act, and with the same views. But when we so speak, and so reason, we are all the while referring to an intelligent principle or existence; we are referring to our mind, and not to our bodily frame. The agency which we infer from this reasoning is, therefore, a spiritual and immaterial agency-the working of something like our own mind-an intelligence like our own, though incomparably more powerful and more skilful. The being of whom we thus acquire a knowledge, and whose operations as well as existence we thus deduce from a process of inductive reasoning, must be a spirit, and wholly imma terial." In this statement the first thing that strikes the reader is the immense weight of inference which the noble writer lays upon the decision of a question so much and SO unsuccessfully agitated by philosophical inquirers of every age. This sense is by no means diminished when, upon following the argument, it is not found to be either very new or very decidedly convincing. As there are, amongst religious persons, some habitual notions which we are not desirous to offend, we shall, before making any comment, state in a few words the precise length and breadth of our own philosophy on this topic. We are strongly impressed with a habitual sense of the distinct nature and independent existence of the soul. For this we have, further, some strong reasons, but they do not amount to philosophical or logical proofs. We do not think that reason can decide the question; we do not believe its decision necessary to the truth of revelation, unless we find it asserted in Scripture; and if so, we consider the assertion to amount to a perfect proof. As to the assertion of immateriality, we should modify this statement. If revelation affirms it, we believe; because we take the doctrine upon the affirmation of God, and are ready to admit, that numberless modes of being may exist beyond the scope of our perceptions or powers of conception. But we cannot discover the slightest shadow of proof for such a belief. If, within the range of being, there exists an immaterial essence, we think it must be mind. We admit thought to be immaterial: but thought is not a thing; it is an operation. We know not, and we cannot conceive an immaterial form of being. To reason, the thought involves a contradiction; for all our distinct conceptions of being are so exclusively referred to material substance, that to remove it, is to annihilate the conception. Upon a question so little tangible to mere reason, it might seem strange that the noble lord should have so far staked his whole argument. The induction by which he proves the being of God, does not require it; for this argument rests upon three known terms of the analogy, by which is implied the existence of a fourth. The works of art are the effect of intelligence, however constituted; and the similar characters in the phenomena of nature are, by the inductive rule, referred also to intelligence. As to the actual constitution of either of these intelligences, nothing is implied. There is no rea sonable ground to limit that agency which is thus implied to any particular modification of substance, or of nonsubstantiality. Why, then, it may be asked, has the necessity of this step been affirmed by the noble lord? We can only conjecture. He desired to extend his theory to the proof of the immateriality of the Deity; and to effect this, he thought it was absolutely necessary to preserve the exactness of his analogy, by proving the immateriality of his second term man. The logical necessity was, as we have shown, but seeming. That the noble writer's proof fails, is shown by Mr. Wallace, who follows its separate steps with considerable acuteness and force of reasoning, but with a length of comment which our more restricted space, and much more extended purpose, does not permit us to follow; and the more so, as we cannot quit this topic without a few words to estimate the actual extent to which it is possible to attain any distinct knowledge upon it. For the logical scrutiny of the noble lord's statement, we refer to Mr. Wallace; and in doing so, we must, in justice to * See the previous extract. this gentleman, add a passing word on his "Observations." If ever any controversial essay deserved the high praise of exhibiting a fair, manly application of sound common sense and nice logical tact to the dissipation of subtle fallacy, the learned gentleman's commentary deserves it. As we perused his able and well-written essay, and recollected the age, the high professional reputation and laborious life of the writer, our thoughts reverted to his opening description of the Roman patriot, retiring from a life of honorable public duty to the calmer, but not less dignified studies of philosophic retreat; and it struck us forcibly, that the graceful compliment which applies to the noble person with whom he is about to break the lance of controversy, is, at least, as justly due to himself. The pleasing fancy has, perhaps, often been realized, but never more honorably than upon an occasion like the present. The notion of an immaterial essence has arisen from a species of intellectual necessity; the impossibility of conceiving the supposed attributes of spirit as belonging to any modification of material substance. This difficulty, by a very evident process, led to the vague notion of