Man has, therefore,, a power, by virtue of his own liberty of will, or in other words, his free agency to do acts of pure turpitude and horror, which do not promise, either at the time of commission, or at any future time, any degree of happiness, and more than this, has power to will his own misery, (though not to love it,) even without a hope of recompense, which is often done in pure spite to an upbraiding conscience, and of the counsels of the just and the good.

There is such a thing as abstract wickedness, and is called heart wickedness, or sin does not exist at all as a principle, and has no being among men, any more than it has among dumb animals; for animals often hurt, rob and kill each other, yet this is not sin, either against themselves or each other, or any evidence of depravity in their natures, as is the case with man; and the reason is because they are not moral agents.

Man has the power even to amputate his own limbs, to destroy his neighbor and his neighbors property, to commit suicide, and all manner of enormities; which if he had not, the omission of such evils, when tempted thereto, could not be a virtue. "The will is not necessitated, or so determined toward good as not to be able to do the opposite. This was the judgment of all antiquity, and of the church universal." Watson's Dictionary, page 899. So that the will is left free.

We feel and know intuitively, that we have a power presumptuously and foolishly to thrust ourselves into the water, into the fire, from the summit of a precipice, and upon death in many ways, even though we may not have the will to do so; and that we are able to use such power, even to our own destruction, without the hope of present or future good of any description. Power and will, it should be noticed, are two distinct principles, and are possessed by all accountable beings, and may be exerted preposterously, as well as consistently and virtuously, or man is not a subject of moral government, is not a free agent, cannot sin against God, his fellow, or himself.

But if, as before hinted, free-agency is a dangerous gift, it may be also said to be a glorious and valuable gift, as by it the only means of approach to the Divine likeness is afforded; as to this power, the law of God, which includes the whole system of Christianity, is addressed: so that an immeasurable amount of happiness may accrue from its right use, which could not take place on a contrary opinion. With this amazing qualification, which men and angels have, the doors of future happiness in eternal perpetuity, are unlocked to every virtuous aspirant, as they shall advance to boundless fields yet unknown, of pleasures untasted and unseen, in the empire of ceaseless duration; and would remain thus locked to endless ages, were it not for the right use of this key, intellectual free agency. Were it not for this qualification, man could not have either stood or fell, in the

proper sense of the word; yet free agency does not include in its nature the right to do wrong, but the power only.

What though it is contended by Universalists and some others, that man can choose nothing except that which is most agreeable to him, and therefore deny his essential moral freedom; yet they fail to prove this opinion; for even the very act of choosing that which is most agreeable, shows his freedom; for, if he chooses at all, it implies that he might not have thus chosen, and therefore, even in this case the power is still seen in its full force. We know it is impossible to be approached by two objects dissimilar to each other; the one pleasing and the other displeasing, without our perceiving it; but this very power of perceiving the difference, and of choosing the one and rejecting the other, is the proof of free agency, as without this power we could not perceive the supposed difference. In this respect, all animal life is alike; man only ascending by virtue of his rationality to moral subjects, while all the other grades of being below him, are left destitute, yet equally free to reject that which to them appears disagreeable. The fact, therefore, that man naturally chooses that which to him appears most agreeable, is as strong a proof of the existence of true free agency, as are the contrary exertions of the same power, shown in rejecting that which is disagreeable; for surely, he who can move forward can also move backward, though not with equal ease. When we speak of man's naturally choosing that which to him appears the most agreeable, we are not to compare this natural freedom with the freedom of water to run down hill, or the natural gravity of all ponderous bodies, as this latter fact cannot be estimated as moral freedom, there being no reflection or thought exerted in the case; while in the former there is reflection, and therefore choice is shown to be free; or choice cannot be shown to exist at all. The faculty, or power of free choice, is certainly shown to exist in the Scripture, where it is written, "choose ye this day whom ye will serve;" and in another place, "ye choose death in the error of your ways." It also is written of Moses, that when he had the opportunity of being king of Egypt, being heir apparent to the throne, on account of Thermutis, the daughter of Pharaoh, having adopted him as her son, that he chose to suffer reproach rather than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season. In this case, it is clearly shown, that the most agreeable object, as it regarded the senses of Moses, was rejected on the account of a more distant reward, not to be enjoyed till after death.

The fact that man is able to reject any object which may be presented to the senses, which promises immediate gratification, on the account of a more distant and elevated good, of a mental and moral character, is evidence of man's moral free agency, or freedom. If it be urged, however, by the opponent, that although

this power is in the possession of our race, yet it simply shows, after all, man's utter inability to choose that, which upon the whole, appears as the best or most agreeable, either to the senses, or the more elevated powers of the mind; we still maintain, notwithstanding, that his freedom is shown equally clear, or the word choice has no application to the condition of man; and would, were it so, render the application of moral law to the race, as improper and useless, as would be the application of moral law to the fishes of the deep. But if the term choice is descriptive of an optional power in the human soul, however it may be influenced by agreeable objects, whether physical or moral, then the doctrine of man's free agency is made out.

