alone true merit can be praised; yet sufficiently near to be within the memory of men now in their prime; men who in youth glowed over the deeds of the heroes, and in manhood, seeing that they have met with their reward, are incited with good cause to a noble emulation.

In this triplet of brave men, honour is done at once to the whole service: it is, in fact, a monument to the Naval character-a monument to the British seaman, not merely as a man of valour, but in that character which has won for him his highest laurels as a man generous as brave-as humane as he is daring and intrepid.

For what is Lord Exmouth distinguished?-For a long string of brilliant achievements; for the terrible action against Algiers, in opposition to an inhuman slave-trade; for the indomitable courage of an Englishman ;- but for something more. We can name other actions:—when scarcely fledged as a commander, with his own hand he saved from drowning, at different times, two of his men, once when himself dangerously ill. He never issued to a subordinate a harsh command, or ordered what he would not do himself. To promote cheerfulness, he would himself share the common labour. In 1796, when the Dutton East Indiaman struck near the citadel at Plymouth, and the whole crew were on the point of perishing, when the danger was so great that only one man could be found to assist in the hazardous attempt; then, by the (with this exception) single humane exertions of Lord Exmouth, and at the imminent risk of his own life, the hopeless crew was saved. Another time, when, on a cruise, having captured a French vessel, he found on board the wife of a deputy who was going with £3,000, the produce of her property, to join her husband in exile; with true nobility, he restored his portion of the prize-money, and paid to the poor woman, out of his own private purse, the share which had fallen to his subordinates. These are the British seamen, whom our country will do well indeed to honour! We wish that we had space to dwell on the glories of these three brave men; not because we think they are not fully known, but because they are topics upon which, as Englishmen, we love to dwell. Could we but recount the perseverance of Saumarez,—another flower in this wreath of naval glory; the chivalry of Sir Sydney Smith,* whose soul seemed transplanted from the ages of tilt and tourney, the hero of some troubadour minstrel,―rushing with the enterprise and knight-errantry of youth into the most fearful dangers, and coming out of them successful and unscathed,— indued with all the courtesy and noble generosity of the ancient chevalier :could we dilate upon the defence of Acre against the whole forces of Napoleon, the repulse of the enraged general after two months of incessant combat.

Enough has already passed through our minds to awaken in us an enthusiastic feeling of rejoicing, that, in the midst of angry debates and political animosities, parliament should have paused awhile cheerfully to perform an act of policy and duty, to confer with discrimination those honours which form the highest ambition of a noble mind, next to the conviction seldom indeed, if ever, absent from a British sailor's bosom, that he has done his duty.

*We refer our readers with pleasure to "The Life of Sir Sidney Smith," by Mr. Howard; as a piece of literature it is of very moderate pretension, but as a piece of feeling it is most worthy of perusal. We know no life of a man whose trade was arms, written in such truly honourable and christian spirit.

THE

KING'S COLLEGE MAGAZINE.

OCTOBER, 1842.

HISTORY AND HISTORIANS.

No. VI.

In the preceding papers we have taken a general view of the study of history, the various methods in which it may be pursued, the dangers attendant on each, and the remedies which they demand. I do not mean that any directions have been given as to the best manner of acquiring a knowledge of history, or any remarks made on the relative merits of any works intended for that object; but rather that the turn and temper of mind in which history should be read has been examined, and somewhat has been said on the leading principles which must guide us in its investigations. Little has been advanced on the magnitude and importance of the subject; this, in fact, all are ready to admit, few, alas! practically to remember. It is not one to be exalted into grandeur for the brief space of an essay, and forgotten with the praise which has been lavished on it; there is rather reason to fear lest some, when led to view the study in its true extent, and glance at the profound principles, intricate series of causation, and vast results which it shadows forth, should feel convinced that for any but the greatest minds it is useless to enter upon it. True it is, that to attain such proficiency in this study as to be a guide and example to others, does require mental and moral endowments of no ordinary character. But in this, as in every other pursuit, it is not merely to the greatest proficients that real and sound benefits accrue. We do not reject the study of the classics, because we do not hope to equal the attainments of a Porson or a Hermann, or judge mathematics useless to us, because we see no chance of surpassing the discoveries of Newton.

So it is in history; we must be content to sit at the feet of Thucydides or Tacitus, and humbly learn from their lips; we may criticise indeed, but it must be in a spirit of reverence; yet from what falls to our lot we may derive improvement, both as intellectual and moral beings. We may not, indeed, acquire the penetration which can trace in the dim outlines of the future the probable operations of those moral laws which the contemplation of the past has discovered to us; nay, we may often need assistance to enable us to see their effects in the past itself; but by the very knowledge of their existence, and feeling of their greatness, united to a deep consciousness that they are but the modes of action of a divine and eternal power, our moral nature cannot but be elevated, ennobled, and trained to the exercise of all its highest and purest faculties. If there be any man who is led to this pursuit by the mere love of distinction, he has mistaken his mark; let him betake himself to some easy acquirement, where his darling position of first may be quickly grasped, and let him leave history to men of purer aim and higher feeling, for they alone will be apt learners or useful instructors in its school. Let then those who feel a real interest in this study for its own sake, follow it with diligence and in a right spirit of inquiry, and they will reap, sooner or later, the fruit of their labours.

