for their object. It was far otherwise. God could not even bear that his people should be slaves. "I am Jehovah your God," says He, "which brought you out of the land of Egypt, that ye should not be their bondmen; and I have broken the bonds of your yoke, and made you to go upright."* This was the object of God with respect to the Israelites; and this is His calling to every man, "that he should go upright."

TOLERATION.

That a man may cease to be a bondman, and be free to "go upright," it is altogether necessary that the supremacy of the individual conscience be fully recognised and admitted. And when a man pleads 66 conscience" as the authority whose voice he desires to obey, it is altogether necessary, both to the ends of justice and to the speedy coming of the kingdom of truth, that a full toleration be granted to that man, however far his convictions may vary from those which are current at the time, or from the standard which is referred to by others, as the standard of truth. If, indeed, his convictions be such as either to indicate insanity, or to threaten the wellbeing of society, restraints may and ought to be imposed on him who holds them. In that case, a man, as a member of society, may justly be required to abstain from doing what he would have a right to do, were he an individual dwelling in solitude. Society can exist only by such compromises and concessions on the part of individuals. And when an individual refuses to make the concessions which the well-being of society requires, nothing else can be done but to restrain him or banish him. In all other cases, however, all men are to be tolerated while * Levit. xxvi. 13.

they do but hold what they conscientiously believe, and do but express what they feel conscientiously called upon to utter and maintain.

While a full toleration is to be granted to the persons holding such opinions, however, there may justly be a full intolerance of the opinions themselves; and the principle of toleration is well understood only when there is a full toleration for such intolerance. This may perhaps sound paradoxical, but yet there is no paradox in the statement. Intolerance must be tolerated. Wherever indeed there is true liberty in the mind, such as has been described in the preceding section, there cannot but be intolerance. Wherever there is a will bent upon truth, a knowledge of the worth of truth, and power or energy in the soul (which, as has already been shewn, are the elements of true liberty), there cannot but arise from the depths of that soul a hatred of falsehood, and an irresistible demand to express that hatred. There cannot but be intolerance of the false. No doubt in an enlightened man, such hatred, such intolerance, will never be felt in reference to matters of mere speculation, of which the wrong side does not contradict any known law of God, whether set forth in nature or in his word,-matters which either way are comparatively trivial in their bearings, both on faith or practice. But in reference to all matters of demonstration, matters which the declarations of revelation, or the laws of reason settle, and which are of important moral or religious bearings, one of the strongest feelings of an energetic and enlightened spirit is intolerance of the error which seeks to rival and supplant the truth. Nor can any thing shew more truly that all virtue has gone out of the soul, than a state of indifference and equanimity, when what is well known to be error is presenting itself to the soul's acceptance with the claims of truth, and asking the soul to reject the truth for its sake.

Intolerance, therefore, is a feeling which both does exist and ought to exist. Not to speak, therefore, of the necessity of toleration for that which has been, is now, and ever shall be so long as man loves truth, if there ought to be toleration for every thing which ought to be, there ought to be toleration for intolerance. Nor is the principle of toleration more than half understood or carried out into practice, till this is granted and acted upon.

But let it never be forgotten, that the intolerance which has been vindicated, is intolerence of that which is false only, or deemed to be so and that the expressions of intolerance, for which it has been maintained that there ought to be a complete toleration, are expressions directed against things not against persons, against errors either real or supposed, not against the persons or parties who hold these errors believing them to be truths. Such persons have a right to a full toleration, not indeed because they hold errors, but because they hold what they conscientiously believe to be true. To tolerate persons thus holding errors for truths, is not to do homage to error; it is only to refuse to make exceptions to the principle that conscience is always entitled to honour and regard, the only principle that can ever secure the moral peace of society or hasten the spread of truth.

That the dictates of conscience should in all cases whatever be equally deferred to, and no intolerance exercised towards any individual when he is obeying the commands of his conscience, appears to be a matter of universal right. For if two men are equally sincerely and disinterestedly convinced of the truth, each of his own views, they are surely on the same moral level, and have the same rights to be tolerated. If one of them hold views which are true, the other, views which are erroneous, then the former is indeed on a higher intellectual

level than the latter, and possibly enough his higher intelligence urging his moral feelings, may compel him to feel altogether intolerant of the views of the other, and urge him to express that intolerance with all the energy which deep conviction and impassioned eloquence may command. And in all this there is nothing wrong. It is only when we change our subject, when we leave the errors which we detest, and direct our attacks and vent our hatred on our unhappy fellow-creatures, who hold these errors, and whom we ever ought to love,—it is only then that we violate the principle of toleration. But then we do violate that principle, we sin, and do mischief.

We are intolerant in that case; for the principle of toleration is, that all who are sincerely convinced of the truth of what they hold, be at liberty to hold unmolested what they believe; and when they feel called upon, to maintain their views in such terms as those who differ from them, hold and maintain theirs. No doubt this principle, like every other general principle, has and ever must have its just limitations. Other general principles of paramount authority lie around it, and what is right to be done in any given case, can only be learned by co-ordinating all these general principles, and assigning to each its due share in giving a form to the action contemplated. It is another general principle, for instance, that a government must ever consult to the best of its ability for the well-being of the governed. And this general principle cannot but limit that of toleration, as the latter in like manner limits the principle of government. Thus it is plainly necessary for the well-being of society, that restraints be put on those who disturb its peace and security, who hold and would disseminate seditious or demoralizing principles. Nay, though persons holding such principles should be ready to swear that

they entertain them as their most sincere convictions, that were no sufficient reason why government should not restrain and even punish them, if not for holding, yet for propagating them; because, by so doing, they wilfully, if not intentionally, disturb and injúre society, and violate that understanding on which society exists. Such outrages must be prevented; and so long as the necessity exists, and other means remain undiscovered, restraint and punishment must and ought to be resorted to.

But in reference to views not attacking the well-being of society, and not owning consequences, which may be said, by those of the other side, to injure society, the principle of toleration demands an equal freedom of expression to all men who conscientiously believe what they desire to maintain; and every man violates this great principle who tries forcibly or passionately to put down the man who differs from him. But as the principle of toleration is only the principle of justice applied to a particular case, the man who violates the former, violates at the same time the latter, and therefore sins, as has been said. If one man were responsible for the opinions of another, though he had in no degree contributed to form or maintain them, the case would be different; at least it would be of far more difficult discussion. But as there is no such vicarious responsibility on the head of man, one man is not called upon to interfere with the sincere opinions of another in any forcible manner, or, indeed, any how against the consent of that other. Nay, not only is he not called upon so to interfere, he acts cruelly and unjustly when he does so. For, as the responsibility of the opinions in question rests on the head of him who holds them (or of those who have led him into the belief of them), it is plainly necessary, in order that this responsibility be rightly acquitted, that no restraint, no force, be applied. To act towards a responsible being in such