The five senses, hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting and feeling, are exactly adapted to our present condition; but if that higher power, called mind, one ingredient of which is its freedom of action, cannot govern those senses, then it follows that we see, not because the mind directs to the contemplation of objects; the ear hears, not because the mind watches to distinguish sounds; we feel, not because the mind discovers where the sensation is; we taste, not because the mind acknowledges this qualification of the glands of the mouth; we smell, not because the mind is delighted with this mysterious power; but because all these objects which are recognized by the senses, rush fortuitously upon them; not being directed by the mind how to distinguish between objects; which, were it so, would be to half uncreate the soul and body of man, and render him wholly unfit for the present mode of existence. The mind therefore, has this power of choice; it is not situated in any of the senses; the senses cannot control it; because it is a power wholly above that which is agreeable or disagreeable to these five avenues of the mind. Mind, therefore, is free, though adapted to the identical condition of the senses, which have no power of choice; and would, were it so, entirely destroy its existence, and reduce the whole animal world to the condition of mere matter. The fact is, the senses could be no senses, except the mind exists to comprehend them; and yet the mind can neither see, hear, smell, taste, nor feel. To suppose an organized body, without a mind, having all the senses, is to suppose the existence of eyes which cannot see, of ears that cannot hear, of taste which cannot taste, of smell which cannot smell, and of feeling which cannot feel.

Now ought it to be believed that these unthinking, unknowing senses, can, or do control the mind? if not, then it is clear that the mind can act independent of them, and above their solicitations; which proves its absolute power of freedom, or free agency, and the judge of what is best to be indulged in. But notwithstanding all this, we still admit that the mind cannot choose that which is disagreeable to it; yet contend, that this very fact is the whole amount of the evidence of its real free

agency; or, as we have before said, the term choice, has no application to the condition of our race; and also contend that this qualification gives not the right to do wrong, but only the power.

This view of the subject entirely clears the Divine Being of desiring, or of determining the fall of man, or of being the cause of sin, directly or remotely; which, were it so, would prove beyond all doubt, a determination that sin should somehow come to pass, that our first parents should fall, that a breach of God's law should be perpetrated, that contempt should be poured upon his own government. This would be strange work indeed, and so far as we are able to perceive, would make God a party with transgressors, or at least would afford the Most High an opportunity of demonstrating, how easily and wonderfully he could repair moral ruin, which himself was pleased to have take place, and more than this, would at once show that sin does not exist, as says the Deist, because any thing instituted, carried on, and perfected by the Divine Being, either by his own direct power, or by remote agencies of his, is right in principle and in effect, and therefore is no sin. But sin does exist, not only secondarily, as against our fellows, but also primarily against God, as the governor or statute of the universe; and though we believe the fall of man or angels were not desired events, on the part of God; yet we believe that he was greatly glorified in the redemption of our race, but dare not say as some have said, that more glory accrues to the Divine Being on that account, than if the law had not been kept by our first parents; for we ask, what more can even a redeemed creature do after all, than to keep God's holy law, which is no more, however, than could have been done, if men, or angels, had not have fallen. We dare not in this way, or any other way, make the Divine Being indebted to sin, which is the transgression of his own law, for an additional amount of glory to himself; nor dare we write and propagate among men, that the occurrence of sin was a desired event of the ever blessed God, as do Universalists. We are taught in Scripture that the immaculate life of Christ, as a man, honored for man the law, which had been dishonored by the disobedience of Adam and Eve; but there is no intimation in that book that it was more than honored, even by Christ himself, a thing impossible; how then can more glory arise to God, through the redemption, than if man had not sinned? But on the other hypothesis, this must be true, even though it is impossible, and brings the glory of God in debt to sin; because, if sin had not taken place, redemption would not have been applicable to our race.

But if we believe the fall of man was contrary to the will and desire of God, as produced by rebelling free agents, we then at once perceive how exceedingly glorious an undertaking the plan and execution of redemption was, and how wide a field in this occurrence, was opened for the exercise of real benevolence on

the part of God. But on the other idea, which supposes the Creator as willing, and desiring the fall of man, redemption dwindles in its glory down to a mere show and ostentatious parade of pity, which even in man could be nothing short of magnificently disgraceful; for if the fall of man was caused by the will of God, common generosity, nay, justice itself, would require that he should restore him again, if his fall into sin did not please him. But such was not the case; the fall of man was contrary to the eternal will of God; yet he could not prevent it, unless he would control, or take away their free agency, which would have been in part to have uncreated man, a thing impossible, as the Creator changeth not in mind, though the principalities and powers of rational existence which he has made, change in moral character ever so much.

Proofs of the Fall of the Angels, Refutation of several Propositions of Balfour respecting the Opinions of Zoroaster, as copied by the Orthodox Sects, according to this Author, with many other Curious Matters.

But to return again to the case of sinning angels, who kept not their first estate, as recorded by St. Jude and others, so as to ascertain the true origin of their sin, and reason of their apostacy, and of the being of Satan; as this subject is one of the chief objects of this work. But before we proceed to investigate this subject, we are necessitated to prove that some of the angels, whose existence and supernatural character we have made out already in this work, fell from heaven, their first habitation, and became enemies to God, and all his works, with him, now called Satan at their head. We undertake to prove this, because it is denied by those sects who do not believe that there is literally a personal conscious being called Satan, or beings called devils, demons, and evil spirits, beings of an invisible state; which, if we fail to perform, the chief design of this book is not made out, and the faith of those sects who deny their existence, stands unshaken in these respects.

In pursuit of such proof, we know not where to turn, except to the Scriptures; a book which is venerated by all, as the great text book of Christian theology, from whence all men draw authority in support of their religious faith, and is therefore an accredited source of information, on all subjects upon which it treats; and this subject, that of the fall of some of such angels, is one. A book so sacred, and so high in authority, upon which, as upon a foundation of adamant, is built not only the hopes of this life, in moralizing and evangelizing the world; but that of