immaterial being Such a modification may exist in the nature of things; but still, the notion is perfectly gratuitous, whether referred to reason or revelation. Reason cannot discover any distinct limit to the possible properties of material substance; nor can it become acquainted with mind, otherwise than by its acts, perceptible by consciousness. It is at once perceptible that these acts are perfectly different from the commom properties of matter, so far as they are known; but it does not follow that matter is not invested with other properties of which we can have no perceptions. It is to be remarked, that the properties of mind are perceivable by a consciousness which does not extend beyond itself. Without sight we should be without a notion of the most glorious property of matter, which is actually known; so, without some modification of our spiritual being, we are, perhaps, similarly excluded from other still more wondrous properties. For any information to be VOL. VI. derived from reasoning, gravitation might be a mental action of material substance. There is, in the nature of things, no limit to the possible properties, extent, or subtilization of matter. The assumption, that matter must needs be uniformly resolvable into its component parts, is purely gratuitous, when the assertion is hazarded beyond the limit of our perceptions and means of experiment; and it is equally gratuitous to affirm that the spiritual substance must, if material, needs conform itself to all the changes of the fleshly substance. In the universal scale of adaptation, that which is designed to pass through the cycles of earthly change, is framed to change, fall to dust, and be renewed in other forms; that which is destined to remain, endures unimpaired amidst all change, though the microscope of physical research may vainly scrutinize the dust of mortality to find it. the light of revelation, there is a strong Indeed, before we have recourse to probability, afforded by the contemplation of creation, of the material universe is material-a provision, to constitution of our future being. The and organized existence. This fact does our conceptions infinite, for material not, of course, lead to the conclusion that there may not be an unbodied interval between two states, in which we may for some time exist after a mode different from either the initial or the final mode. But it makes the supposition more gratuitous, as appears less conformable to any known scheme. it Upon the question as to the essential nature of the soul, revelation is, we believe, silent, although the distinction which it makes between the flesh and the spirit, (if not referred to the idiom of popular language,) appear to favor the notion that they are things substantially distinct. Upon another topic which we have noticed, it is more explicit. The most express passages which occur on the subject, are those in the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, where the question is supposed," With what body do they come?" The answer of St. Paul is the more observable, because it seems to imply a material principle in the parallel which 2 K tion. 66 he assumes, and still more because it is adapted to meet some of the real difficulties of the doctrine of resurrecThou sowest not that body that shall be." Again, "There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial;" and, "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." Here three things are implied: something is raised that has been sown. That thing is distinct from that which it has been sown with; and lastly, though called spirit, it is also, at the same time, called body. Thus, then, the Scripture bears us company so far as Christian doctrine requires. To the objection suggested by the phenomena of decay, it offers distinctly the proof that these phenomena have their limit where the boundary of spiritual substance begins: and the limitary line thus suggested, is not altogether visionary; for on any assumption it will still be admitted, that mind is a substance, sui generis. The sternest materialist, too, cannot, on any plausible ground, deny that it is possible that there may exist some ultimate indecomposable portion of material substance, not to be resolved into separate elements. Upon this point there is absolutely no knowledge, and the possibilities are unlimited; and the only affirmation that can be made on sure ground is, that however constituted, whether an essence, or effluence, or invisible vapor, or impalpable atom, the soul is immortal; because we have the word of God that it is to survive the empire of the grave. So far are we with the noble lord, and to this extent we should gladly have availed ourselves of his philosophy. Many of his conclusions upon this subject, so far as he reasons, from the natural indications of "the mind and body running courses widely different:" as to the immortal nature of the mind, we frankly agree with. But, with this limitation to our consent, these indications amount not to proof, but simply exhibit pleasing confirmation of truth otherwise known, and perfectly independent of such confirmations. As to the probable designs of Divine Providence, we have no other objec tion to offer to his lordship's commentary, but that, setting out in a spirit of religious humility, and assuming a tone of philosophic moderation, he