know little of the opposite side of the question, and therefore they exult in their own vain pretences to knowledge, as though no man of sense could oppose their opinion. They rail at an objection against their own sentiments, because they can find no other answer to it but railing. And men of learning, by their excessive vanity, have been sometimes tempted into the same insolent practice as well as the ignorant.

Yet let it be remembered too that there are some truths so plain and evident, that the opposition to them is strange, unaccountable, and almost monstrous and in vindication of such truths, a writer of good sense may sometimes be allowed to use a degree of assurance, and pronounce them strongly with an air of confidence, while he defends them with reasons of convincing force.

XX. SOMETIMES a question may be proposed, which is of so large and extensive a nature, and refers to such a multitude of subjects, as ought not in justice to be determined at once by a single argument or answer: as if one, should ask me, are you a professed disciple of the Stoics or the Platonists? Do you receive and assent to the principles of Gassendus, Descartes, or Sir Isaac Newton? Have you chosen the hypothesis of Tycho or Copernicus? Have you devoted yourself to the sentiments of Arminius or Calvin? Are your notions Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Independent, &c.? I think it may be very proper in such cases not to give an answer in the gross, but rather to enter into a detail of particulars, and explain one's own sentiments. Perhaps there is no man, nor set of men upon earth, whose sentiments I entirely follow. God has given me reason to judge for myself, and though I may see sufficient ground to agree to the greatest part of the opinions of one person or party, yet it does by no means follow that I should receive them all. Truth does not always go By the lump, nor does error tincture and spoil all the articles of belief that some one party professes.

Since there are difficulties that attend every scheme of human knowledge,

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knowledge, it is enough for me in the main to incline to that side which has the fewest difficulties; and I would endeavour, as far as possible, to correct the mistakes or the harsh expressions of one party, by softening and reconciling methods, by reducing the extremes, and by borrowing some of the best principles or phrases from another. Cicero was one of the greatest men of antiquity, and gives us an account of the various opinions of philosophers in his age; but he himself was of the Eclectic sect, and chose out of each of them such positions as in his wisest judgement came nearest to the truth.

XXI. WHEN you are called in the course of life or religion to judge and determine concerning any question, and to affirm or deny it, take a full survey of the objections against it, as well as of the arguments for it, as far as your time and circumstances admit, and see on which side the preponderation falls. If either the objections against any proposition, or the arguments for the defence of it, carry in them most undoubted evidence, and are plainly unanswerable, they will and ought to constrain the assent, though there may be many seeming probabilities on the other side, which at first sight would flatter the judgement to favour it. But where the reasons on both sides are very near of equal weight, there suspension or doubt is our duty, unless in cases wherein present determination or practice is required, and there we must act according to the present appearing preponderation of reasons.

XXII. In matters of moment and importance, it is our duty indeed to seek after certain and conclusive arguments (if they can be found), in order to determine a question: but where the matter is of little consequence, it is not worth our labour to spend much time in seeking after certainties; it is sufficient here, if probable reasons offer themselves. And even in matters of greater importance, especially where daily practice is necessary, and where we eannot attain any sufficient or certain grounds to determine a question on either side, we must then take up with such probable arguments as

we

we can arrive at. But this general rule should be observed, viz. to take heed that our assent be no stronger, or rise no higher in the degree of it, than the probable argument will support.

XXIII. THERE are many things even in religion, as well as in philosophy and civil life, which we believe with very different degrees of assent; and this is, or should be, always regulated according to the different degrees of evidence which we enjoy and perhaps there are a thousand gradations in our assent to the things we believe, because there are thousands of circumstances relating to different questions, which increase or diminish the evidence we have concerning them, and that in matters both of reason and revelation.

I believe there is a God, and that obedience is due to him from every reasonable creature: this I am most fully assured of, because I have the strongest evidence, since it is the plain dictate both of reason and revelation.

