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abstract ideas absurd Alciphron angles answer apparent magnitude appear Atheism Berkeley Berkeley's betwixt bodies cause ceived Cloyne colour Commonplace Book conceive consequently consider corporeal substance demonstration Descartes Dialogues distance distinct Divine doctrine doth effect Essay on Vision evident existence experience external farther figure finite geometry GEORGE BERKELEY greater hath Hence human Hylas imagine infinite infinitely divisible J. S. Mill knowledge language Leibniz living mind Locke Locke's magnitude Malebranche material world mathematicians Matter mean mind motion nature objects of sight opinion pain particular perceived by sense perceived by sight perception percipient Phil Philonous philosophers plain Principles realised reality reason relation scepticism sect seems sensations sensible qualities sensible things shew shewn signified simple idea sort soul Spirit substance suggest suppose tangible Theory of Vision thought tion Trinity College truth understanding universe unperceived visible extension volition wherein whereof words
Стр. 256 - ... when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out* of my study, I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study, I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
Стр. 258 - For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word the things we see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas or impressions on the sense; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself.
Стр. 259 - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure.
Стр. 257 - It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction.
Стр. 340 - ... we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.
Стр. 259 - ... so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no, existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit...
Стр. xxxii - Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind...
Стр. 260 - By matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence it is plain that the very notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance involves...
Стр. 292 - To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the .cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it.
Стр. 191 - Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see; quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?