to the Scientific Knowledge of Things Familiar," by the Rev. Dr. Brewer, Trinity Hall, Cambridge, we find the following question and

answer:

"Q. Why does cold produce hunger ?"

"A. Because the air contains more oxygen in cold weather; and, therefore, fire burns fiercer, and animal combustion is more rapid."

But one of the highest authorities we can appeal to is Professor Liebig. To his Report on "Organic Chemistry applied to Physiology and Pathology,"--an abstract of which was drawn up by Dr. Playfair,*— we now desire to draw the reader's attention. By way of introduction it may be stated, that the capacity of the chest in an animal subject is a constant quantity: we therefore inspire the same volume of air either at the pole or at the equator, in winter as in summer. But the weight of the air, and consequently of oxygen, varies with the temperature or expansion of the air-particle. To furnish a striking instance; an adult man takes into the system daily 46,000 cubic inches of oxygen, which, if the temperature of the air be 77°, will weigh 32oz.; but, when the temperature of the air particle sinks down to the freezing point, 32°, and the oxygenic surface of the air-particle becomes, as Swedenborg expresses it

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Compressed into a narrower space and a thicker crust," then the 46,000 cubic inches will weigh 35oz. Hence the Professor very pointedly remarks:--

"An adult in our climate in winter may inhale 35oz. of oxygen: in Sicily he would inspire only 28 oz.; and if in Sweden 36oz."

The following contrast is worthy of the reader's strictest attention :

Swedenborg in 1722.

"Thus, in the same space, there is more fire (oxygen) in particles like fig. 40 (compressed particle), than in others like fig. 39 (dilated particle).

"Thus more fire (oxygen) exists in the bottom of our atmosphere than in its upper parts." Pages 92, 93.

Professor Liebig in 1842.

"It is obvious also, that in an equal number of respirations we consume more oxygen at the level of the sea than on a mountain. The quantity of oxygen inspired must therefore vary with the height of the barometer."

Let it be borne in mind the volume of air inspired is always a constant quantity, and is the same in all localities and under all ordinary circumstances. Hence, though the volume is constant, the proportionate amount of oxygen is various in various localities and circumstances, as the thesis of Swedenborg supposes. So says the Professor when he remarks,

"The quantity of oxygen respired in the colder regions of the earth is greater than that inhaled in the tropics."

* British Association, 1842. Report, page 42.

Yet the volume of air respired in each case would only be the same. Hence it is, says the Professor

"That England sends her dyspeptic patients to southern climates

*

for when they are removed to warmer climates they absorb less oxygen, &c.

"Hence in our own climate, hepatic diseases (or diseases arising from a diminution of oxygen) are more prevalent in summer: and in winter pulmonic diseases, or those arising from an excess of oxygen."

Wherever we apply this beautiful and simple theory, we shall have fresh cause for admiration of the genius which could elaborate such views of the laws and constitution of the universe in which we live, and move, and have our being. The wonder is, how his conceptions could be so complete, and so true to the natural principia of things, whilst no experiments existed to guide the conception.

These additional illustrations of the fundamental facts above given— the theoretical discovery of which we claim for Swedenborg-will form a supplement to our former proof. The Miscellaneous Observations were published in 1722, and contain the same theory of fire and of airparticles as the Principia, which was subsequently published in 1733-4. The reader will therefore observe the state of the case we are submitting to his notice. Black and Cavendish, in 1766, were the first to proclaim the conjecture that air is a compound body. Up to this period it was believed to be a simple elemental body. But they had no idea, neither did they offer a conjecture, of the number and nature of its elements. To Priestly in 1772-4, Scheele in 1774-5, Lavoisier and Trudaine in 1775, and Cavendish in 1784, we are indebted for the first announcement of the number of its constituents, and their nature. Now, before all these, in 1722, Swedenborg, as we have seen, in his Miscellaneous Observations, and again in 1733-4, in his Principia, propounded a most admirable theory of the nature and composition of atmospheric air; wherein he unmistakeably pronounces, and pictorially represents, its binary composition; and wherein he describes in detail, and in the most explicit language, the antagonistic nature of the binary elements; and announces in plain terms, as well as by implication, the now well known fact, that the least in volume of these binary elements of air is the firefeeding element, now known under the name of oxygen. The priority of claim to this remarkable discovery is without doubt to be awarded to Swedenborg.

Manchester.

(To be continued.

S. BESWICK.

377

OPPOSITE DEFINITIONS OF THE TRIPERSONALITY BY THE ASSAILANTS OF THE NEW CHURCH IN AMERICA, DR. WOODS AND DR. POND.

DR. WOODS received a reply from Professor Bush, and Dr. Pond from Mr. Cabell. Both of these opponents of the New Church are deemed eminent Orthodox Evangelical Trinitarians, but although they could so well agree in declaring the New Church view of the Trinity unscriptural, they are altogether, it appears, at issue as to what is the orthodox Scriptural view of the Tripersonal-Trinity.

Dr. Woods says,

"The FATHER is a Person-that is, an intelligent, moral, voluntary, individual Being.

"The Son is equally possessed of what is essential to personality. He has a will distinct from the Father.

"The Holy Spirit has all the marks of personality.

"The Father and Son, [and Spirit] are distinct Persons, as much as Jacob and Joseph are distinct Persons."

"Three entirely distinct intellects, sensibilities, and wills, would constitute three separate independent minds, or, which is the same, THREE GODS, if predicated of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."

