rectly by a contract between the company and a third party for the
erection of buildings or other works of original construction. Toledo,
Delphos and Burlington Railroad v. Hamilton, 296.

2. Whether a mechanic's lien could, under the statutes of Ohio in force at
the time of the attempted filing of a lien in this case, be placed upon
a railroad, quære. Ib.

3. The priority of a mortgage debt upon a railroad has been sometimes dis-
placed in favor of unsecured creditors, when those debts were con-
tracted for keeping up a railroad, already built, as a going concern;
but those cases have no application to a debt contracted for original
construction. lb.

4. A mortgage with words of general description conveys land held by a
full equitable title as well as that held by a legal title. Ib.

5. In foreclosing a mortgage in Louisiana, the mortgagor is entitled in
making up the amount of the judgment, to be credited with judgments
against the mortgagee in another State which have been acquired by the
mortgagor. Mendenhall v. Hall, 559.

See APPEAL, 4;

RAILROAD, 1, 6.

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM.

See TAX AND TAXATION, 1, (2).

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. A power conferred by statute on a municipal corporation to subscribe
for stock in a railway corporation does not include the power to create
a debt, and to issue negotiable bonds representing it, in order to pay
for that subscription: and this doctrine prevails in Missouri. Hill v.
Memphis, 198.

2. All grants of power to a municipal corporation to subscribe for stock in
railways are to be construed strictly and not to be extended beyond the
term of the statute.

Ib.

3. The provisions in the general railroad law of Missouri, which went into
effect June 1, 1866, respecting the loan of municipal credit to a rail-
road company, and of the act of the State of March 24, 1868, respect-
ing the funding of the debts of municipalities, are to be construed in
subordination to the provision of the constitution of the State then in
force, prohibiting the legislature from authorizing any town to loan
its credit to any corporation, except with the assent of two-thirds of
the qualified voters, at a regular or special election. Ib.

4. Where a majority of the taxpayers of a town are authorized by statute
to encumber the property of all, in aid of a railroad or other corpora-
tion, the record must show that the statutory authority has been pur-
sued. Rich v. Mentz Township, 632.

5. The statute of New York of May 18, 1869, 2 Sess. Laws of 1869, 2303,

VOL. CXXXIV-50

authorized a county judge, on the petition of a "majority of the tax-
payers of any municipal corporation," verified by the oath of one of
the petitioners, for the issue of bonds of the corporation in aid of a
railroad, to take jurisdiction and to proceed, as provided under the act,
to determine whether the bonds should be issued. In 1871 this statute
was amended, 2 Sess. Laws 1871, 2115, so as to confer that jurisdiction
only when the application was made by "a majority of the taxpayers"
of the municipal corporation, "not including those taxed for dogs or
highway tax only." The town of Mentz issued its bonds for such a
purpose on an application made after the act of 1871 took effect, but
which in language complied with the act of 1869 only. The Court of
Appeals of the State of New York held these bonds to be void for
non-compliance with the provisions of the act of 1871; and following
the decisions of that court it is now Held, that the bonds sued upon by
the plaintiff in error are void. Ib.

6. Upon questions similar to the issues in this suit the decisions of the
highest judicial tribunal of a State are entitled to great, and ordinarily
decisive weight. lb.

7. There being on the face of the bonds sued upon an entire want of
power to issue them, no reference need be made to the doctrine of
estoppel. Ib.

NATIONAL BANK.

See JURISDICTION, B, 2.

NON-RESIDENT.

See QUIET TITLE.

PARTIES.

See EQUITY, 10.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. The third section of the act of the legislature of Texas entitled "An
act in relation to assignments for the benefit of creditors, and to regu-
late the same and the proceedings thereunder," passed March 25, 1879,
provides that "any debtor, desiring so to do, may make an assignment
for the benefit of such of his creditors only as will consent to accept
their proportional share of his estate, and discharge him from their
respective claims, and in such case the benefits of the assignment shall
be limited and restricted to the creditors consenting thereto; the
debtor shall thereupon be and stand discharged from all further lia-
bility to such consenting creditors on account of their respective
claims, and when paid they shall execute and deliver to the assignee
for the debtor a release therefrom." That section was amended by
an act passed April 7, 1883, so as to provide that "such debtor shall
not be discharged from liabilities to a creditor who does not receive as
much as one-third of the amount due, and allowed in his favor as a

valid claim against the estate of such debtor;" Held, that this legisla
tion applied to limited partnerships formed under chapter 68 of the
Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, adopted by an act passed March 17,
1879. Tracy v. Tuffly, 206.

2. An assignment by a limited partnership consisting of one general part-
ner and one special partner, for the benefit of its creditors, may be
executed by the general partner; and such assignment need not em-
brace the individual property of the special partner. Ib.

3. An assignment by a limited partnership for the benefit of its creditors
is not void because the verified schedule attached to the assignment
embraces a debt of the special partner, which cannot, under the stat-
ute, be paid ratably with the claims of other creditors. Ib.

