New York & Harlem R. R. Co. 3 Sandf. 625; McRae v. Wilming ton Raleigh R. R. Co. 17 Conn. 56; Enfield Toll-bridge v. The Hartford & New Haven R. R. Co. 17 Coun. 56;) Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken, 1 Wall. 150-1. As to what a ferry privilege is, see Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black. 603; Hartford Bridge Co. V. Union Ferry Co. 29 Conn. 210. It may be granted by Kentucky without the concurrent assent of Ohio. Id. (Cites Trustees of Newport v. Taylor, 6 J. J. Marsh, 134) A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a particular Define a thing. (Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 197; Green v. Biddle, contract? 8 Wheat. 92; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 256, 297, 302, 316, 160. 335; Gordon v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. Rep. 319.) Story's Const. § 1376. only does This provision has never been understood to embrace other con- To what tracts than those which respect property, or some object of value, contracts and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. the inhibiDartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wh. 629. A private charter tion apply? is such a contract. Id. 518. So also an act incorporating a banking institution. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; Planter's Bank v. Sharp, 6 Id. 301; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 Id. 304. And a grant of land by the legislature of a State. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Id. 43. And so is a compact between two States. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wh. 1; Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumn. 276. And see 2 Pars. on Cont. 509. An appointment to a salaried office, however, is not a contract, within the meaning of the Constitution. Butler V. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 418; Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322; Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Barr, 49; Jones v. Shaw, 15 Tex. 577. All contracts are subject to the right of eminent domain existing in the several States; and the exercise of this power does not conflict with the Constitution. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 14 Id. 80; The State v. De Lesdernier, 7 Tex. 99. It is a compact between two or more persons. (Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 136; s. c. 2 Pet. Cond. 321.) Story's Const. 1376. A law of a State, issuing transferable swamp land-scrip, and exempting the land from taxation, for ten years or until reclaimed, constituted a contract, between the State and the holders of the land-scrip, issued under the act. McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wallace, -156. 160. tion a An act of incorporation is a contract between the State and the Is an act of stockholders. All courts, at this day, are estopped from question- incorporaing the doctrine. (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 418.) contract? The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wallace, 72. Such contracts are construed liberally by the government. The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wallace, 74. Nothing is to be taken by intendment against the State. The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wallace, 75; The Charles River Bridge, 11 Peters, 544; Jefferson Br. Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black. 446. But the State may grant franchises by reference to another statute on the same subject-matter. What contracts are included? 155. What of retrospective laws? 571. 155-156. Id. After the grant of such franchises, the restraint is upon the Id. The Supreme Court of the United States will determine for It includes executory as well as executed contracts. (Fletcher v. Because the State is not a single sovereign, but a part of the Also express and implied contracts. The grantor is estopped by And assessments upon the stockholders of banks which have gone into liquidation. Commonwealth v. Cochituate Bank, 3 Allen, Mass. 42. 158. MERELY RETROSPECTIVE.-Because a law is merely retrospective, does not bring it within the prohibition. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wallace, 173. The Constitution does not prohibit the States from passing retrospective laws generally, but only ex post facto laws. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110. Retrospective laws, divesting vested rights, are impolitic and unjust; but they are not ex post facto laws within the meaning of the Constitution, nor repugnant to its provisions (Albee v. May, 2 Payae. 74), unless they impair the obligation of a contract. Baltimore & Susquehanna R. R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 401. Should a statute declare, contrary to the general principles of law, that contracts founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration, whether in existence at the time of passing the statute, or which might hereafter be entered into, should nevertheless be valid and binding upon the parties, all would admit the retrospective character of the enactment; but it would not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 412; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 10; Aspinwall v. The Commissioners, &c., 22 How. 365; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wh. 628. For the same inhibitions in the Constitution of Texas, see Paschal's Annotated Dig. 168, 170. The prohibition has no reference to the degree of impairment. The largest and least are alike forbidden. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 12 Wheat. 257; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 84; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 552; Planter's Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327; Farnsworth v. Reaves, 2 Coldwell, 111. Its value must not be diminished by legislation. (Planter's Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327.) Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 553. That is directly, and not incidentally, and only by consequence. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 553. The States may abolish imprisonment for debt. Beers v. Houghton, 9 Peters, 359; Mason v. Haile, 12 Peters, 373; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Peters, 200.) Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 553. 157-160 159. EXEMPTIONS.-And the States may exempt from forced How do sale the necessary implements of agriculture, the tools of a me- exemption laws impair chanic, and articles of necessity in household furniture-the things contracts? which in civilized communities belong to the remedy. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 553. The exact limit between right and remedy must be determined in every case upon its own circumstances. Id. If the right be impaired the law is void. (Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 Howard, 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608.) Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 554. The question between the remedy and the other parts of the contract cannot be considered res integra. (1 Kent's Com. 456; Sedg. on Stat. and Const. Law, 652; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 379.) Id. A State may disable itself by contract from exercising its taxing power in particular cases. (New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 166; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Piqua Branch v. Knoop, 16 How. 331.) Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 554. 