DISORDERED ACTION OF THE WILL. CHAPTER I. NATURE OF THE WILL. § 234. On the relation of the Will to the other parts of the Mind. It cannot fail to have been noticed, that our inquiries hitherto have proceeded upon the important principle, which is now generally acknowledged to be a correct one, of a threefold division of the mind, viz., the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. Having considered the subject before us, very briefly, it is true, in connexion with the two first-mentioned departments, we proceed now to the only remaining topic, viz., the Disordered Action of the Will. The Will is a department of the Mind, evidently standing by itself; having its distinct nature and attributes, as well as its appropriate laws. The purely intellectual acts have something peculiar and characteristic, which shuts them out, as it were, from the region of the Sensibilities. The Sensitive action, as well as the Intellectual, has its specific nature; something by which it is known and distinguished from other forms of mental movement. The Will also stands apart, having its appropriate sphere and its allotted duties; holding, as it were, the place of keystone to the arch, and exercising a sort of supervisory and authoritative power over the other departments of the mind. The philosophy of the Will, considered in its regular or normal action, is a subject of great importance and interest; nor will it be found wholly wanting in interest when considered in reference to those irregularities of action of which it is sometimes the subject. § 235. Of the attribute of Power as existing in the Will. The subject of the disordered action and insanity of the Will will be found, in its basis or origin, to have relation, in nearly all cases, to the attribute of Power. It will be noticed, that we take it for granted that there is such a thing as power. In other words, that power, notwithstanding the fact of its not being directly cognizable by the outward senses (as it is not), is something positive and real; something which can be estimated to some extent, and which can be made a subject of examination, reasoning, and opinion. Accordingly, every man is supposed to know what power is, although it may be very true that it is not a direct object of the sight or hearing, or any of the outward senses. And not only this. It is a fact also, for which we have the testimony of our consciences, that, although it does not exist in the form of a separate faculty analogous to perception or memory, it exists, nevertheless, as an attribute of the whole mind, and is diffused, in a greater or less degree, through all its faculties. In other words, we have an original feeling or conviction, originating in the facts of our consciousness, that in every exercise or operation of the mind there is, and must be, power. And this is not all. Power is not only, in general terms, predicable of the mind as a whole, but it is particularly and emphatically so of the department of the Will. If the other mental acts clearly indicate to us the existence of an innate energy, certainly we should not expect to find less of energy, less of power, existing as the basis of acts of the will. When a person wills to go to a certain place, or wills to do a certain thing, it requires no train of reasoning to convince him that power is the basis of the volition, and, consequently, that power truly exists as an attribute of the voluntary or volitive nature. § 236. Of the degree of Power existing in the Will. We are not to suppose that the power which exists in the Will is unlimited in degree. The degree of power is different in different minds; but in all cases it may be regarded as a fixed and definite thing; capable of a certain amount of action, or of sustaining a certain degree of pressure, but utterly inefficient beyond that amount or degree. The Will, therefore, may, under certain circum stances, be overburdened and oppressed in its action. We may expect too much from it; and it may not answer to our requisitions, merely because it is unable to. It may be thrown into a wrong position by the excited state and the inordinate action of other parts of the mind. It may be undermined by a crazy belief, or trammelled by an invincible association. For these and for other reasons, it may fail (and, in point of fact, this is not unfrequently the case) to discharge successfully its appropriate offices. § 237. Of Positive in distinction from Relative disorder of the Will. Accordingly, a disordered or alienated condition of the Will is as frequently relative as positive. That is to say (and this is an important consideration, which it may be well to keep in mind), it fails to fulfil the duties which pertain to it as a voluntary power, as frequently, and probably more so, in consequence of the disordered action of other parts of the mind, as in consequence of any absolute defect inherent in itself. Nevertheless, there are some cases where it is evident that the defective voluntary action is to be ascribed, not so much to any perplexities and hinderances which lay out of the will, as to something which nature herself may be said to have wrought into it. CHAPTER II. IMBECILITY OF THE WILL. - § 238. Of natural weakness or imbecility of the Will. ONE of the forms in which a disordered will developes itself is that of Imbecility or inordinate Weakness. We not unfrequently see persons who develope this trait of mind; men who are easily intimidated, vacillating, who affirm when they should deny, and deny when they should affirm; who, in common parlance, and almost in strict truth, "have no will of their own." Their minds are essentially in the condition of a paralytic limb, that may be acted upon, but without giving any signs of vitality in itself. Sometimes these persons possess a considerable share of natural intellectual vigour; but it is almost of no avail, since their voluntary energy is not sufficient to bring it into permanent action. They sometimes form plans, but generally exhaust themselves in the incipient efforts, and the execution is a NON SEQUITUR ! They would be wholly useless in society, were it not that they can be acted on by others, and thus be kept in a sort of automatic movement by means of other person's wills substituted in the place of their own. K K |