ment, received precepts from the sheriffs, for the first time, to send representatives, but without any charter, patent, or authority from the crown.* So ignorant were lawyers then of the right of the crown to manufacture a House of Commons of its own creatures by its royal warrants, that they thought it could not make even the slightest change in the form of summoning them from that established by law and custom. Edward IV was the first of our sovereigns who granted a royal charter authorizing a town to send members to parliament. He made Grantham a free borough, after which it began to send members. Ludlow also first made returns in his reign.§ Not a single borough was revived or created by Richard III or Henry VII. Thus, from the time of Edward I to that of Henry VIII, only nineteen boroughs altogether made returns for the first time, and of these one only was authorized by royal charter. Great as were the powers assumed by Henry VIII, he did not imitate the precedent of Edward II as to Wales, but proceeded, by the assistance of parliament, to summon members from it, Chester, Calais, Monmouth, &c. &c., and confined the exercise of this "undoubted prerogative" to the three places we have already noticed. Such having been the practice, we may add, that one of the ablest and most learned writers on parliamentary questions declares himself clearly of opinion "that since the statutes of 5 Richard II, c. 4, 1 Henry V, c. 21, 23 Henry VI, c. 14, no sheriffs, by virtue of the king's writ of summons and forecited clauses in them, can erect or enable any new-created or old long-discontinued boroughs to chuse and return burgesses to our English parliaments, whatever they anciently did or might do before these acts; and that no boroughs can, since these acts, be created or revived but by special act of parliament, as the statutes of 27 Henry VIII, c. 26, 34 Henry VIII, c. 13, 35 Henry VIII, c. 11," " do more than intimate:" and, in reference particularly to the 5 Richard II, st. 2, c. 4, adds, that "it is as clear as the sun at noon-day" that "no sheriffs are bound by law to issue precepts to or cause any cities or boroughs to send citizens or burgesses to parliament

*Prynne's Brev. Parl. Red. 236.

+ See, in R. P. 38 Hen. 6, 367, a petition from the sheriffs of the kingdom that as they had proceeded to the elections by the authority of the king's letters of privy seal, and not by writ, the returns should be confirmed, and they themselves indemnified, by statute.

To Wenlock, in 1478. This is the first and only charter of the kind on record prior to the reign of Henry VIII. Willis, Not. Parl. 42-3.

It was not by royal charter these made the returns.

but such which of ancient times were accustomed to send them."'* Thus, swamping the Commons with the creatures of the crown was another of the “ ingenious devices” of the “ disenthralling” Reformers.

But we shall be told, that though by "the Protestant constitution " the head of the Church could thus create majorities at its pleasure, so as to prevent the ungodly and “ disordered multitude” from questioning the extent of “ the Divine omnipotence,” which Gospel light had assigned him, yet with the advance of Protestantism and civil liberty, the Commons asserted many glorious privileges which they had not dared to think of in the days of Popery and their infantile weakness. We beg of our readers to consider that all those privileges have been gradually passing away since the return of commonsense and rational liberty, just like the extravagant vagaries of Protestantism itself; that they have been all strenuously supported by the ministers of the crown; and that by no accident has it happened that any one of them has been ever exercised against the crown in defence of the rights of an injured subject. When the crown obtained the means of commanding majorities in parliament, it naturally looked on any extension of the powers or privileges of its creatures as an increase of its own powers; and hence, from Henry VIII to George IV, we find the servants of the crown invariably the most vehement advocates of the pretensions of the Commons. Of all those novel privileges, not one has been so eulogised as that by which the Commons claim to themselves the right of determining their own elections. This has been continually lauded as the best and almost only safeguard of that house; as of the very essence of its constitution, and associated with its integrity and independence just as Protestantism itself has been with civil liberty. Were we to be writing its praises for a year and a day, we could scarcely give more than a faint idea of the excellencies it possesses in the opinions of its admirers. Let us therefore examine it in operation and details, and see whether it is not exactly like Church-of-Englandism itself—a sort of superficially delusive system, which charms and captivates at first sight and on a slight inquiry, but which, on closer inspection, is found to have been designed for purposes the very reverse of its professed objects; and whether, as Church-of-Englandism was the prime actor in overthrowing the ancient liberties of England, this privilege was not

* Brev. Parl. Red. 236-238. VOL. X.-NO, XIX.

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required to act a minor part in the drama, by completing the ruin of the independence of the Commons and the electoral rights of the people.

Suppose at a general election two opposing sets of candidates—whigs and tories for instance-start for the several constituencies of the kingdom. Suppose also the tories in office—the sheriffs consequently their friends, or at least nominees, and returning them contrary to the votes of the electors; this privilege then steps in, and instantly constitutes them, for no other reason but that they have been returned by the sheriffs, though thus, according to vulgar apprehensions, unduly returned, the sole judges of the entire transaction; of the return itself; the conduct of the sheriffs; their own rights ; the rights of their friends, and the rights of their rivals. Such they literally were prior to the passing of the

. Grenville Act. We need not stop now to shew how utterly inconsistent with every principle of common-sense and common law such a privilege must be; but see how perfectly consistent it was with the whole spirit and operation of “the Protestant constitution;" which made the life, the liberty, the property, and every right of the subject depend solely on the nod of the British sultan.

