proposition directly, or he distinguishes upon some word or phrase in the major or minor, and shews in what sense the proposition may be true, but that that sense does not affect the question; and then declares that in the sense which affects the present question, the proposition is not true, and consequently he denies it.

VIII. THEN the opponent proceeds by another syllogism to vindicate the proposition that is denied; again the re spondent answers by denying or distinguishing.

Thus the disputation goes on in a series or succession of syllogisms and answers, till the objector is silenced, and has no more to say,

IX. WHEN he can go no further, the next student begins to propose his objection, and then the third and the fourth, even to the senior, who is the last opponent.

X. DURING this time, the tutor sits in the chair as president or moderator, to see that the rules of disputation and decency be observed on both sides; and to admonish each disputant of any irregularity in their conduct. His work is also to illustrate and explain the answer or distinction of the respondent where it is obscure, to strengthen it where it is weak, and to correct it where it is false: and when the respondent is pinched with a strong objection, and is at a loss for an answer, the moderator assists him, and suggests some answer to the objection of the opponent, in defence of the question, according to his own opinion of sentiment.

XI. In public disputes, where the opponents and respondents choose their own side of the question, the modera tor's work is not to favour either disputant; but he only sits as president to see that the laws of disputation be ob served, and a decorum maintained.

XII. Now the laws of disputation relate either to the opponent, or to the respondent, or to both.

The laws obliging the opponent are these.

1. That he must directly contradict the proposition of the respondent, and not merely attack any of the arguments whereby the respondent has supported that proposition:

for

for it is one thing to confute a single argument of the respondent, and another to confute the thesis itself.

2. (Which is a-kin to the former) he must contradict or oppose the very sense and intention of the proposition as the respondent has stated it, and not merely oppose the words of the thesis in any other sense; for this would be the way to plunge the dispute into ambiguity and darkness, to talk beside the question, to wrangle about words, and to attack a proposition different from what the respondent has espoused, which is called ignoratio elenchi.

3. He must propose his argument in a plain, short, and syllogistic form, according to the rules of logic, without flying to fallacies or sophisms; and, as far as may be, hẹ should use categorical syllogisms.

4. Though the respondent may be attacked either upon a point of his own concession, which is called argumentum ex concessis, or by reducing him to an absurdity, which is called reductio ad absurdum, yet it is the neatest, the most useful, and the best sort of disputation where the opponent draws his objections from the nature of the question itself.

5. Where the respondent denies any proposition, the opponent, if he proceed, must directly vindicate and confirm that proposition, i. e. he must make that proposition the conclusion of his next syllogism.

6. Where the respondent limits or distinguishes any proposition, the opponent must directly prove his own proposition in that sense, and according to that member of the distinction in which the respondent denied it.

XIII. THE laws that oblige the respondent are these.

1. To repeat the argument of the opponent in the very same words in which it was proposed, before he attempts to answer it.

2. If the syllogism be false in the logical form of it, he must discover the fault according to the rules of logic.

3. If the argument does not directly and effectually oppose his thesis, he must shew this mistake, and make it appear that his thesis is safe, even though the argument of

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the opponent be admitted: or at least that the argument does only aim at it collaterally, or at a distance, and not directly overthrow it, or conclude against it.

4. Where the matter of the opponent's objection is faulty in any part of it, the respondent must grant what is true in it, he must deny what is false, he must distinguish or limit the proposition which is ambiguous or doubtful; and then granting the sense in which it is true, he must deny the sense in which it is false.

5. If an hypothetic proposition be false, the respondent must deny the consequence: if a disjunctive, he must deny the disjunction: if a categoric, or relative, he must simply deny it.

6. It is sometimes allowed for the respondent to use an indirect answer after he has answered directly: and he may also shew how the opponent's argument may be retorted against himself.

XIV. THE laws that oblige both disputants are these.

1. Sometimes it is necessary there should be a mention of certain general principles in which they both agree, relating to the question, that so they may not dispute on those things which either are or ought to have been first granted on both sides.

