decide upon their character, as compared one with another. Furthermore, it is not the less clear that facts, as they come under the cognizance of the Judgment, exist in the mind in the shape of beliefs, either presumptive, probable, or certain. And if the position of the belief be wrong, it does not easily appear how the decision of the Judgment, which is founded upon such belief, can be right.

We have here, therefore, another class of persons, who exhibit a defective or disordered Judgment; the defect arising not so much from anything in the judging power itself, as from its connexion with the disordered action of another susceptibility.

It seems to be this form of disordered judgment, more than any other, which is found in that busy, amusing, and sometimes beneficial class of men who are known as Projectors. These persons are not only characterized by adopting some new idea, or forming some untried plan, or prosecuting some novel invention, which a man of very sound judgment may sometimes do; but the difficulty is, that the thing, whatever it is, at once assumes a disproportionate place in the estimation of the mind. It not only controls the belief inordinately, but may be said to occupy the whole heart; either banishing for a time all other objects of contemplation, or making them entirely subordinate. And there is this further difficulty, that the strong passion which these persons exhibit, whether it exists in the shape of love, or of faith, or in some other form, is less permanent than strong. It is very desultory; excitable and powerful while it lasts, but suddenly changing its

1

object; and, both in its location and its transitions, in its excessive adhesions at one time and its sudden disruptions at another, is the subject of abundant ridicule to those sober and discriminating minds, that have less facility of belief as well as less energy of emotion.

§ 128. Of disordered Judgment in connexion with obstinacy of Belief.

IV. Another form of disordered Judgment is owing to the fact of its being connected with extreme obstinacy of Belief, and is nearly the opposite of that which has just been mentioned. The persons to whom we now refer attach themselves to a particular object or to a particular aspect of an object; they seize upon a particular opinion, or, perhaps, the minute fragment of an opinion; and they hold it with a tenacity which neither life nor death can separate. All appeals to their feelings, to their sympathies, to their common humanity, would be out of place, and abundantly ridiculous. "Leviathan is With imper

not so tamed." But this is not all. turbable coolness, they turn the scaly hide of their obstinacy to the fiery darts of truth, and shake them off unharmed. No statements of facts, no suggestions of venerable wisdom, no deductions of reasoning, and, least of all, the persuasions even of Athenian eloquence, have the effect to disturb, even for a moment, the invincibility of their adhesion. They give themselves up to their object, "for better or worse;" not temporarily, but, as it were, through all time.

This is, perhaps, a strong statement; but it shows what we mean. It would be absurd to say that this state of things does not imply a disordered action of the mind. But undoubtedly there are varieties here as elsewhere.

§ 129. Of mere unsoundness in distinction from insanity of Judgment.

We have thus given some general and imperfect idea of the more common forms of defective or disordered Judgment; but we do not wish the reader to understand, that the matter, as we have now stated it, comes up to the true idea of INSANITY of the Judgment. The cases which have been stated are such as occur very frequently; and, though they disqualify the persons to whom they attach for very many things, these persons may still, in many respects, be very valuable men. Their judgment is perplexed in its action, and enfeebled, but not extinct. It may even be found, in some individuals, to possess a high degree of strength, when exercised upon any or all matters which do not come within the reach of the intellectual malady.

Insanity of the Judgment, in distinction from mere ordinary defect or disorder, implies something more. It implies an entire disqualification of correct views, either upon all subjects or upon some particular subjects. Not necessarily upon all, because we sometimes find the insanity directing itself to a particular thing, and not extending beyond it. In illustration of what has now been said, take the case of the Projector, the man of new schemes. His de

votedness to the particular object before him is, in many cases, essentially harmless and amusing rather than otherwise. His time is occupied; he is abundantly happy in prosecuting to its anticipated results the "grand experiment ;" and when the experiment fails; when the bubble, which had so long delighted him, bursts, he has the satisfaction of knowing, whatever may be true of himself, that he has contributed to the happiness of others, by exciting to activity the pleasant sentiment of the ridiculous. Such cases as these are the more frequent and common cases; and they are indicative, beyond all question, of real unsoundness of mind; but common parlance would not, as a general thing, speak of these persons as "mad people," as "crazy people." They certainly are not to be regarded as suitable candidates for banishment from society, for guardianship, and for hospitals. With all their faults, they are often found to have their associates and friends, and are often deeply loved in their families.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that they approximate, if they are not already on the very borders of that frightful condition of mind, which insanity, in the more common acceptation of the term, is understood to indicate. They stand, dizzy-headed, on the brink of the precipice. Sometimes the malady increases. They engage in plans which everybody else knows to be not only doubtful, but even hopeless. They are unable to do anything else; they exaggerate the importance of their object; they dissipate their property, ruin their health, and distress their families. These people are called crazy,

pre

and they are so. They are unable to see the cise and full relations of things. They omit to take into account a multitude of circumstances, which are necessary to such precision and comprehensiveness of relative perception. In a single word, the inexpressibly important trait of sound judgment is not merely weakened or perplexed (which is the fact in all cases of disordered judgment), but is annihilated. Insanity, in the strict sense of the term, has supervened; and there is an evident necessity of the substitution of the guidance of friends and of the law for their own personal and self-responsible control.

CHAPTER IV.

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ASSOCIATION.

§ 130. General remarks on the nature of Association.

THE laws of the mind, the great principles which regulate its action, as well as its mere perceptions or states, may be disordered; for instance, the laws of Association. The term Association expresses the general fact, that there is a regular consecution of the mental states. This succession of mental states, however, as is well ascertained, is not an accidental and irregular one, but has its laws. The leading laws of Association, modified by some subordinate