Horbach v. Miller. proved, which when taken together, inferentially, establish or prove the fact in question to a reasonable degree of certainty. We think the instruction was substantially in accordance with the principles of the law as above stated. But in respect to the same question, at the request of the plaintiff in error, the jury were further instructed that unless they believed from the evidence that the land described in the petition, was the identical land described in the deed offered in evidence by the defendant in error, they must find for the plaintiff in error. Hence, it seems clear from the record that the question of the identity of the land in controversy, was fairly and correctly submitted to the jury. On the sixteenth day of January, 1858, the plaintiff in error, by deed sold and conveyed block 1723 to Samuel Moffat, and after several intervening conveyances of this title by deed, it vested in Miller who now claims title to the land by virtue of his deed to the property. Horbach claims title to the land by virtue of an alleged adverse possession of the same. It is, however, contended on the part of the defendant in error, that such adverse possession must have been for the term of twenty-one years, in order to establish a title to the land, because at the time the plaintiff in error entered into the possession of the land, such period of time was the statutory limitation. But the act of February 12, 1869, changed the statutory period, and limits actions for the recovery of real estate to ten years; and the counsel for plaintiff in error contends that this latter act applies to this case, and fixes the time when his title becomes complete. It will be observed that by this act it is specially provided that it shall not take effect until the first day of July, 1869. Hence it is a question of construction as to what is the effect of this act on existing claims. We think the rule is correctly laid down in the case of Bigelow v. Bemen, 2 Allen, 497, as follows: "It is well settled that it is competent for Horbach v. Miller. the legislature to change statutes prescribing limitations to actions, and that the one in force at the time suit is brought is applicable to the cause of action. The only restriction on the exercise of this power is, that the legislature cannot remove a bar or limitation which has already become complete, and that no limitation shall be made to take effect on existing claims without allowing a reasonable time for parties to bring action before these claims are absolutely barred by a new enactment." In this case the court held that there was a reasonable and sufficient time given to bring the action between the time of the passage of the act and the time when it took effect. And in Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick., 433, it is held that what constitutes a reasonable time, in such case, is a question within the exclusive province of the legislature to determine. The ground on which the rule seems to be based is, that the right which the defendant has to bar an action by the statute of limitations, does not originate in or flow from any contract, and therefore this change of remedies does not impair private or vested rights which flow from or are incidental to contracts. Therefore these remedies may be altered or changed within reasonable limits, without impairing contracts or private or vested rights. Bingham v. Bigelow, 12 Met., 273. In view of these principles of law it seems clear that the legislature, in the act of 1869, fixed the time to bring actions on existing claims to real estate, before such claims should be absolutely barred by the new enactment. Now it is said that the elements of all title are possession, the right of possession, and the right of property; hence if, the adverse occupant has maintained an exclusive, adverse possession for the full extent of the statutory limit, the statute then vests him with the right of property, which carries with it the right of possession, and therefore the title becomes complete in him. In Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Burr, 119, Lord Mansfield says that "twenty Horbach v. Miller. one years is a positive title;" in Stokes v. Berry, 2 Salk., 421, it is held that this title will support ejectment; and in Graffins v. Totenham, 1 Watts and Sergt., 488, it is said that the effect of the statute is such as to transfer to the adverse occupant the title against which it runs. Gibson, J., says that "the title of the original owner is unaffected and untrammeled till the last moment, and it is vested in the adverse occupant by the completion of the statutory bar; the transfer has relation to nothing which preceded it; the moment of conception is the instant of birth." Therefore "the operation of the statute takes away the title of the owner and transfers it in legal effect to the adverse occupier;" and "one who purchases the written title of the owner, buys a title which. by operation of law was fairly vested in the adverse occupant." Schell v. The Williams Valley Railroad Co., 35 Penn. State, 204. It is, however, insisted that there must not merely be possession, but that this possession must be under a claim of right for the whole statutory period. This is true; but the question is, what constitutes such a claim of right? In answer to this, it is only necessary to observe that the rule seems to be well settled that acts of notoriety, such as building a fence round the land, entering upon the land and making improvements thereon, raising crops and felling trees thereon, are presumptive evidence and evincive of intention to assert ownership over and possession of the property; and taxation of the land for a series of years to the person claiming it, and the payment of taxes by him are competent evidence tending to show ownership. Elliott v. Pearl, 10 Pet., 412. Allen v. Gilmore, 13 Maine, 178. Little v. Libey, 2 Greenleaf, 242. Miller v. Shaw, 7 Sergt. and Rawle, 136. Farrer v. Fessenden, 39 New Hamp., 277. Angell on Limitations, Sec. 395. So is possession made out by placing on the premises buildings and receiving Horbach v. Miller. the rents and profits thereof. Poignard v. Smith, 6 Pick., 177. We think that under these rules of law, there was sufficient evidence offered on the trial to submit the case to the jury, to determine as a question of fact, whether the plaintiff in error had maintained his allegations of adverse possession, and the submissson of the case to the jury was, under the instructions of the court, at the request of the plaintiff in error, that if they believed from the evidence that the plaintiff in error, for ten years next before the commencement of the action, was in the actual, continued, and notorious possession of the land in controversy, claiming the same as his own against all persons, they must find for the plaintiff in error; and furthermore, that enclosing such land within a fence-the maintenance of such fence-cultivation of the land, and payment of taxes on the same for said period, with said intention, is sufficient in law to constitute adverse possession. We are satisfied that under these instructions, the question was fairly submitted to the jury, in accordance with the rules of law above stated, and that in this regard there was no error committed in the court below. It is assigned for error that the court permitted a map of the town to be offered in evidence by the defendant in error, to the admission of which the plaintiff in error objected. The record does not show that any ground of objection was stated, and therefore it would be difficult for this court to determine, in this case, whether there was or was not error in this ruling of the court. In all such cases the objections should be stated, for if the evidence was admissible for any purpose, it should be admitted: and in this case the admission of the evidence was proper simply to show the jury the arrangement of the blocks and streets of the town, in connection with the testimony of the surveyor. The People, ex rel., v. Martin, et al. On the whole we think, as shown by the record there was no error, and the judgment should be affirmed. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. MAXWELL, J., concurred. LAKE, Ch. J., having tried the cause in the court below, did not sit. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, EX REL THERON NYE, PLAINTIFF, V. WILLIAM MARTIN, LORENZO A. KIMBALL AND CLEVINS C. KENDALL, DEFENDANTS. 1. Elections: PROCEDURE IN CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF COUNTY OFFICERS. The board of justices chosen under Sec. 26 of the general election law, Gen. Stat., 359, in case of the contested election for any county office, should reduce all the evidence given before them to writing, in order to make the same available in case of an appeal to the district court; and though the statute is silent as to whom the custody and control of such testimony shall be intrusted, there is ample inherent power in the appellate court, to compel its production upon consideration of the case there. The trial in the appellate court should be confined to the testimony so taken, though in case of its loss or destruction, neither party would be debarred from introducing necessary evidence to supply such omission. 2. : APPEALS TO DISTRICT COURT IN CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS. A party aggrieved by any alleged error of the board of justices, chosen to hear contests relative to the election of any county officer, has his remedy by appeal to the district court, and a writ of mandamus from the supreme court to compel the correction of such error, does not lie against them. The statute regulating appeals in ordinary civil actions governs such appeal, and the appellate court has ample jurisdiction, though the cause must be tried by the judge without the aid of a jury. THIS was an application to this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for a writ of mandamus. The facts in the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court without setting forth the application at length. The statute regulating contested elections for |