As, under this privilege, the election of a member, or, as it was called, the trial of an election petition, was considered as legitimate an object of contention in the house as at the hustings, or as the election of a speaker, or the voting of the supplies, and was decided in the same manner;

and crown could in all ordinary times command a majority, by bribery, creation, or other “constitutional” means; each individual member held his seat, and his constituents-especially if they were citizens or burgesses-held their rights of election, at the will and pleasure of the royal majority.* The influence of such a state of things, both on the several members and the electors, need not be dwelt on. Yet we are gravely assured, that it was in self-defence against the encroachments of the crown the privilege was assumed. What are the facts ? It is commonly said to have been first exercised in the reign of Elizabeth ; her officers supported the exercise of it as then claimed.t Of the first celebrated committee of twelve, appointed on the 24th of February, 1580, four were members of her government. She is stated, on

very equivocal authority, to have reproved the Commons in one case for interfering, but in no other did she attempt to check them. James, "as an absolute king," had by proclamation forbidden the election of outlaws and other bad characters, and was, it is said, anxious for the return of Fortescue; but after that case he never interfered,† and some of the officers of his government formed part of every committee which sat during the remainder of his reign. After the Restoration, so anxious were the court party to uphold this "constitutional privilege," that when Hale and his colleagues, in the King's Bench,§ gave judgment for Barnardiston against Soame, and thus maintained the accountability of a sheriff in a court of law for an improper return, they raised to the bench the counsel who had been employed for the defendant; by them reversed, in the Exchequer Chamber, the judgment of the King's Bench, and confirmed the exclusive right of the members of the PENSIONED PARLIAMENT to-elect each other. The motive attributed to them at the time for this conduct was, that they thus expected to have the formation of the House of Commons absolutely, totally, and without any qualification or exception, at their own command; for having established the doctrine that the sheriffs could be punished for improper returns in that house only, and that the truth of the return was there only determinable, if they could prevail on the sheriffs-who were entirely at their service-to return "the friends of the monarchy and the constitution," these could decide their own elections, indemnify the sheriffs, and if any dangerous animal happened to get in along with them, could at once kick him out. Such alarm did the confirmation of this judgment by the House of Lords, after the Revolution, create, that the statute 7 and 8 William III, c. 7, was immediately passed to give an action against a sheriff for an improper return. When the Aylesbury case occurred, we find the members of the government supporting this "constitu

*Norfolk case. Dewes' Journal, p. 394-5. There are many reasons for questioning the authenticity and correctness of Dewes' report of this case.

When the committee of 1623-4 was about to restore some ancient boroughs, he thought to prevent them, but on consulting the judges, and finding them in favour of the ancient rights of election, he proceeded no further.

See Journals, passim.

Twisden & Wylde; Rainsford doubting.

There were three judges then made in the Exchequer, and two in the Common Pleas; eight being the total of both courts. We find North, C. J., who had been leading counsel for the defendant, and who was afterwards selected to try the Quo Warranto against the city of London, and five others, reversing the judgment of the King's Bench. See State Trials, vol. vi. 1063; vol. xiv. 457-721.

tional privilege," and the solicitor-general adding the weight of his official character to the extravagant claims of the Commons.* Is the case of Wilkes and Luttrel already forgotten?

. When the Grenville Act was proposed, we find Lord North, his attorney-general, and other official friends, straining every nerve to preserve this “ ancient and undoubted privilege of the Commons;" this “very essence of its constitution.”+ Need we extend our illustrations to modern times? When we thus find the court party advocating this privilege on all occasions, must we not be as doubtful of its tendency to secure the purity and independence of the Commons, as we must be of the tendency of Protestantism to secure civil liberty, when we find it the fosterling of every enemy of popular rights, whether on the banks of the Thames, the Rhine, the Speer, or the Neva?

But there is no room for doubt. Look to the result of its operation on the ancient popular rights of election. At the accession of Henry VIII there were 111 towns sending 224 representatives, and by him and his successors 36 were restored. [ Of all these only two, or three at the utmost, were empowered by charter to send representatives; the rest had their rights of election dependent on immemorial usage or the common law. By the latter, popular rights were greatly favoured. There is not the slightest authority for saying that a property qualification was required for any electors before the passing of the 8 Henry VI, c. 7.|| The authorities, on the other hand, are abundant against such an hypothesis. In the second last year of Edward III, ihe Commons pray that the knights of the shires might be elected by the common election of the better people of the said counties :" but Edward answers, like a chartist, that he wishes they should be selected by the common assent of the entire county.”T All the statutes preceding the act of Henry VI merely direct the sheriffs to make the