, by whom this world has been made. But this strong proof is feeble in comparison with the inductive arguments stated so well by Paley. Again, there is an argument of great power drawn from what Bishop Butler somewhat loosely calls natural religion-the analogy between the works and moral order of nature and the truths of revealed religion. But this analogy does not amount to absolute proof, nor was it ever intended as such it is neither more or less than the most triumphant refutation of speculative infidelity that ever came from any writer on any subject. We trust that Lord Brougham, who can well afford to be candid, will admit that the "friend of revelation" is not altogether without apology, if he protests against the attempt to prop the truth of Christianity upon so vague and unsettled a "science" as natural theology, even though illustrated by the learned labour of his lordship. And although we may admit that within the scope of real existence there is and must be some great system of Divine will and jurisprudence; yet we must continue to protest against the fatal practical error, of rejecting the "light of life" and immortality which God has given, until human wisdom shall succeed in discovering and rendering practically available-that which he has withheld. The evidences of Christianity depend upon the inductive principle as much as any fact of physical science, but not in the manner in which the noble lord attempts to show. It is indeed an error in which his lordship participates with many respectable philosophers, to suppose the assumption of the first cause in any way involved (unless as an inference) in the reasonings of philosophy. The inductive argument commences with the known or assumed uniformity of the laws of nature. How this assumption might be abstractedly proved we are not concerned to know: rely on it, from the necessity of things; for without such a reliance, all reason we ing must cease. That mutual relation between phenomena, which consists in constant and co-ordinate variation, and is in a great variety of cases called the relation of causation, is thus the true ground of reasoning upon facts: practically the reasoner looks no further. The laws of nature may cease, or the metaphysical engineer may doubt their stability; but the argument ceases at such a point to have force or practical purpose. Human assent has its laws, and to these alone is it needful to modify the laws of reasoning. There is no assignable proof to which some theoretical objection cannot be devised, and for this reason the caviller canuot be content, and need not be regarded. We remark this the more especially here, as the noble lord having proved how feeble an analogy can content the speculative theorist, to establish the least experimental facts, at once turns upon the evidences of Scripture, (the firmest and most settled on the laws of human reasoning that ever has been found out of the pale of the stricter sciences,) to prove their inconclusiveness, unless by the assistance of that "dogmatic theology" which he has tried to erect. Now we must insist, in opposition to this, that the proof of Christianity is commensurate with the ordinary laws of assent, and demands no reference to any abstract elements of ratiocination, different from those of testimony in general. It is enough that the known and received laws of inference are precisely and rigidly fulfilled, to satisfy those who are content to use their understandings so far sincerely: otherwise all moral proof must be impossible, as the supposition destroys the very foundation of all reasoning. Something must be granted that cannot be proved; and all that the evidence of revelation demands, is the inductive principle of the uniformity of the laws of nature. The noble lord has offered two objections, one of which is new to us, the other as old as modern infidelity. We shall reply to both. The noble lord observes, that "Revelation cannot be true if natural religion is false, and cannot be demonstrated We are indebted to Mr. Wallace for the phrase. strictly by any evidence, without proving or assuming the latter." In this sentence there is such a confusion of distinct principles, that it would take more space to disentangle them than we can afford. But we here cite it merely as the enunciation of a proposition, and pass to the particular proof: for this his lordship grants the assumption of the facts of the Redeemer's history, the miracles and pretensions of divine Inission; and then observes, that such testimony of this pretension is insufficient to establish it, as supernatural power "does not of necessity exclude fraud or malice, and that therefore these pretensions rest "only on the messenger's assertion. But the doctrines of the existence of a Deity, and of his attributes, which natural religion teaches, preclude the possibility of such ainbiguities and remove all difficulties." We fear this is something worse than the mere error of ignotum per ignotius; it is the groping into the uncertainties of crude speculation for that which is before our eyes. Had our Lord come to earth for the purpose of establishing a religion professedly sensual-tyrannical-favourable to pride-indifferent as to truth, meekness, humility, goodness, holiness, and the supremacy of the Creator-we might say with the stubborn Jew," he hath a devil," or with Lord Brougham, who has rather strangely adopted their error, and passed over the obvious answer, "This messenger might have come from an evil as well as from a good being." One answer may serve for both "If Satan also be divided against himself, how shall his kingdom stand?" (Luke, ii. 18.) The supernatural power of our Lord was proved by miracle; and, waving the argument that his divine power was proved by the nature of these miracles; his goodness, truth, and all the attributes which natural theology, on much less evidence, assigns to God, are proved by his precepts, doctrines, and the history of his life. The jealous authority of Rome acquitted him expressly of ambition or any other crime-"I find no fault in this man." Lord Brougham is a lawyer; let him carefully peruse the trial before Pilate; let him impartially weigh the accusation of the Jews, the solemn disclaimer of the Roman judge--"I wash my hands out of the blood of this righteous man, sce ye to it"-the calm and unimpassioned self-devotion of the victim, breathing