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The writer in the American Journal of Science, already repeatedly referred to, narrates a case which may properly be introduced here. The case is a marked and interesting one, as follows:

"A lady in New-England, of a respectable family, was for a considerable period subject to paroxysms of delirium. These paroxysms came on instantaneously, and, after continuing an indefinite time, went off as suddenly, leaving her mind perfectly rational. It often happened that, when she was engaged in rational and interesting conversation, she would stop short in the midst of it, become in a moment entirely delirious, and commence a conversation on some other subject, not having the remotest connexion with the previous one, nor would she advert to that during her delirium. When she became rational again, she would pursue the same conversation in which she had been engaged during the lucid interval, beginning where she had left off. To such a degree was this carried, that she would complete an unfinished story or sentence, or even an unfinished word. When her next delirious paroxysm came on, she would continue the conversation which she had been pursuing in her preceding paroxysm; so that she appeared as a person might be supposed to do who had two souls, each occasionally dormant and occasionally active, and utterly ignorant of what the other was doing."

There is a particularly interesting case of divided or intermittent consciousness to be found in the Medical Repository, in a communication from Dr. Mitchell, of the City of New-York, to the Rev. Dr. Nott.

"When I was employed" (says the writer of this communication), "early in December, 1815, with several other gentlemen, in doing the duty of a visiter to the United States' Military Academy at West Point, a very extraordinary case of Double Consciousness in a woman was related to me by one of the professors. Major Elicott, who so worthily occupies the mathematical chair in that seminary, vouched for the correctness of the following narrative, the subject of which is related to him by blood, and an inhabitant of one of the western counties of Pennsylvania. Miss R. possessed, naturally, a very good constitution, and arrived at adult age without having it impaired by disease. She possessed an excellent capacity, and enjoyed fair opportunities to acquire knowledge. Besides the domestic arts and social attainments, she had improved her mind by reading and conversation, and was well versed in penmanship. Her memory was capacious, and stored with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and without any forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. On waking, she was discovered to have lost every trait of acquired knowledge. Her memory was tabula rasa; all vestiges, both of words and things, were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn everything again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, writing, and calculating, and gradually became acquainted with the persons and objects around, like a being for the first time brought into the world. In these

But,

exercises she made considerable proficiency. after a few months, another fit of somnolency invaded her. On rousing from it, she found herself restored to the state she was in before the first paroxysm, but was wholly ignorant of every event and occurrence that had befallen her afterward. The former condition of her existence she now calls the Old State, and the latter the New State; and she is as unconscious of her double character as two distinct persons are of their respective natures. For example, in her old state, she possesses all her original knowledge; in her new state, only what she acquired since. If a gentleman or lady be introduced to her in the old state, and vice versa (and so of all other matters), to know them satisfactorily she must learn them in both states. In the old state she possesses fine powers of penmanship, while in the new she writes a poor, awkward hand, having not had time or means to become expert. During four years and upward, she has undergone periodical transitions from one of these states to the other. The alterations are always consequent upon a long and sound sleep. Both the lady and her family are now capable of conducting the affair without embarrassment. By simply knowing whether she is in the old or new state, they regulate the intercourse, and govern themselves accordingly."

It would not be difficult, probably, to multiply cases similar to those which have been mentioned. They are of great interest in themselves, and they seem clearly to establish the existence of that peculiar form of mental disorder in connexion with which

they are introduced. It is unnecessary, after what has already been said, and especially in connexion with what remains to be said, to intimate how erroneous was that ancient doctrine of insanity, which resolved it, in all cases and under all its aspects, into one type or form.

CHAPTER III.

DISORDERED ACTION OF RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT.

§ 123. Relative Suggestion or Judgment a distinct

Power.

AMONG other powers or susceptibilities of the human mind is that by which we perceive or feel the relation of objects to each other in certain respects. The office of this power is not merely to perceive objects in themselves, which may be done by means of the senses, or by original suggestion, or in some other way, but precisely what has been said, viz., to perceive and to make known to us their relations. Hence the name, which is properly given to it, that of RELATIVE SUGGESTION; although, as we have already stated in a previous chapter, it is frequently expressed by the less definite term JUDGMENT. We shall employ the two terms, in what we have to say at present, as synonymous with each other.

The power of relative suggestion, or the judgment, if we choose so to term it, is very properly regarded in systems of Mental Philosophy as a connatural and ultimate principle of the mind; in other words, a principle so thoroughly elementary, that it cannot be resolved into any other. The human intellect is so made, so constituted, that, when it perceives different objects together, or has immediately successive conceptions of any absent objects of perception, their mutual relations (we do not mean to say all, but some of them at least) are immediately felt by it.

§ 124. Of the views which have sometimes been taken of this power.

We are aware, however, that the view which has now been presented, and which is the prevalent one at the present time, has not always been taken. It has sometimes been made a question whether man really possesses the power under consideration, regarded as a distinct and original power. Some of the earlier French philosophers seem to have espoused the negative of this question. It was the doctrine of Helvetius, and of the French philosophic school generally, which was predominant in his day, that all mental acts may be resolved into Sensation. "All the operations of the mind" (he expressly says)" are reduced to mere sensations. Why then admit in man a faculty of judging distinct from the faculty of sensation."* He then goes on with a

* Helvetius on Man, Hooper's translation, sec. ii., chs. iii,, iv., and v.

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