and it was my intention, as soon as the troops | should be fixed in their positions, to propose to Gen. Tyler to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's position at Blackburn's Ford. It should be borne in mind that the plan of the campaign had been to turn the position of Manassas by the left-that is to say, that from Fairfax Court House and Centreville we were to make a flank movement towards Sangster's and Fairfax station, and thence to Wolf Run Shoals, or in that direction. In my interview with the commanding general, just referred to, he said nothing to indicate any change of plan, but on the contrary, his remarks carried the impression that he was more than ever confirmed in his plan, and spoke of the advance on Centreville as a "demonstration." In proposing, therefore, to reconnoitre the enemy's position at Blackburn's Ford, it was not with the slightest idea that this point would be attacked. But a reconnoissance would be the carrying out of a "demonstration." this battery, and Ayres's battery was brought up and stationed on the left. The enemy's batteries soon ceased answering. After ours had continued playing for about half an hour, I thought it a useless expenditure of ammunition, and so stated to you, (who arrived on the spot shortly before this,) and presume that Gen. Tyler concurred in this opinion, as the firing soon ceased. I supposed that this would be the end of the affair, but perceiving the troops filing down towards the run, I thought it necessary to impress Gen. Tyler with the fact that it was no part of the commanding general's plan to bring on a serious engagement. I directed Capt. Alexander (Engineers) to state this fact to him, which he did in writing, having stated the same verbally before. At the same time, I directed Lieut. Houston to accompany the troops and make such observations of the enemy's position as he could. I remained on the heights, observing as well as I could the movements of the enemy's forces. While I was awaiting Captain Alexander I The affair becoming more serious than I exencountered Matthias C. Mitchell, who was se-pected, I was about to go down to the front, cured as a guide. Representing himself as a when our troops retired, and I returned to CenUnion man and a resident of that vicinity, I treville with yourself, to report to Gen. Mcwas engaged questioning him when intelligence Dowell. It is proper to observe that, before was received that Gen. Tyler had sent back for our artillery practice commenced, movements artillery and infantry, and that the enemy was of troops were observed on the road leading in sight before him. Riding to the front I join- from Manassas to Blackburn's Ford. As the ed Gen. Tyler and Col. Richardson. Proceed-road presented itself to the eye, those not very ing with them a short distance further, we familiar with the locality might feel some doubt emerged from the woods, and found ourselves-judging merely by the eye-whether these at the point at which the road commences its descent to Blackburn's Ford. The run makes here a curve or bow towards us, which the road bisects. The slopes from us towards it were gentle and mostly open. On the other side, the banks of the run rise more abruptly, and are wooded down to the very edge of the run. Higher up a cleared spot could be seen here and there, and still higher-higher than our own point of view, and only visible from its gently sloping towards us- -the elevated plateau, comparatively open, in which Manassas Junction is situated. Although, owing to the thickness of the wood, little could be seen along the edge of the run, it was quite evident, from such glimpses as we could obtain, that the enemy was in force behind us. I represented to Gen. Tyler that this point was the enemy's strong position, on the direct road to Manassas Junction; that it was no part of the plan to assail it. I did not, however, object to a "demonstration," believing that it would favor what I supposed still to be the commanding general's plan of campaign. The two 20-pounders of Parrott's had been ordered up. They were opened upon the enemy's position, firing in various directions, without our being able to perceive the degree of effect they produced. We had fired perhaps a dozen rounds, when we were answered by a rapid discharge from a battery apparently close down to the run, and at the crossing of the road. The 20-pounders continued their fire, directing at troops were advancing to, or retiring from Blackburn's Ford. The impression seemed to be quite common among us that they were retiring. I was perfectly sure that they were columns moving up to meet us from Manassas. At my interview with the commanding general that evening, he informed me that he had convinced himself that the nature of the country