That a carrier may be compelled to transport freight over the connection between the terminus of another line to a teamtrack or other siding on its own line, was determined by the Supreme Court in Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission.95 In this case, discrimination was alleged before the Commission, which made an order requiring that the discrimination be removed and that a new tariff be filed and made effective granting "like charges for the movement of a carload shipment received from an industry in the city of Detroit, upon said Grand Trunk Western Railway, consigned for delivery upon a team track or other siding of said road, within the same city, and for a like shipment received by said Grand Trunk Western Railway from a connecting carrier at a junction point within the corporate limits of the city of Detroit, consigned to a team track or other siding upon said road within the same city."

The carrier filed a tariff which the Commission suspended and an injunction was sought. The question arising in the suit was stated by the Supreme Court as follows:

"The question in the case is whether, under the statutes of the state of Michigan, appellants can be compelled to use the tracks it owns and operates in the city of Detroit for the interchange of intrastate traffic; or, stating the question more specifically, whether the companies shall receive cars

53 L. Ed. 1004, 29 Sup. Ct. 678, reversing So. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Hay & Grain Co., 153 Fed. 728, 82 C. C. A. 614. Indemnity may be required of an irresponsible carrier, Enterprise Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 12 I. C. C. 326; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. Ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. 115, affirming Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co., 71 Minn. 519, 74 N. W. 893, 40 L. R. A. 389, 70 Am. St. Rep. 358; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 46 L. Ed. 1151, 22 Sup. Ct. 900, affirming State v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60, 89 Am. St. Rep. 514; Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L.

Ed. 863, 32 Sup. Ct. 535, reversing
State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v.
R. R. Com. of Washington, 52 Wash.
17, 100 Pac. 179.

95 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Michigan R. Com. 231 U. S. 451, 58 L. Ed. 310, 34 Sup. Ct. 152, affirming same styled case, 198 Fed. 1009. To same effect see Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Indiana, 175 Ind. 630, 95 N. E. 364; Thompson v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 105 Tex. 372, 126 S. W. 257, on rehearing 128 S. W. 109, 2 Ann. Rep. Ind. Pub. Ser. Com. 107 et seq., Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Ga., 206 Fed. 181, 213 Fed. 27.

from another carrier at a junction point or physical connection with such carrier within the corporate limits of Detroit for transportation to the team-tracks of the companies; and whether the companies shall allow the use of their teamtracks for cars to be hauled from their team-tracks to a junction point or physical connection with another carrier within such limits and be required to haul such cars in either of the above-named movements or between industrial sidings."

The question thus stated was resolved in favor of the validity of the order of the state commission, although throughout the opinion emphasis is laid upon the fact of "the exceptional situation of Detroit" where the service required by the order covered an area of twenty-two miles.

To the contention that the last order suspending the tariff, which was the order involved, interfered with interstate commerce, the court said, "the contention is premature, if not without foundation." The question as stated related to intrastate commerce, and the answer must be similarly limited.

96

The Jacobson case, cited note, ante, was relied on, and the second of the Stock Yards cases, also cited note, ante, was distinguished. Had the order of the Michigan Commission required the transportation or delivery of commodities moving to or from another state, it would have been a direct attempt to regulate interstate commerce, and void under the decisions in the cases of McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co. and Ill. C. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana. The Michigan case referred to a transportation service to be performed by the carrier for a fixed compensation and does not answer the quære in the Riverside Mills case as to whether or not "a carrier can be compelled to accept goods for transportation beyond its own lines or be required to make a through or joint rate over independent lines." The Supreme Court of

96 McNeill v. So. Ry., 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. Ed. 1142, 26 Sup. Ct. 722, modifying So. Ry. Co. v. Greensboro Ice & Coal Co., 134 Fed. 82. See Sec. 14, ante, Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Railroad Com. of La. 236 U. S. 157, 59 L. Ed. 517, 35 Sup. Ct. 275.

97 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 55 L. Ed. 167, 31 Sup. Ct. 164, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7, affirming Riverside Mills v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 168 Fed. 987.

Georgia has answered the question negatively,98 the Judge delivering the opinion using this language:

"A corporation may voluntarily make a contract of this sort, but there is no law that we know of which compels it to make one against its wishes. And, speaking for myself, I doubt very much the power of the legislature to enact a law compelling a railroad to make a contract for a through bill of lading beyond its terminus.”

Under the Interstate Commerce Act (Secs. 404 and 496, post) the Interstate Commerce Commission is given the power, which is frequently exercised, to require connecting carriers to establish through routes and joint rates, and there appears no reason why a state should not, as to intrastate commerce in a proper case, compel carriers to interchange freight.