2. When the state of the controversy is well known, and plainly determined and agreed, it must not be altered by either disputant in the course of the disputation; and the respondent especially should keep a watchful eye on the opponent in this matter.

3. Let neither party invade the province of the other, especially let the respondent take heed that he does not turn opponent, except in retorting the argument upon his adversary after a direct response; and even this is allowed only as an illustration or conformation of his own response.

4. Let each wait with patience till the other has done speaking. It is a piece of rudeness to interrupt another in his speech.

Yet, though the disputants have not this liberty, the mo¬

derator

derator may do it, when either of the disputants breaks the rules, and he may interpose so far as to keep them to order.

XV. It must be confessed there are some advantages to be attained by academical disputation. It gives vigour and briskness to the mind thus exercised, and relieves the langour of private study and meditation. It sharpens the wit and all the inventive powers. It makes the thoughts active, and sends them on all sides to find arguments and answers both for opposition and defence. It gives opportunity of viewing the subject of discourse on all sides, and of learning what inconveniences, difficulties, and objections attend particular opinions. It furnishes the soul with various occasions of starting such thoughts as otherwise would never have come into the mind. It makes a student more expert in attacking and refuting an error, as well as in vindicating a truth. It instructs the scholar in the various methods of warding off the force of objections, and of discovering and refelling the subtile tricks of sophisters. It procures also a freedom and readiness of speech, and raises the modest and diffident genius to a due degree of courage.

XVI. BUT there are some very grievous inconveniences that may sometimes overbalance all these advantages. For many young students, by a constant habit of disputing, grow impudent and audacious, proud and disdainful, talkative and impertinent, and render themselves intolerable by an obstinate humour of maintaining whatever they have asserted, as well as by a spirit of contradiction, opposing almost every thing that they hear. The disputation itself often awakens the passions of ambition, emulation, and anger; it carries away the mind from that calm and sedate temper which is so necessary to contemplate truth.

XVII. IT is evident also, that by frequent exercises of this sart, wherein opinions true and false are argued, supported, and refuted on both sides, the mind of man is led by insensible degrees to an uncertain and fluctuating temper, and falls into danger of a sceptical humour, which never comes to an establishment in any doctrines. Many persons

by

by this means become much more ready to oppose whatsoever is offered in searching out truth; they hardly wait till they have read or heard the sentiment of any person, before their heads are busily employed to seek out arguments against it. They grow naturally sharp in finding out dif ficulties; and by indulging this humour, they converse with the dark and doubtful parts of a subject so long, till they almost render themselves incapable of receiving the full evidence of a proposition, and acknowledging the light of truth. It has some tendency to make a youth a carping critic, rather than a judicious man.

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XVIII. I WOULD add yet further, that in these disputations, the respondent is generally appointed to maintain the supposed truth, that is, the tutor's opinion. But all the opponents are busy and warmly engaged in finding arguments against the truth. Now, if a sprightly young genius happens to manage his argument so well as to puzzle and gravel the respondent, and perhaps to perplex the moderator a little too, he is soon tempted to suppose his argument unanswerable, and the truth entirely to lie on his side. The pleasure which he takes in having found a sophism which has great appearance of reason, and which he himself has managed with such success, becomes perhaps a strong prejudice to engage his inward sentiments in favour of his ar gument, and in opposition to the supposed truth.

XIX. YET perhaps it may be possible to reduce scholastic disputations under such a guard, as may in some measure prevent most of these abuses of them, and the unhappy events that too often attend them; for it is pity that an exercise which has some valuable benefits attending it, should be utterly thrown away, if it be possible to secure young minds against the abuse of it; for which purpose some of these directions may seem proper.

XX. General directions for scholastic disputes.

1. Never dispute upon mere trifles, things that are utterly useless to be known, under a vain pretence of sharpening the wit for the same advantage may be derived from solid

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