the prayer of mercy on the cross, "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do," the voice of human nature itself speaking in the centurion-" Truly this was the Son of God"-and let his lordship then decide whether the feeble testimony of an obscure and unsettled logic (for such it is) could have been absolutely required to give conclusiveness to this impres sive collection of facts. If the life and doctrines of our Lord are insufficient to prove the truth of his pretension, (first admitted to be preternatural,) we must tell Lord Brougham that he will find it a hard task to establish the divinity (in the implied sense) of the Creator of this world against the Manichean system, which is more justly to be maintained than any system his lordship can reason out, until he has recourse to revealed religion for the key which reason has not found. His lordship has yet a further task than the mere proof of a creator before he has done with the atheist; he must meet the enormous difficulties of the question of natural evil before he can, with logical accuracy, "exclude either fraud or malice" from his creed; he must prove that unity of design cannot result from a combination of minds; he must prove that wisdom is consistent with the assumption of a moral system full of error and obscurity unenlight ened by revelation, or unaccounted for by the known fact that we “see but in part." In truth, natural theology cannot subsist but as a consequence of revelation, and has no value independent of it. It may, perhaps, form an elevating exercise to to a philosophic mind; but it cannot in possibility throw the faintest gleam of light upon the tumultuous waters of the world. Vir tues which the actual belief in revelation has but a very limited power to impress, which even prudential feeling is insufficient to guard, will scarcely be enforced by logic. Let the noble author search his own heart, and ask himself what his religion can effect. A second objection of his lordship's (for as such he must state it) is as fol lows: "Were our whole knowledge of the Deity drawn from revelation, its foundation must become weaker and weaker as the distance in point of time increases from the actual interposi tion." This objection, which proceeds from a misconception of the law of probable reasoning, has frequently been resorted to. We cannot here afford sufficient space to rectify the logical error in principle. Fortunately a special answer will be sufficient for the noble lord's statement. Time is altogether unconcerned in the evidence of revelation, as it actually stands upon the inductive laws of testimony and the evidence of consequences. It must be here observed, that the objection actually applies as much (though not in the same way) to the actual time as to any subsequent time. All who have believed without seeing believe upon testimony alone. In the first place, the oral testimony fulfilled the general law of evidence, which is founded on the induction of facts which ascertains the probability of a certain given accord of witnesses. Of this question, the only real elements are, their number, character, possible designs, and the possibilities of illusion. This will be conceded in our favour by the noble lord; and the question becomes as to the subsequent evidence to posterity. Suppose, now, a historical fact, without written documents, and without monuments, consequence, and continuity of existence; and we would concur with the noble lord in resolving the question into time. The laws of documentary evidence are liable to varied objections and difficulties, which we are not called upon to discuss further than to say that even of these there may be a degree of number, variety, unbroken continuity of tradition and universality of unquestioned reception, such as to amount to sufficient proof; and that when forgery, up to a very ascertainable period, can be disproved, the law of printed and published evidence is from that time totally independent of time, it becomes maintainable by all authority, and defies rational doubt. We simply assert this as rather evident to common sense; but it is not the fact that Christianity relies on documentary evidence: it relies on the existence of monuments: that is to say, doctrines and systems of belief, the whole body of religion and the entire frame of society, presenting effects for which (in probability) there can be found no other origin or cause; and last, the great argument of continuity. This argument we humbly offer to the consideration of the noble lord. "The whole history of Christianity implies, in each period, the precise events of that which went before it, until we are conducted to the beginning; with inevitable force of inference that this beginning cannot be any other than that pretended to by the Christian. The continued existence of Christianity may thus be found to present, of itself, the most unanswerable evidence."+ In fine, the "truths of revelation," we must contend against the noble lord, borrow no "proofs" from Natural Theology. The existence and attributes of God, even if we were to admit his lordship's theory, are not familiarly proved by every thing around us; and if they were, we must say that his lordship has wonderfully obscured this familiar proof. The great truth of religion was originally revealed; but nature never taught it. Nature taught idolatry and witchcraft. The record of the firmament was read amiss, and the Gentile world was convicted by the apostle of so misinterpreting it as to mistake the creature for the creator; from which he proves the necessity of some other source of light by an argument which we humbly beg to recommend to the noble lord. For that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them which believe."S Lord Brougham has, we suspect, felt in this last chapter the weakness of his own reasons, a consciousness often manifested by the appearance of such feeble special pleading as is not otherwise usual with the noble lord. He quotes Mr. Locke in support of the use of reason; "he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, Here the noble lord abandons his own positions. Having overrated the certainty of the inductive method, to apply it to God he underrates or altogether rejects it to assail the testimony of man. + Letters on the Philosophy of Unbelief. Romans, i. 20, 25. Fellowes, London. § Cor. i. 21. |