groundless are the sweeping complaints against moral philosophy, with which this book sets out.

But let us proceed to our principal object in this article, a consideration of the Calvinistic theory of moral philosophy, or, more exactly perhaps, the Calvinistic rejection of all former

theories.

And, in the first place, let us consider, a little more fully, the ground which Calvinism occupies. We ask its advocates to consider it, and to consider it without prejudice. They may be right. We will not call their faith in question now, but will only attempt to fix its position.

Its position with regard to moral philosophy, Dr. Wardlaw has stated. It is not, however, with philosophy alone, that Calvinism is at war, but with all literature, with all the histories in the world, with almost all the memoirs that ever were written, and not less, with the common sense, common conversation, and common conduct of all mankind. For what is the tenor of all the literature, the poetry, the fiction, the history, the biography in the world? What are the written, the recorded thoughts of mankind, as they bear upon the point before us? What is all this, that is portrayed by the hands of unregenerate men, and that draws its delineations from the characters of unregenerate men? Look into these works, and you find them filled with moral pictures, pictures of good and evil. Here, indignation at vice flashes across the page of genius; there, the pencil, dipped in the dyes of heaven, portrays the glowing form of moral beauty and commends it to the admiration of the world. Here,

"the historic muse,

Proud of her treasure, marches down with it

To latest time;

and there, satire throws its withering glance upon fraud and meanness. Here, the orator thunders out his anathema against the tyrant and oppressor; and there, friendship raises its monument to departed goodness, pours out its tears in eulogy and song, and bequeaths unequalled virtue to undying remembrance. "Such beneficence," is its language, "such beneficence, such excellence, such loveliness, when shall we look upon their like again? Well, it is all a mistake! concerning the mass of mankind, it is all a mistake! There is no ground in human nature for these moral discriminations. All

is wrong, all is evil; and what is called good is only the semblance of good. So ends the Calvinist's catechism. The same is true of the conversation and conduct of men. Their conduct, much of it, expresses confidence and love to one another. The manners of life all over the world, with however much of coldness and distrust, are nevertheless moulded by these sentiments of the heart; the approving smile, the glowing countenance, the outstretched hand, the fond embrace, are testifying all over the world, that there are qualities to be admired, that there are virtues to be loved. Conversation, too, is continually bearing witness to the same convictions. Men are everywhere speaking of one and another whom they know, as good, as excellent, as acting worthily and nobly. They are addressing to one another, in a thousand indirect forms of language, the same fervent and kind sentiments. Conversation, language, is everywhere spreading, in the breath of speech, its invisible network, and weaving the ties of affection that hold society together. And the very foundation of all this is confidence in human worth. But again we say, that Calvinism holds all this to be an entire mistake. And there is nothing on earth that is allowed to stand against this blighting judgment. You are surrounded, perhaps, with children. Their early affections, like their bright faces, are putting on a thousand quick, and fluctuating, and beautiful expressions. You are charmed and won by their infantile simplicity and exquisite tenderness. Their very voices seem to be softened and attuned by the gentleness of their hearts. "Beautiful ones of earth!" you are ready to exclaim, "almost meet for heaven! And the Saviour's voice answers back, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven!" It is all a mistake! says the system we are considering. In these children there is nothing really good; in the sight of the unerring Judge of right and wrong, nothing good! Your imagination may please itself with fancying that these are little cherubs; but the truth is, pardon the phrase for the sake of the truth, the truth is, that they are only little devils in the guise of cherubs! Because, if there were one particle of real holiness in these beings, if the only unerring eye saw any thing really good in them, then they would be something better than totally depraved; they would be Christians, says this system, (so say not we,) they would be Christians, and in the way to heaven; but there is not in them one particle of real excellence!

But we must stop here, one moment, to consider and to answer for the thousandth time, we suppose, the only objection that is ever offered to this conclusion. "Not one particle of holiness," the defender of this system may say; but still there is much that is amiable and excellent, in human nature; and much that is so pleasing, that it almost persuades us to call it real virtue." If we were dealing with a professed metaphysician or moral philosopher, we confess that we should hardly know how to suppress our indignation at such trifling with words, as appears in this objection. What is it, that is in controversy here? It is moral excellence. The question is about moral excellence, and about nothing else. It is not about what may chance to be pleasing and agreeable to a totally depraved nature, but about what is really good, good according to the only unerring standard. But what is the highest and most unerring standard ? It is the judgment of God. Is there any thing morally good in human nature, according to that standard? The Calvinist's answer is, Nothing. Here end all questions then. To say that there is something pleasing in human nature, as there is in animals, the horse and the dog, is nothing to the purpose. Το say, that there are semblances of goodness in men, is worse than saying nothing to the purpose. It is gravely putting forward an argument which can answer no end but that of self-deception. And, if we are so deceived, we ought to reform our language; we ought not to say that these semblances are excellent and lovely; we ought to suspect, and dread, and dislike them more than open vices; for they are more dangerous; they beguile us of all moral discrimination; they corrupt the fountain of truth in us. And, indeed, there are semblances of good, which are to be thus regarded; but the evasion we are considering, instead of exposing, helps to shield them. If the Calvinist only maintained that the mass of mankind is not prevailingly, habitually good, there would be no controversy. If he only said, that mankind are sadly depraved, that the highest principle of virtue, the fixed love of God, is wanting in multitudes, we should have no dispute with him. But he says that there is nothing good, not any, the least thing that is pure and holy, nothing, that by any addition or increase, can become holiness, not one solitary, momentary breathing of real virtue, ever to be found in human nature. Now, for Calvinists to admit that there is nevertheless some