to the left or southward of Manassas was unfit for the operations of a large army; that he had determined to move by the right, turning the enemy's left; that the provision trains were just coming in, and that the troops would require the next day to cook their provisions for another march. I told him I would endeavor, the next day, to obtain such information as would enable him to decide on his future movement. The next most prominent crossing of Bull Run, above Blackburn's Ford, is the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike. Such a point could scarcely be neglected by the enemy. Information from various quarters gave good cause for believing that it was guarded by several thousand men-that at least four cannon were stationed to play upon it and the ford not far below, and moreover that the bridge was mined, and extensive abatis obstructed the road on the opposite shore. Two or three miles above the Warrenton Bridge is a ford laid down on our maps as Sudley's Springs. Reliable information justified the belief that the ford was good, that it was un fortified, that it was watched by only one or | take the road for Sudley's Springs-or, rather, two companies; and, moreover, that the run above it was almost everywhere passable for wheeled vehicles. Midway between the stone bridge and Sudley's Springs, maps indicated another ford which was said to be good. it was provided that (if I mistake not) Hunter's division should proceed to Sudley's Springs, and Heintzelman to take the lower ford. These matters, however, to be regulated by circumstances. Accompanying the commanding general, we, as you are aware, after waiting two or three hours at the turn off, rode on to overtake the front of Hunter's division, when we emerged from the woods, nearly northeast of Sudley, into the open country, from whence the course of the run and the slopes of the opposite shore could be seen; we could perceive the enemy's column in motion to meet us. The loss of time here, in a great measure, thwarted our plan. We had hoped to pass the ford and reach the rear of the enemy's forces at Warrenton stone bridge before he could assemble in sufficient force to cope with us. It was intended that the head of Hunter's Notwithstanding our conviction of the prac- division should be at the turn off at early dayticability of these fords, no known road con-light, or about 4 A. M., and that it should reach nected with them from any of the main roads Sudley by six or seven. on our side of Bull Run. We had information You are aware of the unexpected delay. The that a road branched from the Warrenton turn-two leading brigades of Tyler's had not cleared pike, a short distance beyond Cub Run, by the road for Hunter to this point until half-past which-opening gates and passing through pri- five, and our guide, alleging that a nearer route vate grounds-we might reach the fords. It to the ford would bring our column in sight of was desirable to assure ourselves that this route the enemy's batteries, led them by so circuiwas entirely practicable. In company with tous a way that Hunter did not reach Sudley Capt. Woodbury (Engineers) and Gov. Sprague, until half-past nine or thereabouts. and escorted by a company of cavalry, I, on the 19th, followed up the valley of Cub Run until we reached a point west ten degrees north, and about four miles in an air line from Centreville, near which we struck a road which we believed to lead to the fords. Following it for a short distance we encountered the enemy's patrols. As we were most anxious to avoid attracting the enemy's attention to our designs in this quarter, we did not care to pursue the reconnoissance further. We had seen enough to be convinced of the perfect practicability of the route. To make more certain of the fords, however, Capt. Woodbury proposed to return at night, and with a few Michigan woodsmen from Col. Sherman's brigade, to endeavor to find them. On returning to camp it was determined to send Capt. Wright and Lieut. Snyder (Engineers) with Capt. Woodbury. At the same time the commanding general directed Capt. Whipple (Topographical Engineers) and Lieut. Prime (Engineers) to make a night reconnoissance of the run between Warrenton Bridge and Blackburn's Ford. Both these night expeditions failed. It was found the enemy occupied the woods too strongly on our side of the run to permit the reconnoissance to be accomplished. It was not our policy to drive in his pickets until we were in motion to attack. It now became necessary to have Tyler's division force the passage of the bridge. It had always been intended that this division should pass at or near the bridge, but it was hoped, by taking its defences in rear, it could be passed without force. The commanding general promptly sent