But how can man act before he is? Perhaps we cannot perfectly explain the How, but we can state, and have stated the That, that the fact is so. But at the same time we beg it to be understood that it is only in one sense that this is true. We would not be misunderstood. We here guard ourselves from the imputation of saying that in every sense man is absolutely a nonentity before he acts, or that he actually creates his Being. This we are very far indeed from affirming. Prior to the act of consciousness, he possesses as we have said an existence in the eyes of others; and this species of existence is undoubtedly given. Anterior to this act, the foundations of his Being are wonderfully and inscrutably laid. He is a mighty machine testifying his Creator's power. But at this time being destitute of consciousness, we again maintain that he is destitute of personality, and that therefore he wants that which constitutes the true reality and proper life of humanity. We maintain further, that this personality, realized by consciousness, is a new kind of existence reared up upon the ground of that act; that further, there was no provision made in the old substratum of unconscious Being for the evolution of this new act; but that, like the fall of man with which perhaps it is in some way connected, it is an absolutely free and underived deed, selforiginated, and entirely exempt from the law of causality; and moreover, in its very essence, the antagonist of

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that law. This we shall endeavour to make out in the following chapters, and if we can succeed in showing this act to be primarily original and free, of course it will follow that the Being which results from it must be free likewise. But whether we succeed or not, we at any rate think that having shown fully that the thought I" precedes and brings along with it the reality or existence "I," and that this thought "I" is an act, we have now said enough to establish this important truth in psychology, that man, when philosophizing concerning himself, does not do well to commence with the contemplation, or with any consideration of hunself as a Being, we say this with an especial eye to the substance and doctrine of "Mind,” for his proper Being is but a secondary articulation in his actual development, and therefore ought to form but a secondary step in his scientific study of himself, and ought to hold but a subordinate place in his regard. But he ought to commence with the contemplation of himself as an act, the act of consciousness, for this is in reality his true and radical beginning; and therefore, in speculation, he ought to follow the same order; and copying the living truth of things in his methodi cal exposition of himself, should take this act as the primary commencement or starting-point of his philosophical researches. Such in our opinion is the only true method of psychological science.

Man's existence for others, his unconscious existence, is immediately given; his existence for himself, his conscious personal existence, the reality ego is not immediately given, but is realized through an act. Thus a radic al distinction between these two sorts of existence is established, the one being found to precede, and the other to follow that act. The Necessitarian however takes no note of this distinction. He breaks down the line of demarcation between them. He runs the two species of existence into one; and the Libertarian, usually acquiescing in this want of discrimination, places in his adversary's hand the only weapon with which he might success,

fully have combated him. Disagreeing widely in their conclusions, they yet agree so far in their premises, that both of them postulate, in an unqualified manner, man's existence as a substratum for his actions. On this account therefore it must be confessed that the victory in point of logic has always been on the side of the Necessitarian, however much commonsense and moral principle may have rebelled against his conclusions. For a given or compulsatory existence can never be free in any of its acts. It can merely serve to conduct the activity transmitted to it from other quarters; and the peculiar inflections, whatever these may be, whether to evil or to

good, which it may appear to give to that activity, cannot be owing to any original or underived power it possess es, but must depend upon its natural construction, just as a prism has no power in itself to refract this way or that the rays of light which pass through it, but is determined to this refraction by the particular angles into which, without being consulted, it was at first cut by the hand of its artificer. In point of fact, the activity of such a being is no activity at all, but pure passivity; for a derivative act is not properly action, but passion. In merely receiving and passing on an act, a creature is not an agent, but a patient. Such a creature, bringing nothing original into the field cannot in any sense be said either to operate or co-operate. All its doings being derivative, are done for it or necessitated; therefore it is free in nothing, and by the same consequence, must remain devoid of morality and responsibility.

The usual reasoning on this subject therefore being utterly fatal to the cause of Human Liberty, we have endeavoured in the foregoing chapter to lay the groundwork of a new line of argument; the only argument by which, in our opinion, the conclusions of the Necessitarian can be met and proved. In clearing away the weeds by which the premises of the question were overgrown, and in bringing them under our close and immediate inspection, we found that these premises, when viewed and tested as facts as all premises ought to be, if we would ascertain their exact truth and value, are directly the reverse of those usually laid down, and allowed to pass current. We found in a word that an act is the substratum of man's proper existence, and not vice versa.

other natural germ or faculty of humanity? We answer, No. It comes into operation after a very different fashion. It is an act of pure will; for precisely between the two species of existence we have indicated, Human Will comes into play, and has its proper place of abode; and this new phe nomenon, lying in the very roots of the act of Consciousness, dictates the whole natural machinery of man, gives a new and underived turn to his development, and completely over throws, with regard to him, the whole law and doctrine of causality; for Will as contradistinguished from, and opposed to wish or desire, is either a word of no meaning and intelligibility at all, or else it betokens a primary absolute commencement-an underiva tive act. But as the Necessitarian may admit the former of these al ternatives, and may hold Will, when applied to man, to be an unmeaning word, it will be proper to postpone any discussion on that subject at present; and without involving our selves in what after all might be a mere skirmish of words, to do our best to go more simply and clearly to work, by addressing ourselves as much as possible to facts, or the realities of things.

But lest it should be urged that man, although perhaps really free, is yet incompetent to form a true and adequate conception of Liberty; and that there fore his freedom must in any event be for him as though it were not; lest this should be urged, we deem it incumbent upon us, before proceeding to establish Human Freedom as fact, to endeavour to delineate a faithful and correct representation of it; in short, to place before our readers such a conception as would be Liberty if it were actualized or realized in fact. Before showing that Liberty is actual, we must show on what grounds it is possible.

ness.

man's undetermined power of choosing; but whence comes his act of particular choice or determination? Is it derivative? can it be traced out of him up into some foreign scource? Then of course his liberty vanishes. Is it not derivative? Then his liberty stands good; but is no longer found to consist in a state of indetermination to several courses of action. It must be conceived of as an underived or absolutely self-grounded act of determination in favour of one.

