OF MAJOR GENERAL SIR WILLIAM NOTT, G.C.B. COMMANDER OF THE ARMY OF CANDAHAR, AND ENVOY AT THE COURT OF THE KING OF OUDE. EDITED, AT THE REQUEST OF SIR WILLIAM NOTT'S DAUGHTERS, LETITIA NOTT AND BY J. H STOCQUELER, ESQ. AUTHOR OF THE 'LIFE OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,' THE 'HAND-BOOK OF BRITISH INDIA,' &c. &c. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II. LONDON: HURST AND BLACKETT, PUBLISHERS, SUCCESSORS TO HENRY COLBURN, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET. 1854. 13-333=43 THE LIFE OF SIR WILLIAM NOTT. CHAPTER I. NOTT'S ANXIETIES-THE DOORANEES-THE DEFENCE OF JELLALLABAD -MAJOR-GENERAL POLLOCK-MAJOR OUTRAM-BRIGADIER ENGLAND'S REPULSE AT HYKULZYE-LORD ELLENBOROUGH ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA-THE GOVERNMENT RESOLVES TO WITHDRAW THE TROOPS FROM AFFGHANISTAN-NOTT'S VEXATION-HIS OBEDIENT SPIRIT-ENGLAND JOINS NOTT-THE RELIEF OF KHELAT-I-GHILZIE— THE FALL OF GHUZNI. THE anxieties of Major-General Nott had by no means terminated with the dispersion of the Dooranees. The situation of the garrisons of Ghuzni and Khelat-iGhilzie, and the condition of the sixteen officers, the ladies, children, and soldiers, who had been taken prisoners by the Affghans in the Caubul Passes, formed subjects of the deepest solicitude. It was part of his instructions to bring away the garrisons of the two fortresses, if he VOL. II. B should find it necessary to retire to Scinde; and how to reach them, beset as the intervening country was with large bodies of the enemy, became a question of deep concern. Without cavalry-for a reinforcement of which arm he had frequently applied—without ammunition, medicines, and a sufficiency of carriage, it was impossible for Nott to move with any prospect of achieving much good. An accession to his strength had been promised from Scinde under Brigadier England, but March, 1842, was waning, and England came not. The plan chalked out for Brigadier England is thus given in a letter from Captain Hammersley, the political officer at Quettah, to Major Outram : MY DEAR MAJOR, March 15th, 8 A.M. I have received your letter of the 10th just now, and am delighted to find that my own views on the subject have so far agreed with yours. Rawlinson's letter of the 4th has arrived most opportunely, and has still further strengthened my opinion that Brigadier England should not delay an advance towards the Kojuk, but that his advance should be made with as little incumbrance as possible. I would recommend his moving a compact little force, with only five lacs, or even less, of rupees, some of the most useful medicines, and no more ammunition than is absolutely necessary for the detachment. If General Nott moves down to the Kojuk, well and good; the treasure &c., which will be sufficient to maintain the troops for at least a month more can be made over, and the force from this can either occupy Fort Abdoolah, or return to this place to await the remainder of the division, and, if necessary, to assist it through the Zig Zag. I do not see what advantage is to be gained by the reoccupation of Killa Abdoolah, and any small force placed there would be liable to much annoyance from the enemy's horse, who would most certainly prevent supplies for man and beast being brought in there, and it is out of our power to procure carriage here just now for the conveyance of a month's supply beyond what would be required for the march. Should General Nott feel disinclined to move down to the Kojuk, which is very possible from what Brigadier England wrote to him, we shall turn our march to good account by opening the now completely closed road to Pisheen, and thereby giving an opportunity to the Syuds and the Tireenees to bring in their supplies of grain and camels for sale. Unless something of this sort is done, carriages will be found wanting by-and-bye, for not an animal is procurable for hire to Candahar, and should we have to retire in the autumn, we must depend altogether on our own Government camels. I have already mentioned my having written to the Tireenees, recommending them to remain as they have hitherto done at their homes, and not to be led into any compact with the rebels Mahomed Sadig and others, who wish to bring all into the same dangerous position they themselves have foolishly chosen. pointed out how the Tireenees, from their homes being in the plains, would be the first to suffer if they were found to deserve punishment, and that if they continued quiet their property would be certainly respected by us. Yesterday a man whom I had placed at the Hydezye returned, and states, "The day before yesterday (12th) the Tireenees left Mahomed Sadig, as he would not promise anything or give anything." Now, if we were to move at present towards Killa Abdoolah, these Tireenees would gain confidence, and most probably shake off all connection with Mahomed Sadig. The late turn our connection with the Kakurs has taken renders the necessity for strengthening this place the more urgent, for we must be pre I |