Taking advantage of this remarkable case of orthodoxy versus orthodoxy, we will suppose the following dialogue as taking place between a New Churchman and the two Orthodox Doctors of the United States:

New Churchman. It is fortunate, gentlemen, that I have met with you together, as your presence with each other may prevent misunderstanding, and likewise facilitate my apprehension of your respective views of the nature of the Trinity in Unity, as set forth by each of you.

Dr. Woods. I trust that I, as well as my brother Pond, shall be "always ready to give an answer to every man that asketh a reason of the hope that is in me, with meekness and fear."

N. C. Very good. Then I wish to ask you both, What is the exact idea you each entertain of the Divine Unity, which you call a Unity in Trinity? What is your idea of the Unity of God-God as three Divine Persons? Has the tripersonal God-the whole God, that is, according to your views, that kind of individual Personal unity which is implied in the language of a human person, who, from his individual consciousness, or his indivisible personality, says, "My will is"—" I think thus"- I act as I will and think best"?

Dr. W. I have already declared, in my publication on the Trinity, N. S. No. 130.--VOL. XI.

2 F

that I do consider the Tripersonal God as having the attributes of distinct personal unity; and that each of the Divine Persons has also a distinct personal unity; a distinct will, and thence distinct action. But I cannot explain how the three Personal wills make up the will of the One God-the Triune God whose will is revealed in the Bible.

Dr. Pond. I altogether disagree with my brother Woods. I deny that personal unity can be predicated of the Triune Deity; for I regard it as a unity of essence. It is true I am accustomed to speak of the will of God, which is a personal attribute essential to every voluntary agent, but believing as I do, that neither of the Divine Persons has a distinct will of his own, I cannot see how there can result from the union of the three without wills, such an attribute of will in the Triune God as that which is essential to human personality. I deny that each Divine Person has a distinct will, because if he had, he would be a distinct God. And if I were to admit that while each Person has no will, the Triune God has a personal will resulting from three non-existent personal wills, I should admit that which no one could understand. But supposing that each Person had a distinct will, I cannot see how their three distinct wills could go to make up one united Personal Divine Will, or constitute that One Divine Mind which we call "GOD." I must confess, then, that neither upon your hypothesis, Dr. Woods, nor upon my own, can I admit the Divine Unity to be a Personal Unity; it is a Unity of Essence or Substance.

Dr. W. And what is a Unity of Essence or Substance without Personal consciousness, but a dead and unconscious unity? If God be Life in its essence, how can that Life be void of consciousness? And how can consciousness be thought of separately from a conscious will and thought, whence all activity can alone proceed? "God is Love." What is will but the expression of the Love? As we love, we will, and thence act, and how can it be otherwise with God, in whose likeness we are made-God, I mean, as believed in by us-God in three Persons? I ask you again, What is that Unity of essence which excludes Personal Unity?

Dr. P. I confess I do not know. It is an unfathomable mystery; I cannot see or explain how the three Persons-real Persons as they doubtless are, although without that distinct Personal unity which arises from distinctness of will-I cannot see how the Persons are united in One Essence, and yet I believe it. I cannot certainly admit that this unity is of the nature of the Personal unity already defined, notwithstanding I do speak of it in discourses as a Personal unity when I set forth the will of God, meaning of course God in three Persons.

N. C. And yet, Dr. Pond, you must confess, that when Christian teachers speak of the will of God, they generally mean the will of the First Person, namely, of "God the Father." Of this I am quite sure, from abundant experience. Whenever they speak without premeditation of the will of God, they mean the will of the first Person only, the Father; but when they dispute, they take care, as you are now doing, to think of God, not as the First Person only, but as God in three Persons. Now, gentlemen, as you must both admit that God the Father, as a Divine Person, has a will of his own, pray tell me how the attribute of will can be denied to the other two Persons? Are the Divine Persons so diverse, that one of them has a will, but the other two have no will?

Dr. W. I am really amazed! It surely cannot be maintained that either of the Divine Persons is without a will! To my mind, such a denial as that of a will to either of the Divine Persons amounts to a denial of the Scriptures. It is, in fact, an outrage on all our clearest and most familiar conceptions.

Dr. P. I am grieved to hear my learned and much respected brother Woods express himself so unadvisedly, and, indeed, so illiberally towards his evangelical brethren, while he gives a triumph to those who maintain that "three distinct Divine Minds are the same as three Gods." From such a union as that of three Divine Wills, there might indeed result a unanimity, but certainly nothing like unity.

Dr. W. I have admitted that I cannot tell how three Divine Personal Wills can go to make up the One Divine Will of the Triune God, any more than you, Dr. Pond, can tell me how three Divine Personal Beings can exist without Personal attributes, and yet are united in Essence so as to make up One God, such unity of Essence having nothing in common with a personal unity of will. And I must say, that you are somewhat unreasonable in declaring that to be error which I deem mystery; while you claim that what I consider as your error should be regarded, with all possible respect to your individual opinion, as a Divine mystery.

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be

N. C. Certainly, gentlemen, you are both in a singular predicament. You each charge the other with error, and you each shelter these reciprocally alleged errors under the too generally respected designation of mystery." Why surely it is obvious that any amount of error may justified, or at least secured from animadversion, by its advocate pronouncing it a Divine mystery. You, Dr. Woods, cannot mean to assert that you have a right to pronounce ex cathedra, that your view is not an error, but a mystery; while Dr. Pond has not an equal right to pro