secretes around itself the staple forms of words, which in turn serve as the basis for a further generation of thoughts.

Thus it seems to me - and I am not aware that any writer of note has ever ventured to question the view-that, given the faculty of speech, in however rudimentary a degree, and we have given the germ of that difference between the mind of man and the mind of brutes, which may proceed, under suitable conditions as to social requirements, etc., to develop into any conceivable degree of divergent excellence. The only question, therefore, with which as evolutionists we are here confronted is, Why has man alone of animals been gifted with the logos?

To answer this question we must first consider in what the essence of the logos consists. Analysis shows that it consists in the power of predication, or of making a proposition, which is the expression of the power of forming a judgment. Thus far, men of all schools of thought are in agreement, even Mr. Mivart conceding that "if the brute could think 'is,' man and brute would be brothers." I conceive, then, that the only question before us is to explain the possible evolution of the power of predication.

Let it first be remembered that speech in all its forms is nothing more than a highly elaborated system of signs, and that, where adequate intelligence is already present, propositions admit of being made with quite as much distinctness and quite as much rationality by any other comparably elaborated system of signs, as is the case, for instance, with the gesturelanguage of deaf-mutes or of the American Indians. Next let it be remembered that the germ of the sign-making faculty occurs among animals, at least as far down in the scale as the ants, and that in all the higher vertebrata it is capable of development up to a very considerable level. Pointer dogs make gesture signs, the meaning of which they well understand; terriers will "beg" for food; cats will pull at one's dress to lead one to their kittens in trouble; and a hundred other instances might be given. It is true that in none of these instances have we any evidence of predication, properly so called. But we have the germ of it. And when we have an animal sufficiently intelligent intentionally to translate its logic of feelings into a logic of signs for the purpose of communication, we have an animal which, in effect, is making a proposi

tion, although it may not know or think about the proposition as a proposition. When a cat or a dog pulls one's dress to lead one to the kittens or puppies in need of assistance, the animal is behaving in the same manner as a deaf-mute might behave when invoking assistance for a friend. That is to say, the animal is translating the logic of feelings into the logic of signs, and, so far as this particular action is concerned, it is psychologically indistinguishable from that which is performed by the deaf-mute; for, under the circumstances supposed, the deaf-mute does not wait to formulate any definite proposition even in his own mind; his only feeling is, "Come, come," and this is directly translated into a gesture sign.

Now, if among animals we thus have, as it were, the protoplasm of the sign-making faculty, it does not seem to me so very hard to understand how it might, under suitable conditions, become organized into the faculty of predication. The quadrumana habitually employ vocal signs as well as gestures whereby to express their emotions, and the comparatively simple logic of their feelings. Let us, then, try to imagine an anthropoid ape somewhat more intelligent than the remarkable chimpanzee which has recently been brought to the Zoological Gardens of London, and which in respect of intelligence, as well as hairlessness and carnivorous habits, is perhaps the most human-like of these animals hitherto observed.* It does not seem to me very difficult to imagine that such an animal should extend the vocal signs which it habitually employed in the expression of its emotions to the conventional naming of a few familiar objects, such as food, child, etc. This, indeed, is no more than we find to be the case with a much less intelligent animal, viz., the parrot, which in many cases certainly uses vocal signs as names, whether these vocal signs are words the meaning of which it has been taught, sounds imitative of those made by the objects named, or, as is sometimes the case, wholly arbitrary, such as a peculiar squeak to signify a nut. Whether this nominative stage of

*The carnivorous habits of this animal, which is a new variety, are most interesting. It is surmised that in its wild state it must live upon birds, but in the Zoological Gardens it is found to show a marked preference for cooked meat over raw. It dines off broiled mutton chops, the bones of which it picks with its fingers and teeth, being afterward careful to clean its hands. It mixes a little straw with the mutton as we mix vegetables, and after dinner takes a dessert of fruits.