Thus then the conception of liberty is reduced to some degree of distinctness and tangibility. If there be such a thing as human liberty, it must be identical with an absolutely original or underived act; and the conception of the one of these must be the same as the conception of the other of them. But it is still our business to show in what way the conception of such an act is possible.

It is palpably impossible to conceive liberty, or an underived act as arising out of man's natural or given exist ence. According to our very conception of this species of existence, all the activity put forth out of it is of a derivative or transmitted character. As we have already said, such kind of activity is not activity at all, but passivity. Not being originated absolutely by the creature who apparently exerts it, every particle of it falls to be refunded back out of this creature into the source from whence it really comes; and this clearly leaves the being in question a mere passive creature throughout; and at any rate incapable of putting forth a primary and underived act.

But though it is impossible for us to conceive an underived act put forth out of man's natural existence, there is yet nothing to prevent us from conceiving an act of this kind put forth against man's natural or given exist

ence. If we consider it well, we shall be satisfied that it is only on this ground that the conception of an underived act is possible and moreover, we shall see that on this ground, the conception of such an act is inevitable.

For if we suppose an act of antago nism to take place against the whole of man's given existence, against all that man is born-it is impossible that this act itself can be given or deriva. tive; for the supposition is, that this act is opposed to all the given or derivative in man, and is nothing except in so far as it is thus opposed. If therefore it were itself derivative, being no longer the opposite of the derivative, it would be a nonentity; or it would be a suicidal act exterminating itself. Therefore, if we are to form a conception at all of such an antagonist act, we must conceive it as absolutely primary and underived; and on the other hand, if we would frame a true conception of human liberty, or an underived act, we can only conceive it as the antagonist act we have been describing-we must conceive it as an act opposing or resisting every thing in man which is given, passive, natural, or born.

Thus then we have now shown in what way a correct conception of human liberty is to be framed; or in other words, we have pointed out the grounds upon which man's freedom is possible. It is possible, because the particular act described as identical and convertible with it, namely, an act of determinate antagonism against the natural or unconscious man, can at any rate be conceived. But admitting that it may be conceived, we must now ask, Is it also practised? Is Human Liberty actual as well as possible? Besides finding its realization in thought, does it also finds its realization in fact?

For an answer to this question we must refer ourselves to observation and experience. But observation and experience have already decided the point. Consciousness itself is the actualization of the conception we have been describing. Lying between the two species of human existence discriminated at the commencement of this

paper, consciousnes is an act of antagonism against the one of them, and has the other of them for its result. A glance at the very surface of man showed it to be a matter of general notoriety, that sensation and the consciousness of sensation, passion and the consciousness of passion, never coexist in an equal degree of intensity. We

found the great law connected with them to be this; not that they grew with each other's growth and strengthened with each other's strength, but on the contrary, that each of them gained just in proportion as the other lost. Wherever a passion was observed to be carried to its greatest excess, a total absence or cessation of consciousness was noticed to be the result, and the man lost his personality. When consciousness began to re-assert itself, and to regain its place, the passon in its turn began to give way, and becoming diminished or sus pended, the man recovered his personality. The same was observed to be the case with regard to sensation. A sensation is notoriously most absorbing when the least consciousness of it has place; and therefore is not the conclusion legitimate that it would be still more effective-that it would be all-absorbing, provided no consciousness of it interfered to dissolve the charm? And does not all this prove that consciousness is an act of antagonism against the modifications of man's natural being, and that indeed it has no office, character, or conceivability at all, unless of this antagonist and negative description?

But this act has as it were two sides, and although single, it fulfils a double office. We have still to show more clearly than we have yet done, how this act, breaking up the great natural unities of sensation and of passion at once displaces the various modifications of man's given existence, and by a necessary consequence, places the being which was not given the "I" of humanity-the true and proper being of every man "who cometh into the world." This discussion will lead us into more minute and practical details than any we have yet encountered.

The earliest modifications of man's natural being are termed "sensations." These sensations are like all the other

changes of man's given existence purely passive in their character. They are states of suffering, whether the suffering be of pleasure or of pain, or of an indifferent cast. There is obviously nothing original or active connected with them. There is nothing in them except their own given contents, and these are entirely derivative. In the smell of a rose, for instance, there is nothing present except the smell of a rose. In a word, let us turn and twist, increase or diminish any sensation as we please, we can twist and turn it into nothing except the particular sensation which it is.

Let us suppose then a particular sensation to be impressed upon any of man's organs of sense-let us suppose it propagated forwards along the nerves-let us trace it forth unto the brain-let us admit Hartley's or any other philosopher's "vibrations," "elastic medium," or "animal spirits," to be facts; and finally, let us suppose it, through the intervention of the one or other of those, landed and safely lodged in what metaphysicians are pleased to term the "mind;" still we maintain that in spite of this circuitous operation, the man would remain utterly unconscious, and would not in consequence of it have any existence as "I" the only kind of existence which properly concerns him, nor would the external object, have any existence as an object for him. He would not perceive it, although sentient of it; the reason of which is, that perception implies an "I," and a "not I," a subject and object; and a subject and object involve a duality; and a duality presupposes an act of discrimination. But no act of discrimination-no act of any kind is involved in sensationtherefore man might continue to undergo sensations until doomsday, without ever becoming "I," and without ever perceiving an external universe.*

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