sary to bring into being existences, which shall be endowed with a likeness and image of my own moral and eternal intellect, on which account such beings will live to eternity, coeval with myself, and never either become insensible, or cease to be, as it shall relate to their minds. These having in a degree my image, as it relates to moral powers; and as it relates to eternity of being, my full likeness, forth forward from the time of their creation, will, in distinction from all matter, whether animate or inanimate, have a power of perception, so as to be able, not only to know that they themselves exist, but also in proportion as I will reveal myself to them, may know, love, obey and glorify me. By this means, therefore, though I create myriads of systems of matter, in the form of globes, or worlds, and shall people them with as many kinds of animals; yet all these, though they cannot know either themselves or me, shall glorify me, as through them in a measure, my eternal power and Godhead shall be known, to such beings as I shall make in my image and likeness. But I must not only endow them with a measure of rational understanding, but also with the power of moral freedom of will, or they will not be able to make use of their understanding; which if they cannot, will be to them a useless attribute, and a useless attribute is the same as none at all: for as I am a free spirit, a portion of this principle must be given them, as the crown of their intellectual natures, and my peculiar likeness. By this, they will be constituted intellectual free agents, having power to will and to do, in a limited sense; but not so limited, however, as that their acts shall not be their own, and their vice or their virtue their own, not mine. If this is not done, they will not be above that grade of my works comprehending mere animals, and therefore, incapable of moral action and moral accountability, and in such a condition can never know, love, obey, nor glorify me, as their Creator; yet if I shall thus endow them with freedom of will, or in other words constitute them free agents, in the volitions of their mind; then they will most assuredly be liable to fall, and to apostatize from me, and loose the holy, innocent, upright state, in which 1, as God, can do no otherwise than create them, as I can never create that which is evil, or having any tendency thitherward, for liability and tendency are two distinct principles. But if I do not thus endow them, then they cannot act freely, and can never be moral agents, nor in any degree be above that scale of existences which will dis tinguish the brute creation; who can never act, except as the law of instinct and sensation shall direct; for which reason it is impossible for them to be accountable for their acts, as there will be no intellectual moral freedom of choice in their

power. Under such circumstances, should I give them a law, it cannot be such a law as shall make them accountable, as it will not be possible for them to err in a moral sense, as they will act only as they shall be acted upon; moral law to such beings cannot be in any sense applicable.

In the creation of mind and matter, I seek my own declarative glory, by communicating a knowledge of myself to the intellectual part of my works; and in return, desire to receive their love, obedience and adoration, which, if performed, will insure their happiness, and shall be required in the nature of such laws as I shall adapt to their state of being. But if I do not make rational moral free agents, then shall I be forever prevented from being declaratively glorified, as no other kind of being can do it, but such as shall have this tremendous qualification; and in consequence, so far as it can relate to my declared glory, will be the same as if I should never create anything at all. I therefore determine to create such beings as shall be intellectually free to act morally right or wrong, as they alone may elect; otherwise than this, it will be impossible for me to introduce beings into existence having capacities of intellectual happiness, and will baffle my great design of endless benevolence, and of being thus glorified by the works of my hands, and to manifest the glory of my power. But should I make angels and men, in such a condition as to them shall appear that they act freely, but in fact shall not be free, and on that account should enter into judgment with them, if any should err; when at the same time I shall know that my unseen power propels them to every action, and that their doings will be but the echo of my own will, and that I could succeed in hiding this fact from them to all eternity; yet in me, such a procedure could never be sanctioned by my holiness, and therefore such a state of things can never take place, because it would be morally inconsistent, and therefore impossible, under the administration of heaven. And now that the subject has been duly weighed in the eternal mind, as it relates to the condition in which I will produce intellectual beings, and find it can be no otherwise accomplished; shall it, therefore, be done? seeing I foreknow that some will abuse this amazing qualification of their being, which is free agency, and descend to unutterable ruin, whether redeemed or not. Benevolence being a trait and an attribute of my nature, as well as that of omniscence, is it consistent with that benevolence that I shall create beings and endow them with so fearful a power, which will put ruin within their reach, seeing I also know that some will abuse that It is consistent; power, to their own endless destruction? inasmuch as the creation of that power cannot be the cause of

their ruin, nor the possession of that power, nor any secret operation of mine; but solely its abuse and pervertion to purposes which can never be sanctioned by my holiness, will be the real and only cause of sin, and their destruction. I shall therefore create them thus; for if I do not, they cannot be moral agents, and never can enjoy true intellectual happiness, and will compel me to create, if I will create at all, nothing higher than mere irresponsible animals, and the globes on which they must subsist, whose mere existence can bring no glory to my great name, under such circumstances, and therefore I may as well renounce forever any such operation. But I shall not renounce it, as it is consistent to create beings with this exceeding endowment; for if I do not, my declarative honor will be forever prevented; and besides this, shall I suffer the foreseen evil and apostacy of some, to prevent me of the creation of countless myriads of others, whom I know will not abuse that gift, and will remain forever happy? shall I suffer some evil foreseen, to overcome and prevent an immensity of good, as it shall relate to others, who will not abuse that power? But were it foreseen of me, that more evil will ensue from the abuse of free agency among the moral beings which I am able to produce, than good, then a reason why creation should not be allowed to proceed, from motives of universal benevolence, would seem to be afforded; yet even under such a predicament, as that of the existence of more evil than good, the principle of benevolence in me, would remain unimpeached, as it is impossible for me to will the ruin of any part of my intellectual creation, however I may foresee the abuse of my gifts; which abuse will be their ruin, but not by my will. But if the gift of free agency shall render all liable, may not all the intellectual beings which I may bring into being, descend into a state of ruin? this is even possible, and may so turn out, as my mere foreknowledge of events can have no influence on the action of free creatures. And if I will continue to them the power of free agency, I, even I, cannot prevent their fall by sin, as it is a free principle, and cannot otherwise exist, than by its own freedom, which I will not destroy out of their natures; for were I to do this, it would be to render them unaccountable, and to retrench a part, and the most beautiful part of my intellectual creation. But on the other hand, is it not equally possible by virtue of this ennobling gift, that none of all the myriads of intellectual beings which I may cause to exist, will abuse their gift of free agency, and therefore may, if they will, live forever in a state of progressive perfection; yet even such a state of things cannot ensue, merely because I foreknow all events; but because they can will obedience to me, which power will be the very design of their liberty of will, and glory of their natures. But on the principle of my foreknowledge of their abuse of this free power; how is it, as a principle, either consistent or benevo

