more or less restricted, the operation of this power appears to be entirely unobstructed. It might, perhaps, be suggested here, that the disordered action does not exist so much in the reasoning power, in itself considered, as in that antecedent state of mind, whatever it is, which furnishes the premises upon which the ratiocinative process is based. That is

to say, the reasoning process goes well in itself, but is upon a wrong track. It arrives at an erroneous issue, because it started from a wrong point.

A man, for instance, believes that he is made of glass. He reasons correctly, in deducing the conclusion from premises of this kind, that he must move slowly and cautiously. Another person believes that he is a plant; an idea which is said to have taken possession of one of the Bourbon princes. He reasons correctly when he goes into the garden and insists on being watered in common with the plants around him. Another, again, believes that he is a king; and he reasons correctly in requiring for himself the homage suited to a king, and in expressing dissatisfaction on account of its being withheld.

In all such cases, it is very true that the fundamental error is in the premises. Nevertheless, when we consider that reasoning must necessarily have its preliminaries or basis, and that the true idea of reasoning, at least in the higher sense of the term, embraces premises as well as conclusion, we shall not hesitate to speak of such reasoning as has been mentioned, although erroneous in the incipient rath

er than the deductive stage, as on the whole wrong, perverted, or insane.

§ 147. Instance of the foregoing form of perverted

Reasoning.

We have an instance of the form of mental disorder just described, namely, that which is limited to a particular subject or class of subjects, in the character of Don Quixote. Cervantes, it will be recollected, represents the hero of his Work as having his naturally good understanding perverted by the perusal of certain foolish, romantic stories, falsely purporting to be a true record of knights and deeds of chivalry. These books, containing the history of dwarfs, giants, necromancers, and other preternatural extravagance, were zealously perused, until the head of Don Quixote was effectually turned by them. Although he was thus brought into a state of real mental derangement, it was limited to the extravagances which have been mentioned. We are expressly informed, that in all his conversations and replies, he gave evident proofs of a most excellent understanding, and never "lost the stirrups" except on the subject of chivalry. On this subject he "was crazed."-Accordingly, when the barber and curate visited him on a certain occasion, the conversation happened to turn on what are termed reasons of state, and on modes of administration; and Don Quixote spoke so well on every topic as to convince them that he was quite sound, and had recovered the right exercise of his judgment. But something being unadvisedly said about the Turkish

war, the knight at once remarked, with much solemnity and seriousness, that his majesty had nothing to do but to issue a proclamation, commanding all the knights-errant in Spain to assemble at his court on a certain day; and, although not more than half a dozen should come, among these one would be found who would alone be sufficient to overthrow the whole Turkish power.

When the subject of conversation turned upon war, which had so near a connexion with shields, and lances, and all the associations of chivalry, it came within the range of his malady, and led to the absurd remark, which showed at once the unsoundness of his mind, notwithstanding the sobriety and good sense which he had just before exhibited.

§ 148. Of disordered Reasoning arising from a disordered state of the other powers of the Mind. All the powers of the mind have a connexion, more or less close, with each other. Hence their action may be said, in reference to this connexion, to be a conditional one. Consequently, if the condition fails, the action fails. As an illustration, the exercise of the reasoning power implies, as the necessary condition of its own existence, the antecedent exercise of memory, of relative suggestion, of the external and internal perceptive powers, and also of the susceptibility of belief. It is obvious that disorder cannot attach to any one of these without indirectly affecting any power which, although it may be distinct, is, nevertheless, in some sense built upon them. Hence the reasoning power is often Y

disordered, in consequence of derangement in some one of these powers, or in some other part of the mind, with which its action is particularly connected.

We make here this general remark, as one which it may be important to keep in mind, without deeming it necessary to dwell upon it.

§ 149. Of readiness of Reasoning in the partially

insane.

Those, who have been personally acquainted with the intellectual condition of the partially insane, have sometimes observed in them great quickness of thought in some little emergencies, and an unusual degree of cunning. When, for instance, an attempt has been made to seize and confine them, they steadily and promptly mark the motions of their pursuers; they rapidly decipher their intentions from their countenance, and cause them no small degree of perplexity. In particular, it has been observed in some instances that they discover more fluency of expression and rapidity of deduction than others of a perfectly sound mind, or than themselves could have exhibited before their derangement. This singular fact is to be briefly explained.

The unusual quickness of deduction and of expression, which has sometimes been noticed in partially insane persons, may be referred to two causes; first, an uncommon excitation of the attention and of all the intellectual powers; and, secondly, a removal of those checks which attend the sober and the rational in their reasonings.

Some of the checks which retard the process of

reasoning in the case of men whose powers are in a good state, are these. I. There is a distrust of phraseology, a fear of mistakes, from the ambiguity and vagueness of language. The object of a rational man is supposed to be to arrive at truth, and not merely to gain a victory. He therefore feels anxious not only to employ terms which appear to himself proper, but which shall be rightly understood by his opponent. But the irrational man, as might be expected, does not find himself embarrassed with considerations of this nature. II. A second obstruction to facility and promptness in argumentation, in the case of the sober-minded and rational, is this: they fear that they may not be in possession of all those premises on which the solution will be found in the event to depend.-Many disputes are carried on without previously forming an acquaintance with those facts, which are necessarily and prominently involved. While disputants of sound minds have any suspicion on this point, and know not but it will be labour lost, they of course feel their interest in the dispute very much diminished. III. The third circumstance to which reference was had, is this: the influence of certain feelings of propriety and of good sense, which ordinarily govern men in the full exercise of their powers.

The disputant feels himself under obligations to profess a deference for his opponent; it is due to the customary forms of society. He is sometimes restrained and embarrassed by what he considers due to those who are present to hear the argument. He is particularly careful to say nothing foolish, ab