Subject out, whereof the Predicate is not faid, According to the former Senfe of Univerfality it is not neceffary that in every concluding Syllogifin one Propofition be univerfal. But according to the latter Senfe of Univerfality(which indeed is the moft proper Senfe of it) it is certainly neceffary. And I dare challenge any Man to fhew me one Inftance of a concluding Syllogifm that has not one Propofition univerfal in the latter Senfe. For even a fingular Propofition is thus univerfal, fince being indivifible, it can have nothing faid of it, but what is faid of it wholly and univerfally, adóns, as Ariftotle expreffes it. The Author may fee a further Ac count of this in Dr. Wallis his Thefis de Propofi tione fingulari, at the latter end of his Inftitutio Logica.

THESE, Sir, are the most confiderable Paffages that at once reading I thought liable to Reflection in this Work, which, notwithftanding these few Erratas, I think to be a very extraordinary Performance, and worthy of the moft publick Honour and Refpect. And tho I do not approve of every particular thing in this Book, yet I must fay that the Author is juft fuch a kind of Writer as I like, one that has thought much, and well, and who freely writes what he thinks. I hate your Common-place Men of all the Writers in the World, who tho' they happen fometimes to fay things that are in themfelves not only true, but confiderable, yet they never write in any Train or Order of Think

ing, which is one of the greatest Beauties of Compofition.

But this Gentleman is a Writer of a very different Genius and Complexion of Soul, and whofe Character I cannot eafily give, but muft leave it either to the Defcription of fome finer Pen, or to the filent Admiration of Pofterity. Only one Feature of his Difpofition I am concern'd to point out, which is, that he feems to be a Perfon of fo great Ingenuity and Candor, and of a Spirit fo truly Philofophical, that I have thence great and fair Inducements to belive that he will not be offended with that Freedom I have used in thefe Reflections, which were not intended for the leffening his Fame, but folely for the promoting of Truth and right Thinking.

AND this will justifie that part of the Refletions, where agreeing with the Author in the Propofition intended to be proved, I lay open the Infufficiency of his Proofs. For to say that a thing is falfe for fuch Reasons, when 'tis not falfe for fuch Reasons, though it be abfolutely false, is as great an Injury to Truth, as to fay a thing is false when 'tis not falfe. A falfe Inference is as much as an Untruth, as a falfe Conclufion; and accordingly he that might reflect upon the Conclufion if falfe, may with as much reafon reflect upon a wrong way of inferring it, tho' the Conclufion it felf be true. Which 1 mention with refpect to the former Part about Innate Principles, where though I agree

with the Author in the thing denied, yet I think his Reasons are not cogent.

AFTER all, notwithstanding my diffenting from this Author in fo many things, I am perhaps as great an Admirer of him as any of his most sworn Followers, and would not part with his Book for half a Vatican. But every Writer has his Alloy, and I exempt not any Writings of my own from the like Defects: Of which perhaps, Sir, I have been convincing you all this while. But that fhall not trouble me, if at the fame time I may be able to convince you of my Readiness to serve you at any rate, as it highly becomes,

SIR,

Your Obliged and

Humble Servant,

J. N.

A

33

A Brief Confideration of the REMARKS made upon the foregoing REFLECTIONS by the Gentlemen of the ATHENIAN SOCIETY, in the Supplement to the Third Volume, &c.

HE Gentlemen of this new Society undertake two things, to Report, and T to Judge of the Contents of the most

confiderable Books that are Printed in England; which I acknowledge to be a very ufeful and laudable Undertaking, if performed Skilfully and Faithfully, with Judgment and Integrity. But whether they have thus acquitted themselves in reference to the foregoing Reflections, the Liberty they have taken with the Author, will I think warrant him to Examin.

SUPPLEMENT, Pag. 2. Paragraph 1. It will be fufficient to obferve that Mr. Norris is a Cartefian, and as it seems, of thofe of the Cartefians that are of Father Malebranche's Opinion. This occafions that being full of thefe Thoughts, he seems not always to have well comprehended his meaning whom he Criticifes upon. Why the being a Cartefian, and according to the way of M. Malebranche, fhould make me lefs apt to comprehend Mr. Lock's Book, I cannot divine. Were the thing it felf never fo true, yet I think the Reafon here given of it, is as odd as may be. But 'twill be time enough to feek out for the

Reafon

Reafon of my misunderstanding Mr. Lock's Book, when it is better proved than at present, that I have done fo. But as to that, if Mr. Lock himself had told me fo, his bare Authority without any Reason would have obliged me to fufpect my Apprehension, and to think once again; it being a Deference owing to every Author to fuppofe that he best understands his own Meaning. But from you, Gentlemen, who ftand on the fame Level with me, I expect Reason, and upto be fhewn where and how I have mistaken him. For the prefent I am rather apt to think that I have comprehended Mr. Lock's Senfe well enough, but that you understand neither Me, nor Mr. Lock.

PARAGR. 2. He upbraideth Mr. Lock of attempting to treat of Ideas, without defining what he understood by this Word. Here is a falfe Report. I did not cenfure Mr. Lock for undertaking to dif courfe of Ideas, without premifing a Definition, of the Name or Word, (for that I grant he has done) but for offering to account for their Origination, without giving a Definition, or any Account of the thing. My Words are, But fure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defined what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Origination. And again, This therefore ought to have been his first and indeed main Bufinefs, to bave given us an account of the Nature of Ideas: And yet this is not only neglected in its proper Place, but wholly omitted and pals'd