CHAPTER II.

MORAL INSTITUTIONS.

§ 1. THE SOCIAL IMPERATIVE.-We have seen to some extent what the nature of the "6 ought" is. It is, as we may say, the law imposed by our ideal self upon our actual self. Since, however, the ideal self is the rational self, and since the rational self is not realized in isolation, but in a society of human beings, it follows that this "ought" is imposed on societies as well as on individuals. As Mr. Herbert Spencer says, ' "we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state"; and in considering such an ideal we pass a criticism not only on existing men, but on existing social states. Not only can we say that an individual ought to act in such and such a way, but we can also say that a society ought to have such and such a constitution. In so far as an individual acts as he ought to act, we say that his conduct is right, and that he is a good, upright, or moral man. In so far as a society is constituted as it ought to be, we say that it is a well-ordered society, and that its constitution is just. In each case we compare actually existing men or states with the ideal of a rational man and a rationally 1 Data of Ethics, chap. xvi., § 106.

2 It may be asked, On whom is this "ought" imposed? The answer is, on the society as a whole, and more particularly on its politicians and other "active citizens."

constituted state.

I

briefly consider. '

The latter of these we must now

2

§ 2. JUSTICE."Blessed," it is said, "are they that hunger and thirst after justice." But perhaps it is more easy to hunger and thirst after it than to define precisely what it means. Here, at any rate, we can only indicate its nature in the vaguest and most general way. For a fuller treatment reference must be made to works on Politics.

A just arrangement of society may be briefly defined as one in which the ideal life of all its members is promoted as efficiently as possible. The constitution. of a society is, therefore, unjust when large classes in it are so enslaved by others as to be unable to develop their own lives. It is unjust, for instance, when there is any class in it so poor, or so hard-worked, or so dependent on others, as to be unable to cultivate their faculties and make progress towards the perfection of

1 A complete discussion of this subject belongs rather to Politics or Social Philosophy than to Ethics. But it seems necessary to consider it here, in so far as it can be dealt with from a purely ethical point of view. Some of the points dealt with here are somewhat more fully discussed in my Introduction to Social Philosophy, chaps. v. and vi. English writers on Ethics have, as a rule, not given much attention to the subjects referred to in this chapter. Reference may, however, be made to Stephen's Science of Ethics, chap. iii., Porter's Elements of Moral Science, Part. II., chaps. xiii.-xvi., Rickaby's Moral Philosophy, and Clark Murray's Introduction to Ethics, Book II., Part II., chap. i. For fuller treatment the student must consult such works as those of Höffding and Paulsen. Some of the points are also referred to by Prof. Gizycki, whose work has been adapted for the use of English readers by Dr. Stanton Coit. Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts must, however, still be regarded as the model for the treatment of this whole subject. It has recently been translated into English by Professor Dyde.

2 The Greek word dikatorum, translated "righteousness," may equally well be rendered by "justice."

their nature. It is unjust when the idle are protected and set in power, and the laborious are crushed down and degraded.

To free society from such arrangements as these has been one of the chief efforts, perhaps the chief effort, of the wise and good in all ages; and there are certainly few things to which a student of Applied Ethics should give more attention than the methods by which this has been and may still be done. The subject is, however, much too complicated for such an elementary treatise as this, or indeed for any treatise; and all that we can here do is to indicate some of the main points that have to be attended to in constructing a just order of society. 2

§ 3. LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION.-The first thing to be observed is that a just arrangement of society can be only to a certain extent enforced. The saying has often been quoted

"How small of all that human hearts endure

That part which kings or laws can cause or cure!"

And it is partly true, if it be taken to apply simply to that which can be directly and immediately accomplished by positive laws. Laws are inefficient when a

1 In a just social state, every human being must be treated as an absolute end. It follows from this, however, that no one can be treated as the absolute end: otherwise every one else would be treated only as a means with reference to this one. Hence every one must be treated at once as means and as end.

2 The accounts of Justice given by Plato and Aristotle (Republic and Ethics) have never been surpassed. For more modern discussions, the student may be referred to Mill's Utilitarianism, chap. v., Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book III., chap. v., and Principles of Political Economy, Book III., chaps. vi. and vii., and Stephen's Science of Ethics, chap. v., §§ 35-39. See the Note at the end of this chapter,

people is by nature lawless; and when a people has become orderly or wise, laws may often be allowed to sink into abeyance. The conditions of life are continually changing, and positive laws which were beneficial at one time begin gradually to have a pernicious effect. It is, consequently, in many departments of life of far more importance to try to develop good habits of action and of opinion in a people than to furnish it with hard and fast positive enactments.1 Nevertheless, the sphere of positive law is a great one. Public opinion grows very slowly, and there are always considerable bodies in a community who are unaffected by it, unless it takes the form of definite laws, with punishments attached. Sometimes, after such laws. have fulfilled their purpose, it becomes desirable to repeal them. St. Paul said of the Jewish law that it was "a schoolmaster to lead men to Christ"; meaning that as soon as men grasped the true meaning of the moral ideal they could dispense with the narrow injunctions of the law, which, nevertheless, were necessary as a preparation. So it is with nearly all laws. They are too rigid and formal for human beings, as soon as they attain to true freedom; but they are necessary at first as a check upon licentiousness. What men do at first from fear, they learn by and by to do from habit, and afterwards from conscious will. Law comes first, then habit, then virtue. 2

1 This seems to express the element of truth in much of what is said by Mr. H. Spencer in his famous, but extremely one-sided book, The Man versus the State. Some aspects of the same point are brought out, in a more guarded way, in Aspects of the Social Problem, edited by Dr. Bosanquet.

2 Mr.Muirhead quotes (Elements of Ethics, p. 93, note), a story about Connop Thirlwall. "who on one occasion became involved in a

§ 4. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.—The forces of law and of public opinion are mainly concerned with the establishment of men's rights and obligations. These terms are strictly correlative. Every right brings an obligation with it; and that not merely in the obvious sense that when one man has a right other men are under an obligation to respect it, but also in the more subtle sense that when a man has a right he is thereby laid under an obligation to employ it for the general good. This fact is concealed from many men's minds through a certain confusion between legal and moral obligation. It is generally convenient to enforce the observance of rights by positive laws; whereas it is not generally convenient to enforce the corresponding obligation. Hence it comes to be thought that there is no obligation at all. For instance, it is convenient to protect property; whereas it would be very troublesome and dangerous to try to compel men to use their property wisely-and indeed any such attempt, beyond certain narrow limits, is almost bound to defeat its own ends. Hence it comes to be said that a man "may do what he likes with his own." Legally, he may; but morally, he is under the obligation to use his own for the general good, just as strictly as if it were another's. A man's rights, in fact, are nothing more than those things which, for the sake of the general good, it is convenient that he should be allowed to possess.

discussion with the late Dr. Christopher Wordsworth, Bishop of Lincoln, when the latter was residing at Trinity College, about the retention of enforced attendance at chapel. 'It is a choice,' said the Bishop, between compulsory religion and no religion at all.' 'The distinction,' replied Thirlwall, 'is too subtle for my mental grasp, The same might be said of compulsory morality it is equivalent