Again, I believe there is a future resurrection of the dead, because scripture tells us so in the plainest terms, though reason says nothing of it. I believe also that the same matter of our bodies which died (in part at least) shall arise; but I am not so fully assured of this circumstance, because the revelation of it is not quite so clear and express. Yet further, I believe that the good men, who were acquainted here on earth, shall know each other in heaven but my persuasion of it is not absolutely certain, because my assent to it arises only from circumstantial reasoning of men upon what God has told us, and therefore my evidences are not strong beyond a possibility of mistake. This direction cannot be too often repeated, that our assent ought always to keep pace with our evidence: and our belief of any proposition should never rise higher than the proof or evidence we have to support it, nor should our faith run faster than right reason can encourage it.

XXIV. PERHAPS it will be objected here, Why then does our Saviour, in the histories of the Gospel, so much commend

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mend a strong faith, and lay out both his miraculous benefits and his praises upon some of those creatures of little reasoning, who professed an assured belief of his commission and power to heal them?

I answer, The God of nature has given every man his own reason to be the judge of evidence to himself in particular, and to direct his assent in all things about which he is called to judge; and even the matters of revelation are to be believed by us, because our reason pronounces the revelation to be true. Therefore the great God will not, or cannot, in any instances, require us to assent to any thing without reasonable or sufficient evidence, nor to believe any proposition more strongly than what our evidence for it will support. We have therefore abundant ground to believe, that those persons of whom our Saviour requires such a strong faith, or whom he commends for their strong faith, had as strong and certain evidence of his power and commission from the credible and incontestable reports they had heard of his miracles, which were wrought on purpose to give evidence to his commission *. Now in such a case, both this strong faith, and the open profession of it, were very worthy of public encouragement and praise from our Saviour, because of the great and public opposition which the magistrates, and the priests, and the doctors of the age, made against Jesus the man of Nazareth, when he appeared as the Messiah.

And besides all this, it may be reasonably suppposed, with regard to some of those strong exercises of faith which

are

When our Saviour gently reproves Thomas for his unbelief, John xx. 29. he does it in these words, "Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed: blessed are they who have not seen, and yet have believed," i. e. Blessed are they who, though they have not been favoured with the evidence of their senses as thou hast been, yet have been convinced by the reasonable and sufficient moral evidence of the well-grounded report of others, and have believed in me upon that evidence. Of this moral evidence Mr Ditton writes exceedingly well in his book of the Resurrection of Christ,

are required and commended, that these believers had some further hints of inward evidence and immediate revelation from God himself; as when St Peter confesses Christ to be the Son of God, Matth. xvi. 16. 17. our blessed Saviour commends him, saying, "Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona;" but he adds, " Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven."

And the same may be said concerning the faith of miracles, the exercise whereof was sometimes required of the disciples and others, i. e. when by inward and divine influences God assured them such miracles should be wrought, their obedience to and compliance with these divine illuminations was expected and commended. Now this supernatural inspiration carried sufficient evidence with it to them, as well as to the ancient prophets, though we who never felt it are not so capable to judge and distinguish it.

XXV. WHAT is said before concerning truth or doctrines, may be also affirmed concerning duties; the reason of both is the same; as the one are truths for our speculation, the others are truths for our practice. Duties which are expressly required in the plain language of scripture, or dictated by the most evident reasoning upon first principles, ought to bind our consciences more than those which are but dubiously inferred, and that only from occasional occurrences, incidents, and circumstances: as for instance, I am certain that I ought to pray to God; my conscience is bound to this, because there are most evident commands for it to be found in scripture, as well as to be derived from I believe also that I may pray to God either by a written form, or without one, because neither reason nor revelation expressly requires either of these modes of prayer at all times, or forbids the other. I cannot therefore bind my conscience to practise the one so as utterly to renounce the other; but I would practise either of them as my reason and other circumstances direct me.

reason.

Again, I believe that Christians ought to remember the