4. The only effect of the failure of a limited partnership to state fully in
the published notice the terms of the partnership is that the partner-
ship shall be deemed general. Ib.

5. Circumstances stated under which creditors may be estopped to deny
the existence of a partnership as a limited partnership. Ib.

PATENT FOR INVENTION.

1. Under § 4887 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that "every patent
granted for an invention which has been previously patented in a for-
eign country shall be so limited as to expire at the same time with the
foreign patent, or, if there be more than one, at the same time with
the one having the shortest term, and in no case shall it be in force
more than seventeen years," a United States patent runs for the term
for which the prior foreign patent was granted, without reference to
whether the latter patent became lapsed or forfeited in consequence of
the failure of the patentee to comply with the requirements of the
foreign patent law. Pohl v. Anchor Brewing Co., 381.

2. There was no novelty or invention in "the combination of a griping chuck,
by which an article can be so held by one end as to present the other
free to be operated upon, with a rest preceding the cutting tool, when
it is combined with a guide cam, or its equivalent, which modifies the
movement of the cutting tool, all operating together for the purpose
set forth," which was patented to Charles Spring and Andrew Spring
by letters patent, dated May 10, 1859, and extended for seven years
from May 10, 1873; and the letters patent therefor are therefore in-
valid. Howe Machine Co. v. National Needle Co., 388.

PENAL STATUTES.

See STATUTE, A, 4.

POWER.

See WILL.

PRACTICE.

The fact that there is no controversy between the parties may be shown at
any time before the decision of the case; and there is no laches in de-
laying to bring it before the court until after argument heard on the
merits. Little v. Bowers, 547.

See APPEAL, 1, 2, 3;

CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION IN OPINION;

PUBLIC LAND.

EX POST FACTO LAW, 4;
JURISDICTION A, 11, 12.

A rule in force for the subdivision of public lands for disposal under the
public land law does not necessarily apply to the subdivision of pri-
vate lands by their owners after they have been granted by the gov-
ernment without having first made official subdivisions. McKey v.
Hyde Park, 84.

See ACCRETION.

QUIET TITLE.

1. A State may provide by statute that the title to real estate within its
limits shall be settled and determined by a suit in which the defend-
ant, being a non-resident, is brought into court by publication.
Arndt v. Griggs, 316.

2. The well-settled rules, that an action to quiet title is a suit in equity;
that equity acts upon the person; and that the person is not brought
into court by service by publication alone do not apply when a State
has provided by statute for the adjudication of titles to real estate
within its limits as against non-residents, who are brought into court
only by publication. Ib.

RAILROAD.

1. A railroad company made a mortgage to secure an issue of 3000 bonds
of $1000 each. It contracted with a contractor for the construction
of 31 miles of its road, and as part consideration therefor agreed to
give him 310 of these bonds. Before any further issues were made it
agreed with a banking house in New York, as a part consideration for
their acquiring these bonds, that it would only issue bonds to the ex-
tent of $10,000 a mile on its constructed road, and on the faith of this
the New York house bought and paid for the bonds, and the 31 miles
of road were constructed. Subsequently, and without constructing
any additional miles, it issued 147 more bonds which were mostly
used in the settlement of debts to parties who had notice of the agree-
ment with the New York house. Default having been made in pay-
ment of interest a bill in equity was filed to foreclose the mortgage;
Held, (1) That as to all persons acquiring any part of the 147 bonds
with notice of the agreement with the New York house, the 310 bonds
held by the latter were entitled to priority; (2) That holders who

took them without notice of it, whether taking originally from the
company, or by purchase from one who took with knowledge, were
entitled to share with the New York house in the distribution.

Murray v. Moran, 150.

Mc-

2. A consolidation of railroad companies in Missouri, under the act of
Missouri of March 24, 1870, § 1, held valid. Leavenworth County
Commissioners v. Chicago, Rock Island &c. Railway, 688.

3. A provision for the filing with the Secretary of State, by each of the
consolidating companies, of a resolution accepting the provisions of
the act, passed by a majority of the stockholders, at a meeting called
for the purpose, was not observed, but its non-observance did not
render the consolidation void. Ib.

4. The object of the statute was to prevent the consolidation of compet-
ing roads, and to confine it to roads forming a continuous line.
5. A certified copy from the office of the Secretary of State of the copy
of the articles of consolidation filed there, under the statute, is con-
clusive evidence of the consolidation in every suit except one brought
by the State to have the consolidation declared void. Ib.

6. A foreclosure of a mortgage on a railroad, and its sale under a de-
cree, held valid, in a suit attacking them for fraud, because of the
trust relations of the parties, when there was no collusion or fraud in
fact. Ib.

1. While repeals of statutes by implication are not favored by the
courts, it is settled that, without express words of repeal, a previous
statute will be held to be modified by a subsequent one, if the latter