§ 16. Regulating Crossings.-The state may regulate public railroad crossings. The police powers of the state are sufficient to enable them to protect the public from danger at places where railroads cross public streets and roads and where one railroad crosses another. Such regulation, although affecting interstate railroads, falls within the class of legislation "which," as was said by Chief Justice Marshall, "can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves.''99 Congress has not attempted to legislate on the subject, and that state legislation "relating to railway crossings" is valid has been determined so frequently as to make extensive citation of authorities unnecessary.100

98 Coles v. Central R. & B. Co., 86 Ga. 251, 12 S. E. 749; State v. Wrightsville & Ten. R. Co., 104 Ga. 437, 30 S. E. 891; Wadley So. Ry. Co. v. State, 137 Ga. 497, 73 S. E. 741. To the same effect, see Lotsfreich v. Central R. & B. Co., 73 Ala. 306; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 120 S. W. 1028; Home Tel. Co. v. Granby & Neosho Telephone Co., 114 Mo. 1111, 126 S. W. 773.

99 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.

100 New York & N. E. R. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. Ed. 269, 14 Sup. Ct. 437, extension of grade crossings; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. Ed. 948, 18 Sup. Ct. 513, viaduct over a street; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Indiana, 221 U. S. 400, 55 L. Ed. 786, 31 Sup. Ct. 537, interlocking plant at crossing of two railroads; Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co. v. Hunt, 38 Ind. App. 657, 78 N. E. 358; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McNamare, 91 Ark.

Similar to the power of the states to regulate crossings is the power to exercise a control over the right of way. A law of Texas prescribing the duty of preventing the growth of particular vegetation was held valid.101 Regulations requiring guard posts on railroad trestles and bridges, and stock gaps at crossings, are within the police power of a state.102

A law of the state of Georgia requires railway locomotives running on the main line to be equipped with electric headlights of a certain prescribed character. Locomotives thus required to be equipped were used in hauling interstate freight, and it was urged that the statute constituted an unwarrantable interference with interstate commerce. The validity of the statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of Georgia,103 and, upon a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, the judgment of the state court was affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States cited as controlling the case of New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41 L. Ed. 853, 17 Sup. Ct. 418, supra, where a law prescribing regulations concerning the heating of cars was held valid, and stated the principle applicable to be: "In the absence of legislation by Congress, the states are not denied the exercise of their power to secure safety in the physical operation of railroad trains within their territory, even though such trains

515, 122 S. W. 102, blocking frogs; State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 177 Ind. 553, 96 N. E. 340; Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 58 L. Ed. 721, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, regulating operation of cars in streets and affirming same styled case, 155 N. C. 356, 71 S. E. 514. See also St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Ark., 240 U. S. 518, 60 L. Ed. 776, 36 Sup. Ct. 443, and Western & Atlantic R. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 73 L. Ed. 884, 49 Sup. Ct. 445.

101 Mo. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 48 L. Ed. 971, 24 Sup. Ct. 638; Chicago T. H. & S. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 242 U. S. 283, 61 L. Ed. 302, 37 Sup. Ct. 124.

102 Alabama Great So. R. Co. v. Fowler, 104 Ga. 148, 30 S. E. 243; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41 L. Ed. 853, 17 Sup. Ct. 418, affirming 142 N. Y. 646, 37 N. E. 568, holding valid a law relating to heating trains. See the case of Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 58 L. Ed. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 400; same styled case 115 Minn. 460, 133 N. W. 169, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1027, and cases cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States.

103 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Georgia, 135 Ga. 545, 69 S. E. 725, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 20.

See as sustaining the comment in the text, notes 104 and 133, post.

are used in interstate commerce."104 Having in mind that Congress has enacted several safety-appliance acts,105 it would seem that there is reason supporting the argument that Congress has already "occupied the field" wherein "safety in the physical operation of railroad trains" is provided. This decision of the Supreme Court can, with difficulty, be reconciled with a subsequent decision of the court, holding that a law of Indiana requiring hand-holds on freight cars used in interstate commerce was void.106

§ 17. Elevator Charges. Transportation, as defined by the Interstate Commerce Act (post, Sec. 403) includes all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property transported.

The charges for elevating products as a part of an interstate transportation of such products is clearly not subject to state regulation, but must be prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.107

In the Minnesota Rate cases, at pp. 413 and 414 of the opinion, Mr. Justice Hughes cited the Granger cases and the Railroad Commission cases, and in referring to the Munn case,' 108 said:

"The court had before it the statute of Illinois governing the grain warehouses in Chicago. Through these elevators, located with the river harbor on the one side and the railway tracks on the other, it was necessary, according to the course of trade, for the product of seven or eight states of the West to pass on its way to the states on the Atlantic coast. In addition to the denial of any legislative authority to limit charges it was urged that the act was repugnant to the ex

104 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 58 L. Ed. 312, 34 Sup. Ct. 829. See note 140.

105 Sec. 393, post.

106 Southern R. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Ind., 236 U. S. 439, 59 L. Ed. 661, 35 Sup. Ct. 304; reversing same styled ease, 179 Ind. 23, 100 N. E. 337. Note 122, post.

107 Int. Com. Com. v. Diffenbaugh,

222 U. S. 42, 56 L. Ed. 83, 32 Sup. Ct. 22; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Updike Grain Co., 222 U. S. 215, 56 L. Ed. 171, 32 Sup. Ct. 39.

108 Simpson et al., R. R. Com. of Minnesota v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 432, 433, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 Sup. Ct. 729; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. (4 Otto) 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.