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The Commission has no jurisdiction unless the claim is filed in time and cannot relieve from the operation of the statute.163 Section 16 was amended in 1924 by changing the provisions relating to the limitation of actions.164

§ 267. General Investigations by the Commission. The Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized and empowered to enforce the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. To accomplish such purpose, it has authority to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of the Act, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same is conducted, and shall have the right to obtain from such common carriers full and complete information necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was created, and it may institute any inquiry on its own motion in the same manner and to the same effect as though complaint had been made. It also has "power to require, by subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation. Such attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evidence, may be required from any place in the United States, at any designated place of hearing. And, in case of disobedience to a subpoena, the Commission, or any party to a proceeding before the Commission, may invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents under the provisions of this section. "165

In the Brimson case,166 an informal complaint having been.

163 Werner Saw Mill Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 388; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 230 U. S. 304, 57 L. Ed. 1474, 33 Sup. Ct. 938. To stop the running of the statuté there must be a definite claim for reparation in the complaint filed, Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ferguson Saw Mill Co., 235 Fed. 474, 484, 149 C. C. A.

164 43 Stat. 633. For amended provisions, see 49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 16, par. (3).

165 Sec. 12 of Act; Sec. 481, post. 166 Int. Com. Com. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. Ed. 1074, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125.

made of the facilities of certain carriers, the Commission, of its own motion, decided to investigate the matters set forth in such complaint; and thereupon it made an order reciting the facts of the informal complaint and requiring each of certain named carriers "to make and file, in its office at Washington, a full, complete, perfect and specific verified answer setting forth all facts in regard to the matters complained of and responding to" certain questions relating to the methods of operation of the carriers and especially as to the relation of such carriers to the Illinois Steel Company. To these questions each carrier filed a denial and each averred that it had, in all respects, complied with the obligations imposed by the laws of the United States. Notwithstanding these denials, the Commission continued the investigation by the examination of witnesses and books and documents. It subpoenaed W. G. Brimson, who was president and manager of five carriers incorporated under the laws of Illinois, which carriers were among those under investigation. This witness refused to answer the question as to the ownership of his companies by the Illinois Steel Company. Other witnesses refused to answer the same question. The Commission thereupon filed its petition in the Circuit Court praying that the witnesses be required to answer the questions. The Circuit Court refused the order, holding that the proceeding did not constitute a controversy to which the judicial power of the United States could be extended. Section 12 of the Act was held valid in the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court reversed and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court. The very able opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan concluded as follows:

"We are of the opinion that a judgment of the circuit court of the United States determining the issues presented by the petition of the Interstate Commerce Commission and by the answers of appellees, will be a legitimate exertion of judicial authority in a case or controversy to which, by the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends. And a final order by that court dismissing the petition of the Commission, or requiring the appellees to answer the questions propounded to them, and to produce the books,

papers, etc., called for, will be a determination of questions upon which a court of the United States is capable of acting and which may be enforced by judicial process."

In the Baird case,167 which was also an application of the Commission to the court to compel the testimony of witnesses, the defendant urged that though a complaint was filed, the complainant "did not show any real interest in the case brought." The witnesses were required to answer.

In the Harriman case,' 168 the investigation was upon the motion of the Commission, not upon complaint. The relations between the Union Pacific Railroad Company and other connecting roads, whether parallel or not, were inquired about and certain questions asked were, under advice of counsel, not answered by the witnesses.

The gist of the opinion is contained in a short paragraph, which is here reproduced:

"We are of the opinion on the contrary that the purposes of the act for which the Commission may exact evidence embrace only complaints for violation of the act, and investigations by the Commission upon matters that might have been made the object of complaint. As we have already implied the main purpose of the act was to regulate the interstate business of carriers, and the secondary purpose, that for which the Commission was established, was to enforce the regulations enacted. These in our opinion are the purposes referred to; in other words the power to require testimony is limited, as it usually is in English-speaking countries at least, to the only cases where the sacrifice of privacy is necessary-those where the investigations concern a specific breach of the law."

In its twenty-second Annual Report (1908) the Commission pointed out the difficulties of administering the law with the limitations stated in the Harriman case.