orders to Tyler to press his attack with all vigor. I had yet much confidence that, though we had been anticipated, (owing to the delays mentioned,) the enemy was not yet assembled in numbers to oppose us in great force, (a confidence which I think the facts justified;) that we might successfully attack him in front, while the division of Tyler should fall upon his flank and rear. On laying before you the information obtain- When we reached the front of Hunter's coled, the commanding general believed himself umn the battle was just commencing. The justified in adopting the following plan of at- events of the battle-field will be described in tack, which was decided upon on the 20th: the reports you will receive from other quarFirst-A false attack to be made by Rich-ters. I was near the commanding general unardson's brigade (temporarily attached to Miles's division) on Blackburn's Ford, the rest of that division remaining in reserve at Centreville. Second-Tyler's division to move from its camp at 3 A. M. (the 21st) towards the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike, to feign the main attack upon this point. til some time after the arrival of Sherman's brigade on our left. Being accidentally separated, I saw yourself on the right, and joining you, we observed for some time the action on the heights, where the enemy made his final and successful stand. As we were observing, the Zouave regiment of Heintzelman was Third-The divisions of Hunter and Heintzel-driven back, leaving Rickett's battery, upon man (in the order named) to leave their camps which we observed the enemy charge. at 2 A. M., (they were encamped about two or You left me here, and I remained a few minthree miles behind Tyler,) and, following his utes longer an anxious spectator, and for the movement, to diverge from the Warrenton first time beginning to anticipate a possible deturnpike at the by-road beyond Cub Run, and | feat. Two brigades of Tyler's division had Capt. H. G. Wright and First Lieut. G. W. Snyder, to the Third Division, under Col. Heintzelman. Capt. B. S. Alexander and First Lieut. D. C. Houston, to the First Division, under Gen. Tyler. First Lieut. F. E. Prime, to the First Division, under Col. Miles. passed over the run, and I supposed (and I be- | Charles E. Cross, to the Second Division, unlieved the commanding general supposed) that der Col. Hunter. the entire division was over. If so, the stone bridge was unguarded, and if we were defeated our retreating columns might be cut off from Centreville by the detachments of the enemy crossing this bridge. I became so anxious on this point that I sought you again, and found you at some distance in the rear. After some consultation, you, on my assuming the responsibility, sent an order to Col. Miles to move up two of his brigades to the stone bridge, and to telegraph the Secretary of War to send up all the troops that could be spared from Washington. While I was returning towards the front, intending to rejoin the commanding general, I saw our front give way, and it soon became evident that we were defeated. They have all been most active and zealous in the discharge of the duties devolving upon them. A report from Capt. D. P. Woodbury is herewith annexed. Reports from Capts. Wright and Alexander and Lieut. Prime will be furnished when received. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient, MAJOR BARRY'S REPORT. ARLINGTON, VA., July 23, 1861. Capt. J. B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General, Head-quarters Department N. E. Virginia: CAPTAIN: Having been appointed, by special orders No. 21, Headquarters Department Northeastern Virginia, Centreville, July 19, 1861, Chief of Artillery of the Corps d'Armée, commanded by Brig. Gen. McDowell, and having served in that capacity during the battle of tho 21st inst., I have the honor to submit the fol I have stated that it was a part of the plan of the battle, that Tyler's division should pass at or near the stone bridge. Two of his brigades actually did pass, not at the bridge, (they finding fords a half mile higher up,) and connected themselves with our left. In anticipation that the stone bridge would be blown up, Capt. Alexander had been instructed to obtain a trestle bridge to replace it. This he had on the spot, but there appears to have been no mine prepared under the bridge. Capt. Alex-lowing report: ander passed over his pioneers one by one, and set them to cutting away the abatis-two hundred yards in extent obstructing the road. This task was accomplished, and the way was opened for Schenck's brigade to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front. The Artillery of the Corps d'Armée consisted of the following named batteries: Rickett's (Light Company I, 1st Artillery) six 