gradually loses sight of both; and having seriously overstated the evidences of Natural Religion, and still more understated those of revelation, he leaves the truth of religion to be assailed at all points upon the authority of his lordship's dicta. We grant the moderaation of the actual authority which he claims for natural religion; and we trust he is sincere in his implied acknowledgments of revelation. But we venture to predict to his lordship, that his professions will not receive the same credit from the numerous and motley academics who have so long looked up to his lordship as their principium et fons. His reasonings will be carried to their consequences, as such reasonings have ever been; and the accompanying caution will be attributed to the political reserve of which many eminent philosophers have left examples. But we disclaim all unworthy imputations; and simply looking to the fact, that by following the same course with this discourse of the noble lord's, numerous writers, and still more numerous thinkers, have reached two fallacious conclusions; one, the competency of human reason to supersede revealed religion; the other, the inconsistency of those philo sophical discoveries with revelation. As it is our desire to enter with some fulness upon this most momentous question, we must apologize for leaving untouched many lesser topics worthy of notice in the different sections of this discourse, in order to examine how far his lordship is warranted in the affirmation, that "our own highest destinies are involved in the results of the investigation." The noble author clearly perceives the objections to which the extension of Natural Theology which he proposes is liable; but he presumes that it is to be remedied by the application of inductive reasoning. In tracing out the means of this application, he not only neglects to perceive the important fact, that he reasons away the entire value * Verse 36, 37. of this method, and wholly alters its character: but that, in point of fact, if his notions are to be received, the only consequence that can follow is, that the large class of theorists who have darkened this and every other subject of speculation with vain reasonings, have never, in reality, used any other method. Like the person who did not know that he had been speaking prose all his days, these metaphysical gentlemen were ignorant of their real strength: that they have ever been, or may, by a little such dexterity as the discourse overflows with, and metaphysics has ever had at will, be proved to be inductive reasoners. which infers from this analogy is Inductive still. In all such reasoning the inference is but probable. The inductive principle is, that the laws of nature are uniform; and that therefore a known relation may be assumed to be universal. Different classes of phenomena offer more or less possibility of exception, and demand different methods of observation, as well as different laws of calculation. And in these different classes, as the laws become more constant, and the reasoning more uniform, the subject becomes nearer to the nature of a science. Applying these considerations to Not the least of our charges is the the argument from final causes-and undertone of misrepresentation which admitting its inductive character-it runs throughout. In his anxiety to must still appear to be as restricted in break down all distinctions between its application and degree of assurance, causes and purposes, he has hazarded as if we made no such admission. Not the strong argument from which is to lay too much stress on the reader's inferred the existence of a Creator, by attention; instead of stating this disa method of statement which confuses tinction abstractly, we shall state a it with second causes. In like mancase: Suppose two pieces of unknown ner, in his very able view of the machinery to be found: the first ina priori argument, he cannot help ferences are, that they are both the confusing inductive reasoning with result of intelligent design; this is the simple experience. If we admit argument from an effect to a cause; that an idea not to be had "apart and it is the more certain because from experience," constitutes induction, founded on an analogy without known Euclid becomes an inductive science; exception. The next inference is as for we cannot, without experience, form to the purpose (or final cause), and the idea of a point, a line, or a dis- from the identity of construction it is tance; and it follows that theology is hastily inferred that the purpose of one and the same science with geome- both is the same. A more intelligent try. We should congratulate the noble observer, however, discovers by chance, lord upon this extension of his creed, that one of these machines was found which is the more charitable, as it must in a watchmaker's work-shop; the bring within the pale of religion many other, in that of a person known as who can have no other pretension: the inventor of some other species of but we regret to be obliged to suggest automatic machinery. A new inthat the mode by which an idea is ference is immediately suggested. One acquired, has nothing to do with the has discovered a new construction for logical use which may be made of it. a timepiece; the other, perhaps of a We fear that, in a needless anxiety to carriage, or a