thing pleasing, grateful, charming in human nature is all mockery. It is nothing to the purpose. We might as well be told that the human form is sometimes beautiful, the countenance lovely, the movement graceful. It is nothing to the purpose. The question now is, not a question of taste, but of theology. It is a question about the object, not of the imagination, but of the conscience, the moral nature. When men admire, praise, love the virtues of others, they suppose they admire, praise, love what is really, morally excellent. Do they so? Calvinism avers that they do not. If it admitted that there was any thing morally pure and good in what men love, that there was in human nature the least possible degree of what is pleasing to God and conformable to his law, the very basis of Calvinism would be taken away, and all its superstructure would fall to the ground. But it denies this, and therefore, we repeat, it stands confronted with the judgment of the whole world.

We return to this point, for we wish that this position of the system may be understood; we think it will be found to yield us some inferences.

This, then, is the position of the system and of its defenders. A few persons, a few individuals in a community, a few thousands in the world, declare, that all the rest are totally depraved, that there is no foundation in their nature for a system of moral philosophy; no truth in the moral part of their literature; nothing but error in their conversation, so far as it touches the moral qualities of those around them. All the rest of the world denies it; not in form, perhaps, but in fact denies it. That is to say, they speak about virtue, right, goodness, as realities, and not fictions and delusions. They say habitually, and they say it not of a few elected persons, but of many beside them, "such men are good men, such actions are right, such qualities are excellent and lovely." "No," say the few; "these things are not good, nor right, nor excellent." And when they say this, they oppose the judgment of the whole human race! Ask any man, whether he does not love a kind action, or a merciful deed; whether his feelings do not sometimes kindle at the thought of a generous benefactor, of an excellent parent, of a good and worthy man ; and he will, with all his heart, answer that they do. He would think himself a brute and a monster, if they did not. In fact, the language, the literature, we repeat, the poetry,

the history of all the world, is full of testimonies to the beauty of goodness. "Nevertheless," say the few, "there is not real love of goodness in the world; none but in the hearts of the regenerate. With the exception of what is good in them, there is no real goodness in the world. What men call goodness, is not goodness; and if it were, they would not love, but hate it. God, the infinitely good and kind Being, they perfectly hate." And when the few say this, we repeat, they set themselves against the judgment of the whole world!

It is not strange then, that Calvinism should find it difficult. to sustain itself in the public mind. It is not strange that its tenets, according to the experience and confession of all its advocates, should show a tendency, the moment they are let alone and left to themselves, to sink down, out of the public mind, and to be lost in the mass of opinions, so actively conflicting with them. This tendency is well understood, and universally acknowledged. There never was a city, nor village, nor hamlet in the world, where this system has been preached, that it did not sooner or later array against itself an intelligent opposition. And there never was a congregation on earth, where this system has once been preached, and has, at length, ceased to be urged, so that men's minds were left to take the natural course of human opinion, that they did not give up, one after another, every point of it. And it would be easy, if it did not seem invidious to mention now two cities in different parts of the world, inferior to none in general intelligence, once the strongholds of this system, now as much distinguished for their departure from it. Total depravity, we know, is the convenient explanation assigned for facts of this nature; but it would be, at any rate, a more modest solution of the phenomenon, to refer it to the total opposition which exists between all the current ideas, maxims, and literature in the world, and the system of Calvinism. Indeed, Calvinism far more needs, for its protection, a guardian Index Expurgatorius, than Popery. The moment its votaries get beyond the literature of the Institutes, and of Turretin, and of Ridgley's Body of Divinity, and Boston's Fourfold State, they are on dangerous ground. We say not this scornfully, but simply; inasmuch as it is simply true. For that moment they come in contact with opinions at war with their creed. The classic literature of all nations, from the times of Homer to this day, stands in direct contraVOL. XIX. 3D S. VOL. I. NO. I.

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