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns; Hunt's (Light Company M, 2d Artillery) four light 12-pounders; Carlisle's (Company E, 2d Artillery) two James's 13pounder rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Tid It will be seen from the above that the com- ball's (Light Company A, 2d Artillery) two 6bination, though thwarted by adverse circum-pounder guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; stances, was actually successful in uniting three entire divisions, (excepting the brigade of Schenck, which had just opened its way to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front,) upon the decisive point. A fault, perhaps it was, that it did not provide earlier for bringing the two brigades of Miles's (in reserve at Centreville) into action. One of his brigades (Richardson's) actually did participate, (though not on the battle-field,) and in its affair at Blackburn's Ford probably neutralized at least an equal number of the Green's (Company G, 2d Artillery) four 10pounder Parrott rifle guns; Arnold's (Company D, 2d Artillery) two 13-pounder James's rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Ayres's (Light Company E, 3d Artillery) two 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, two 6-pounder guns; Griffin's (Battery D, 5th Artillery) four 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Edwards's (Company G, 5th Artillery) two 20-pounders and one 30pounder Parrott rifle guns. The 2d Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers had with it a battery of six 13-pounder James's rifle guns; the 71st Regiment New York Militia, two of Dahlgren's On retiring to Centreville my opinion was boat howitzers, and the 8th Regiment New asked as to maintaining our position, and I York Militia a battery of six 6-pounder guns. gave it in favor of a prompt retreat; for I be- The men of this last-named battery having lieved the enemy was far superior in numbers, claimed their discharge on the day before the and that, elated by his victory, he would pur- battle, because their term of service had exsue, and I believed that a defeated army, actu-pired, the battery was thrown out of service. ally driven back on Washington before a pur- The whole force of artillery, of all calibres, suing enemy, would endanger the safety of the Capital. enemy. The engineer officers under my command and attached to the different divisions were as follows: Capt. D. P. Woodbury and Second Lieut. was therefore 49 pieces, of which 28 were rifled guns. All of these batteries were fully horsed and equipped, with the exception of the two howitzers of the 71st regiment New York Militia, which were without horses, and were drawn by drag-ropes manned by detachments from the regiment. Gen. McDowell's disposition for ron of United States Cavalry, under Captain the march from Centreville on the morning of Colburn, 1st Cavalry, was subsequently ordered the 21st inst., placed Tidball's and Green's bat- as additional support. We were soon upon the teries (8 pieces) in reserve with the division of ground designated, and the two batteries at Col. Miles, to remain at Centreville; Hunt's once opened a very effective fire upon the eneand Edwards's (6 pieces) with the brigade of my's left. The new position had scarcely been Col. Richardson, at Blackburn's Ford; and occupied, when a troop of the enemy's cavalry, Carlisle's, Ayres's, and the 30-pounder (11 debouching from a piece of woods close upon pieces) with the division of Gen. Tyler, at the our right flank, charged down upon the New stone bridge; Rickett's, Griffin's, Arnold's, the York 11th. The Zouaves catching sight of the Rhode Island, and the 71st regiment batteries cavalry a few moments before they were upon (24 pieces) accompanied the main column, them, broke ranks to such a degree that the which crossed Bull Run at Sudley's Springs. As cavalry dashed through without doing them soon as the column came in presence of the much harm. The Zouaves gave them a scatterenemy after crossing Bull Run, I received from ing fire as they passed, which emptied five sadGen. McDowell, in person, directions to super- dles and killed three horses. A few minutes intend the posting of the batteries as they sever- afterward a regiment of the enemy's infantry, ally debouched from the road and arrived from covered by a high fence, presented itself in line the field. The Rhode Island battery came first on the left and front of the two batteries, at upon the ground, and took up at a gallop the not more than 60 or 70 yards' distance, and position assigned it. It was immediately ex- delivered a volley full upon the batteries and posed to a sharp fire from the enemy's skir- their supports. Lieut. Ramsay, 1st Artillery, was mishers and infantry, posted on the