language in the ape was first reached by articulation, or, as is more probable, by vocal sounds of other kinds, and gestures, is immaterial. In either case the advance of intelligence which would thus have been secured, would in time have reacted upon the sign-making faculty, and so have led to an extension of the vocabulary, both as to sounds and gestures. Sooner or later the vocal signs, assisted by gestures, and even leading to a gradual advance of intelligence, would have become conventional, and so, in the presence of suitable anatomical conditions, articulate. The next step would have been the conventional naming of familiar qualities, such as sweet, bitter, and so on. This, be it observed, does not imply any very great advance upon the naming of objects by vocal or gesture signs; but yet it brings us to the very borders of predication. For if once the name of an object and the name of a quality belonging to that object are used in apposition, the copula is latent in thought, and only requires a further advance of intelligence itself to become an object of thought.

Such, I believe, were the steps by which the faculty of predication was reached, and the bridge between the brute and the man constructed. Once this bridge was formed, all subsequent generations of intellect were free to roam over the hitherto unoccupied regions of possibility thus opened up; conscience, religion, sense of beauty, and all or any other product of the higher intelligence of man being but the natural result of the conditions which, in converse with its environment, that intelligence has itself created.

GEORGE J. ROMANES.

THE DRIFT TOWARD CENTRALIZATION.

If our peril is the centralization of power, it has been enhanced by two opinions delivered in the Supreme Court of the United States. By one, the Government may create whatever money it may require to maintain itself in power. By the other, if the Government unlawfully take the property of the citizen, he has no legal means for its recovery.

In the case of Juilliard vs. Greenman, the majority of the court held that Congress has the power to make the treasury notes of the United States a lawful tender in the payment of private debts, i. e., legal money of the country. The court relies on the citations it makes from the opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by Chief-Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch rs. Maryland (4 W. 316). That case did not relate to the power of Congress to make money, but it brought into consideration the enumerated and incidental powers of Congress; and the rules relating to them established then have never been questioned since, and have always been relied upon by the opponents of paper money.

The incidental powers are only means for executing the enumerated powers: they inhere in them, and are conveyed with and by them. They must, in the words of Chief-Justice Marshall, "consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution" (4 W. 421). But they are not capable of more precise description than that of the Constitution, "necessary and proper."

Of the enumerated powers, Chief-Justice Marshall says:

"This Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have been required to be enforced by all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge. The principle is now universally admitted." (4 W. 405.)

These enumerated powers are called by Chief-Justice Marshall "great substantive and independent powers" (4 W. 411). They are substantive, because each is complete in itself. They are independent, because each is created by its own specification, and has its specified function, and is efficient for nothing else.

The power of making money is required for making paper money, as well as for making coin money. And the court implies that abstract power from the enumerated powers "to pay debts," "to borrow money," "to lay and collect taxes"; and to these powers it adds the power to "coin money." But "to coin money" is expressly to make money of coin, and cannot further the implication of anything else. The claim of the court, therefore, must rest on the other powers specified.

Now the power to make money is not a power to use or apply money. And the mere abstract power of making money, as contradistinguished from the power of using it or applying it, cannot serve or tend to pay debts. Therefore the abstract power of making money is not involved in, and cannot be implied from, the enumerated power "to pay debts," which requires only the use and application of money, and authorizes nothing else. The two powers differ as the manufacture of an ax differs from cutting down trees with it.

Neither can the abstract power to make money tend or serve to execute the power "to borrow money," for this does not contemplate even the use or application of money, but contemplates only the procurement of money from other people. Therefore the abstract power of making money is not involved in, and cannot be implied from, the power to borrow money. For like reasons the abstract power of making money cannot tend or serve to execute the enumerated power to lay and collect taxes; for this contemplates and involves only an order and assessment on other people to pay money due from them.

Individuals have no power to make their paper legal money. Yet they pay their debts and borrow money and collect their dues, because for these things the abstract power of making money is not required, or is not, in the words of the Constitution, "the necessary and proper" means. If the abstract power of making money is not involved in the enumerated powers specified, and cannot be implied from them, then the court, in fact, uses those powers as the means of executing the power to make money. And this the law forbids. Chief-Justice Marshall says