§ 268. Same Subject-Amendments of 1910 and 1920.Section 13 of the Act in force at the date of the decision in the Harriman case, supra, after providing for hearings on

167 Int. Com. Com. v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. Ed. 860, 867, 24 Sup. Ct. 563.

168 Harriman v. Int. Com. Com., 211 U. S. 407, 419, 420, 53 L. Ed. 253, 29 Sup. Ct. 115.

complaint, in addition to the power conferred by Section 12, supra, gave power to the Commission to "institute any inquiry on its own motion in the same manner and to the same effect as though complaint had been made." The same section as amended by the Act of 1910109 materially enlarges the powers of the Commission in this respect, giving it full authority and power "on its own motion in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which a complaint is authorized to be made, to or before said Commission by any provision of this Act, or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions of this Act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act. And the said Commission shall have the same powers and authority to proceed with any inquiry instituted on its own motion as though it had been appealed to by complainant on petition under any of the provisions of this Act, including the power to make and enforce any order or orders in the case, or relating to the matter or thing concerning which the inquiry is had excepting orders for the payment of money."

The Transportation Act, 1920, increased the subjects that may be investigated, but did not change the principles which should control such investigations.170

In the Harriman case, this quaere was propounded: "Whether Congress has unlimited power to compel testimony in regard to subjects which do not concern direct breaches of the law, and whether, and to what extent, it can delegate such power." It need not be said that Congress has unlimited power in this respect, but it would seem that the power granted to the Commission as stated herein was a proper and constitutional delegation, because necessary to the performance of the duties of the Commission under the Interstate Commerce Act. The Goodrich Transit Co. case, while not directly in point, supports this statement.171

169 Sec. 484, post.

170 Transportation Act 1920, Sec. 416; Int. Com. Act, Sec. 13; Secs. 484, 485, 486, post.

171 Int. Com. Com. V. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 56 L. Ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, reversing Com

merce Ct. in Goodrich Transit Co. v. Interstate Com. Com., 190 Fed. 943, Commerce Court Opinions Nos. 21-24, p. 95; See in this connection: Smith v. Int. Com. Com., 245 U. S. 33, 62 L. Ed. 135, 38 Sup. Ct. 34.

The provisions of the Act giving the Commission power to prescribe methods of accounting and to require reports from the carriers subject to its jurisdiction, are complementary to the power to make general investigations, and these powers relating to the accounts which such carriers must keep are valid.172 In making investigations into the "accounts, records and memoranda" kept by the carriers, the Commission has no power to investigate general correspondence and original documents not required to be entered on their books. 173 The rather extraordinary avowal by counsel asking the questions that they were asked as the beginning of "an attempt to go into the whole business of the Armour car lines-a fishing expedition into the affairs of a stranger for the chance that something discreditable might turn up," resulted, in the Ellis case,174 in a refusal by the witness to answer the questions. After making the statement in the quotation above, the Supreme Court held that the Commission had no power to demand answers to such questions.

§ 269. Commission May Ask the Aid of Courts to Enforce the Law. We have seen that the Commission may apply to courts to aid it in obtaining testimony in investigations relating to violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. Upon request of the Commission, it shall be the duty of any District Attorney of the United States to whom the Commission may apply to institute in the proper court and to prosecute under the direction of the Attorney-General of the United States all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act and for the punishment of all violations thereof.

At the request of the Commission, suit was filed and an injunction granted enjoining a carrier from engaging in interstate commerce without filing tariffs and making reports as required by law and also enjoining discriminatory practices.175

172 Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. U. S. 231 U. S. 423, 58 L. Ed. 926, 34 Sup. Ct. 125.

173 United States v. L. & N. R. Co., 212 Fed. 486; affirmed U. S. v. L. & N. R. Co., 236 U. S. 318, 59 L. Ed. 598, 35 Sup. Ct. 363; United

States v. N. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 217
Fed. 254.

174 Ellis v. Interstate Com. Com., 237 U. S. 434, 59 L. Ed. 1036, 35 Sup. Ct. 645.

175 United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Co., 226 U. S. 286,

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