lent for me to create such beings or individuals at all? on this ground, and this alone, it is answered; I shall be benevolent in design, and for the same reason shall be consistent in principle, as inconsistent benevolence cannot find a place in the Divine mind. There is no reason, therefore, that foreseen evil should prevent the operations of my hand, if such foreseen evil shall arise solely out of the abuse of high and holy privileges, but not out of my works, as a matter of necessity. Could such an event transpire, as that sin and moral ruin should arise, as a matter of course or necessity, out of the operations of my hands, then indeed will it be seen of those to whom intellectual perception shall be given, that my wisdom, my goodness and ability to arrange and create orders and systems of being without containing in them the germs of dissolution, and moral damnation, does not exist; which is not according to truth; but were it so, would argue me, and more than argue, would prove me, in the view of such beings, a God far enough from possessing consistent unlimited power, wisdom and goodness. But I am certainly able to produce beings of such moral powers, and having such degrees of free agency as shall enable them to decide their own happiness, or their own misery, by the abuse or the right use of prin ciples and powers which I can give them; or I am not entitled to the claim of universal homage, as having unlimited, consistent power and goodness. Were I not able to do this, then were it impossible for me to produce beings who could be accountable to me, as it would be impossible, on that account to address to their attention moral law, as moral law would be as unfitly applied to beings of such a description, as to the beasts of the wilderness, not having power to accept and obey, or to reject and disobey. On this ground, as it will be impossible for them to sin, so will it be equally impossible for them to serve me, only as unthinking matter shall serve me, moving only as it shall be acted upon, which is in no degree intellectual service. But I do know, that a vast amount, both of angels and men, who shall people heaven, and the worlds, and systems of worlds which I will frame, will not abuse this gift, will not pervert their agency, however severe ly they may be tempted, will not rebel against my goodness, to be developed in my laws and government; but will stand, holding fast their first estate, in eternal fruition and perpetuity, by a right use of their free agency, of which gift I will be the author, and will ever honor, as the brightest trait in their intellectual being, without which gift their being can be of no real value.

Thus we have satisfied our own mind, and, as we think, have justified the Divine Being in bringing forward, from a state of non-existence, the creation of men and angels, even though he knew that some would fall away from their first condition of innocence; by showing that his design was benevolent, and that he could not have willed the sin and ruin of any, nor have made

them accountable, without also making them liable. Sin, therefore, came into being, not of God's set purpose, but from the abuse of the very gift which constitutes the moral existence of all intellectual beings.

But says the Universalist, who objects to the fact of man's free agency, as qualified by the orthodox sects of religion; can it be maintained that a good and powerful father can be consistently benevolent, who shall bring into being a child, and then put a dangerous weapon in that child's hand, by which that father foreknows his child will certainly destroy its own life? we think it can be maintained, but on one ground, and on no other. Pray what ground is that? it is this, and this alone; if that knife, or weapon, is made essential to the whole happiness and well being of the child, if properly used, it is consistent, as without it, it could not be happy.

. This similie illustrates our idea of intellectual free agency, as without it intellectual beings cannot be happy, though it is a dangerous gift. Any other view of this subject neutralizes man's accountability to God, either in this life or the life to come, as well as to himself, or to his fellow man; for virtue starts from the same point, where sin may also have its beginning.

On the Mode or Manner of the Trial of the Angels, and respecting those who fell.

But to return again to the main point, that of the first sin, and reason of the being of the devil or Satan, with other fallen angels. But what light is there that shines on a path whose track runs over so high a region? None, except that of mere human research and speculation. John Milton, the greatest of English poets, has struck out for himself, in blank verse the most exalted, way over this moral Alps, as found in his Paradise Lost, the story of which is as follows:

Long before the creation of this world, or any part of the solar system, when the space it now occupies was dark and void, when chaos reigned, as it had reigned from unbeginning eternity; on a certain day, such days as eternity brings forth, all the angels or first beings, were, by the summons of the Most High, brought immediately around the throne of the supreme presence; who, as they arrived, took their places according to their degrees of intellectual excellence, in circles, one beyond another, orb encircling orb, of circuits inexpressible, on account of their multitudes. From all the ends of heaven they journeyed on golden wings, under their various hierarchs, or angel-captains, waving as they came on, myriads of ensigns, standards and gon