157 The legal obligation of a contract consists in the remedy given In what by law to enforce its performance, or to make compensation for the does the legal obligafailure of performance. Johnson v. Higgens, 3 Metcf. (Ky.), 566. tion consist? A law which forbade the rendering of judgments for a given time was constitutional. Id. So, where a State has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and tax, to meet its engagements, the power cannot be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied. (People v. Bell, 10 California, 570; Dominic v. Sayre, 3 Sand. 555.) Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 554. It is a trust which neither the State nor corporation can annul. Id. 160. STAY LAWS.-Statutes relating to levies on executions How do may be applicable to levies made before their enactment, as they stay laws impair affect the remedy and not the right. Grosvenor v. Chesley, 48 contracts? Maine, 369; Coriell v. Ham, 4 Greene (Iowa), 455; Swift v. Flet- 159 cher, Minn. 550. But redemption laws, as to judgments upon anterior contracts, are unconstitutional. Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 572; Iglehart v. Wolfin, 20 Ind. 32. And the laws for the release and discharge of securities. Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550. So of laws allowing the debtor to remove without subjecting his property to sale, so far as concerns judgment liens accruing prior to their passage. Tillotson v. Millard, 7 Minn. 513. The legislature cannot extend the time for redeeming lands sold at tax sales. Robinson v. House, 13 Wis. 341. Nor apply appraisement laws to anterior contracts. Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa (2 With.), 470. How will The Supreme Court of the United States will determine for itself, the S. C. conirrespective of the decision of the State courts, what is a contract strue? By what C. of U. S. within the meaning of the Constitution. Jefferson Branch Bank v. will the S. Skelley, 1 Black, 443. A law authorizing a redemption of property be governed sold by forced sale, impairs the obligation of a contract, and is in defining a unconstitutional as to mortgages and contracts of anterior date to contract? 155, 109. Do laws only impair? the redemption law. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612-615; Gantly v. Ewing, 3 How. 716–7; Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. 464-5; Bunn v. Gorgus, 41 Penn. St. R. 441; Weaver v. Mailot, 15 La. 395; Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Penn. St. R. 324. The legislature of a State has a right to bind the State by contract, so as to exempt persons, corporations, and things from taxation. The Richmond R. R. Co. v. The Louisa R. R. Co. 13 How. 71; Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 33; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cr. 164; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 447-8. But the intention to exempt must be clear. Id.; Gilman v. The City of Sheboygan, 2 Black, 513. And the privilegia favorabilia will be narrowly construed. Rector, &c. v. The County of Philadelphia, 24 How. 302. 161. LAWS WHICH AFFECT THE REMEDY ONLY.-Where there which affect is no direct constitutional prohibition, a State may pass retrospectthe remedy ive laws, such as in their operation may affect suits pending, and give to a party a remedy which he did not previously possess, or modify an existing remedy, or remove an impediment in the way of legal proceedings. (Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts, 300; Shenly v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. State, 57; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 325.) Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 175. The legislature may pass private acts authorizing sales by administrators, in a different manner from the general statutes regulating the subject. (Mason v. Wait, 4 Scam. 134.) Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 216-7. Judicial sales of lands to pay the debts of a decedent's estate, are in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and the purchaser need only look to the order of sale. The State court is presumed to have correctly settled every judicial question, including the constitutionality of the act of assembly. (Grignon v. Astor, 3 How. 319.) Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 216. The inhibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is upon the States not the United States. (Evans v. Eaton, 1 Pet. C. C. Rep. 322; In the matter of Klein, 1 How. 277; Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill, 325.) Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 453. What of usurious conti: cts? Costs? The cases which draw the distinction between ex post facto laws; the laws impairing the obligation of contracts; retrospective laws, and laws which only affect the remedy, will be found fully collected in Paschal's Annotated Digest, notes 61, 157, 168, 410, 1107-1109. And for a very learned and exhaustive treatise upon the whole subject, see Story's Const. Book III. ch. XXXIV., § 1374-1400. The States may pass laws validating contracts which were usurious and void when made. Welsh v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149. But not to operate unreasonably and unjustly upon antecedent rights. Id. And may change the interest laws relieving from penalties. Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68. And the laws of costs as to pending suits. Taylor v. Keeler, 30 Conn. 324. But not the compensation of rights already vested. State v. Auditor, 33 Miss. 287. And providing for the validity of marriages. Goshen v. Richman, 4 Allen (Mass.), 458. And changing the presumptions in favor of tax sales. Hickor v. Tallman, 38 Barb. Evidence? N. Y. 608. And curing irregularities in conveyances, as to the parties and subsequent purchasers; but not to disturb vestod Conveyrights. Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292. ances? the inhibi the States consent of [2] No State shall, without the consent of the What are Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or ex- tions upon ports, except what may be absolutely necessary for without the executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of Congress? all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. [3.] No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships-of-war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. 162. For the definitions of " "imposts " and "duties" see 75-77. notes 75 to 77. For a history of this clause, see journals of the Convention, 222, 227, 275, 301, 303, 318, 377 and 378. 138. 274. "AN IMPOST OR DUTY ON IMPORTS," is a custom or tax levied What is a on articles brought into the country. Brown v. Maryland, 12 duty on Wheat. 446, 447. Imports are things imported-the articles them- imports? selves which are brought into the country. It is not merely a duty on the act of importation, but it is a duty on the thing imported. It is not confined to a duty levied while the article is entering the country, but extends to a duty levied after it has entered the country. (Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446, 447.) Story's 86-89. Const. § 1019; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 199-201. The power to impose duties on imports is exclusive in Congress. Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 479. A charge on vessels by the State for the benefit of the master and warders of the port is unconstitutional. The Southern Steamship Company v. The Master, &c. 6 Wall. It was really intended to make the vast inter-state commerce as nearly free as possible. The ordinance of the city of Houston requiring wharfage duties of steamboats, does not infringe this provision of the Constitution. Sterrett v. Houston, 14 Tex. 166. "EXCI PT WHAT MAY BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY."-This is the Necessary? strongest qualification of " necessary See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Kent's Com. 398-401; Story's Const. § 1033. |