loom, or perhaps of a make all reasoning inductive, he has chess-playing or a talking machine. only illustrated the fact, that the force Now, of these inferences, it must be and certainty of inference does not observed, that the very first is in no depend altogether upon this universal way altered by the comparative uncerargument, but as we have already tainty of the others. It owed its ceraffirmed upon the nature of the tainty to two facts, the constancy of subject and the evidence of its facts. the induction and its generality; whereas the others wanted both these properties. Such is the difference between the two methods, as exemplified in the same case. But further, there is a higher degree of certainty in favor of the watchmaker's purpose The value of an induction depends upon the certainty of the facts; the distinctness with which they are defined and interpreted; and the precision of that analogy which subsists between the cases compared. The argument than that of the projector. The first belongs to a numerous class all similarly occupied; the second is a person sui generis; his purposes are various and unlimited within our knowledge we know not the full scope of his designs, and have no analogy-the induction fails, not because it is inapplicable in principle, but because, in fact, it cannot be applied. Some other means of investigation must be had recourse to: we must go and ask. The argument from final causes is of the highest importance, whether we look to its use or its abuse. And it is that branch of human reason, the abuses of which are most insidious. The great foundation of error is the want of some precise scale of conclusive value. This may be supplied by distinguishing the modes of application of which it is capable; and the respective value of each. First, when the contrivance and effect are both to be seen, the inference is of the most perfect order of physical induction. Second, when apparent contrivance is observed, there is still an inductive argument, complete so far as to prove that there is some purpose; incomplete as to the actual purpose. In this latter case, its value is to govern conjecture; and it is to be estimated by the degree in which the possible purposes can be limited. In such an estimate there are some important considerations to be kept in view. The instance may be a case within the ascertained analogies of some known science which affords collateral guidance; or it may generally be found within the broader analogy of the laws of physical na ture; or more uncertain still, it may be referred to the less uniform experience of human purposes; or, lastly, it may be referred to our knowledge of some Being whose existence can be proved, by reasonings which are also competent to prove that he must be very imperfectly and inadequately known. Such is the distinction which we humbly conceive to be too frequently confused by several writers, who attribute too much or too little weight to this method, by omitting to notice that it changes its nature as it is applied within or without the limits of our knowledge of first causes. It is to be recollected, that the nature of physical experiment, is to reason from the uniformity or uniform variation of effects; and that however the immediate nature of observation may be varied, it is from this principle that in physics, the induction derives its main certainty. It is because, from a given cause there is a calculable result; or it is because, in the elimination of accidental causes, the sameness of some main cause can be experimentally tried. In metaphysics, there is no such principle of constant comparison. Unconscious of other minds, the reasoner sees others only in effects; and these complicated beyond the utmost powers of the most refined analysis; there is (it is true) a broad and loose analogy, sufficient for the experience of life, for the moralist and preacher. But all the metaphysical skill of ages has only served to make manifest how little it presents for the generalizations of strict sci ence. To the question actually under debate, although we are far from thinking it the most judicious way to meet it, we may apply the negative species of induction, already authorised by his lordship; and ask whether we have not a sufficient induction of facts to prove that no system of religion can be derived from the argument from final causes. For this we might enu merate the uniform failures of the phi losopher. We might generally corroborate this argument, by noticing that the progress of knowledge so far from holding out any hope of perfecting such a method, has been rather to bring it into discredit, not merely by failures, but by defining the actual principles of human knowledge. We might still further entrench ourselves by accounting for any pretended instance to the contrary; and showing that the known uniformity of the physical laws of nature, is highly favorable to conjectures founded on certain ascertained principles. The arrangements of the external world, are known to be for certain purposes which are all of the same class, namely, physical effects; and therefore any discovered arrangement, not only ascertains that there is a purpose, but suggests what that purpose is likely to be. Still the noble lord is aware that the chances of a false conjecture are numerous in proportion to the compli |