declivity killed, and Capt. Ricketts, 1st Artillery, was of the hill and in the valley in its immediate wounded, and a number of men and horses front, and to a well-sustained fire of shot and were killed or disabled by this close and wellshell from the enemy's batteries, posted behind directed volley. The 11th and 14th regiments the crest of the range of hills, about 1,000 yards instantly broke, and fled in confusion to the listant. This battery sustained, in a very gal- rear, and, in spite of the repeated and earnest hant manner, the whole force of this fire for efforts of Col. Heintzelman with the latter, and nearly half an hour, when the howitzers of the myself with the former, refused to rally and 71st New York Militia came up, and went into return to the support of the batteries. The battery on its left. A few minutes afterward, enemy, seeing the guns thus abandoned by their Griffin brought up his pieces at a gallop, and supports, rushed upon them, and driving off came into battery about 500 yards to the left the cannoneers, who with their officers stood of the Rhode Island and New York batteries. bravely at their posts until the last moment, Rickett's battery came up in less than half an captured them, ten in number. These were hour afterward, and was posted to the left of the only guns taken by the enemy on the field. and immediately adjoining Griffin's. The ene- Arnold's battery came upon the field after Ricmy's right, which had been wavering from the kett's, and was posted on our left centre, where moment Griffin opened fire upon it, now began it performed good service throughout the day, to give way throughout its whole extent, and and by its continual and well-directed fire asretire steadily, his batteries limbering up rapid-sisted materially in breaking and driving back ly, and at a gallop taking up successively two new positions further to his rear. The foot troops on our left, following up the enemy's retiring right, soon left our batteries so far in our rear that their fire was over the heads of our own men. I therefore directed the Rhode Island battery to advance about 500 yards in front of its first position, accompanied it myself, and saw it open fire with increased effect upon The army having retired upon Centreville, I the enemy's still retiring right. Returning to was ordered by Gen. McDowell in person to the position occupied by Rickett's and Griffin's post the artillery in position to cover the rebatteries, I received an order from Gen. Mc-treat. The batteries of Hunt, Ayres, Tidball, Dowell to advance two batteries to an eminence, specially designated by him, about 800 yards in front of the line previously occupied by the enemy's batteries. I therefore ordered these two batteries to move forward at once, and, as soon as they were in motion, went for and secured as supports the 11th (Fire Zouaves) and the 14th (Brooklyn) New York regiments. I accompanied the former regiment to guide it to its proper position, and Col. Heintzelman, 17th United States Infantry, performed the same service for the 14th on the right of the 11th. A squad the enemy's right and centre. The batteries of Hunt, Carlisle, Ayres, Tidball, Edwards, and Green (21 pieces) being detached from the main body, and not being under my immediate notice during the greater portion of the day, I respectfully refer you to the reports of their brigade and division commanders for the record of their services. Edwards, Green, and the New York 8th regi ment, (the latter served by volunteers from Wilcox's brigade,) 20 pieces in all, were at once placed in position; and thus remained until 12 o'clock P. M., when orders having been received to retire upon the Potomac, the batteries were put in march, and, covered by Richardson's brigade, retired in good order and without haste, and early next morning reoccupied their former camps on the Potomac. In conclusion, it gives me great satisfaction to state that the conduct of the officers and en listed men of the several batteries was most | lances, they can then return to their proper exemplary. Exposed throughout the day to positions. a galling fire of artillery and small-arms, sev- As the general commanding visited almost eral times charged by cavalry, and more than every part of the ground during the conflict, once abandoned by their infantry supports, with a view to encourage or direct the moveboth officers and enlisted men manfully stood ments of the troops, my position as a member by their guns with a courage and devotion of his staff gave me every opportunity of seeworthy of the highest commendation. Where ing the results of the action. I therefore emall did so well, it would be invidious to make braced the opportunity thus offered to give didistinction, and I therefore simply give the rections when needed to the drivers of the amnames of all the officers engaged viz.: Major bulances where to find the dead and wounded; Hunt; Captains Carlisle, Ayres, Griffin, Tid- and also to those carrying off the wounded ball, and Arnold; Lieutenants Platt, Ransom, where they could find the needed conveyances. Thompson, Webb, Barriga, Green, Edwards, The stretchers were found very useful and comDresser, Wilson, Throckmorton, Cushing, Har-fortable to the wounded, and were in constant ris, Butler, Fuller, Lyford, Will, Benjamin, Bab-requisition, conveying them to the nearest ambitt, Haines, Ames, Hasbrouck, Kensel, Harrison, Reed, Barlow, Noyes, Kirby, Elderkin, Ramsay, and Craig. The two latter were killed. I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant, WM. F. BARRY, Major 5th Artillery. MEDICAL AND SURGICAL REPORT. ARLINGTON, Department N. E. Va., July 26, 1861. Being chief of the Medical Staff with the Army in the Department of N. E. Virginia, I have the honor to make the following report of so much of the results of the action on the 21st at Bull Run, as came within my charge. As the officers of the Medical Staff were attached to the different regiments and on duty with them, I deemed it proper to remain with and accompany the general commanding and staff from the beginning to the termination of the battle, in order that I might be present if any were wounded; and, also, that I might be enabled to visit in this way every part of the field where the killed and wounded might be found. bulances. So far as I am informed, the medical staff belonging to the different volunteer regiments discharged their duties satisfactorily. I observed Acting Assistant-Surgeon Miles busily engaged in dressing wounded men under the shade of a tree, in a part of the field where the fire from the enemy was very hot. He addressed me a brief inquiry as I passed relative to the safety of his father, and then resumed his occupation. geons Grey and Steinburg of the Regular Army, and Drs. Honiston and Swan of the New York 14th, also preferred to remain rather than abandon their charge. The conduct of these officers is worthy of all commendation. Surgeon C. C. Keeney of Col. Hunter's division, and Assistant-Surgeon D. L. Magruder, attached to the commanding general's staff, did good service in the hospital church I have mentioned, and also in two houses near the church, where the wounded were placed after the church had been filled. These officers remained busily engaged in the discharge of their duties till the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, and but narrowly escaped capture, when they left. Drs. Swift and Winston, attached to the New York 8th regiment, remained with their sick sacrificing all selfish considAfter the action had fairly commenced, and erations for their own safety, in order that the the wounded and the dead were lying on the wounded might not be neglected, and are now field in every direction, I despatched Assistant-prisoners. I am informed that Assistant-SurSurgeon D. L. Magruder to the rear, with directions to prepare a church (which I had observed as we passed before arriving at the scene of action) for the reception of the wounded, and also to send the ambulances forward as rapidly as possible to pick up the wounded and dead. In a very few minutes the ambulances made their appearance, and contrived throughout the day to visit every part of the ground which was accessible, so as to be within reach of those parts of the field where the fighting was going on, and wounded were to be found. It is due to the ambulance drivers to say that they performed their duties efficiently, and the result of their operations also shows how absolutely necessary these means of conveyance are to the comfort and relief of the wounded in giving them shelter and water when ready to perish with heat and thirst. By means of the ambulances, also, the men who go to the relief of their wounded comrades are separated but a short time from their companies, as, having deposited them in their ambu It would be premature in me, in the absence of sufficient data-the reports of the regimental surgeons not yet being received-to express a positive opinion as to the number killed and wounded in the action on the 21st. There were, no doubt, many concealed from observation under cover of the woods and bushes, but, judging from the number that I saw in various parts of the field, and allowing a wide margin for those unobserved, I should think that the killed and wounded on our side did not exceed from 800 to 1,000. The impossibility of making a careful survey of the field after the battle had ceased, must be my apology for the briefness and want of detail in this report. W. S. KING, Sur. and Med. Direc'r, U. S. A. |