I would here introduce a remark, which seems to me applicable to the study of history generally, whenever (and when does it not?) it leads us to reflect on the characters and actions of men. Very many persons, who in common intercourse would readily acquiesce in the propriety of forming, as far as possible, a charitable judgment of the conduct of others, and abstaining from the imputation of bad motives where good may exist, seem to consider the rule as abrogated and annulled in respect of those of former ages whose actions are recorded in history. They sport with their motives, and condemn them with a facility really wonderful. But is it either just or wise to set such limits to the exercise of a charitable judgment? Is it not better to treat the memory of the dead with the same respect and consideration as we would the character of the living? To endeavour to discover and appreciate that which is good in the mind of each man, who comes before us as we read, will both lead us nearer to the truth, and be more conducive to our own moral advancement. Our first inquiry should be, Had this man any high principle of action, any object out of himself and above himself, which he valued above the

gratification of his passions, any ideal venerated in his loftier. moments, superior in any degree and at any time to the love of self? If we find it so, we should make full allowance for it, as a motive of his life and conduct, in every case where it is not manifestly overpowered and excluded; and the same course we should pursue even more in judging of national than of individual acts. To demonstrate the truth of this assertion would be impossible; but, as founded on the great principle of charity to men, it will, I think, recommend itself to every rightly-feeling mind, and might, did space permit, be confirmed by arguments and instances of very considerable weight. "Are we then," it may be asked, “to yield up our reasonable conclusions, framed from careful investigation, to this vague feeling of benevolence to men?" Certainly not; but the human mind is so constituted that reason can rarely, if ever, be brought to act simply and independently of the feelings; they generally precede, and in some degree influence the judgment; all then I mean is, that this charitable disposition should be habitual with us in the study of history.

There is an objection, which might be advanced against the view of history which I have taken, when, in the course of these essays, I have spoken of the investigation of the laws which regulate human affairs, an objection which I should wish to meet in concluding the series, and the more so, because some, falling into the same misconception of my meaning, might thence derive apparent support for a false and dangerous principle. "Do you not," it may be said, "direct us to endeavour to discover for ourselves, from the comparison and analysis of events, the moral laws by which the course of human transactions is governed? Are not these laws, proceeding from the Divine Ruler, of necessity founded on and in consonance with the principles of his government of mankind? Do you then mean that it is to be our aim to find out for ourselves what these principles are? If so, into what a maze of bewilderment are we led, how difficult, how uncertain is the task imposed on us, how great the peril if we err!" In all this there is much truth; bewildering indeed would be the labyrinth in which we should be wandering, were such our aim as students of history. But does the inquiry into the laws by which the Divine Ruler governs the world, imply any doubt as to the principles on which his administration of it is built? I think not; for by moral laws we understand only the constant rule and method according to which principles are carried into effect.

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principles determine the ultimate object, the final result to which the operation of all moral laws conduces, they go far to decide the nature of the laws themselves, yet are they distinct from them, and in no case to be confounded with them. We feel sure that the rewarding of virtue and punishing of vice are in agreement with our conception of the nature of the Deity; but we cannot thence conclude, what in national existence at least seems to be a fixed law, that guilt shall finally work out its own punishment; the former being known, we may still regard the latter as a fair subject for investigation. At the same time, from a knowledge of the principles, we may derive material assistance in discovering and prehending the laws which are founded upon them. objection, then, being based on an assumed identity between laws and principles of moral government, or at least such a connexion as renders each law a necessary consequence of some principle, falls to the ground; the question, however, still remains, whether from history we can hope to ascertain what are the principles of the Divine government. It would appear that, supposing us to be totally ignorant of them, we could not hope to discover them from the course of events alone; nay, knowing them, and convinced of their truth, we are not unfrequently perplexed in the endeavour to reconcile them with the phenomena of history. Often, for example, we might be led to think that virtue is not rewardedthat vice will be finally triumphant; not, indeed, because history affords real ground for any such presumption, but because our limited view of human affairs, the open success of wickedness, the slow, and often hidden progress of good, all combine to mislead and perplex our judgment. To what then is the student of history to look for the knowledge of the principles on which the world is regulated? Certainly to revelation; there, and there only, may he truly learn the nature of God, the wisdom, the holiness, the benevolence of his character in all his relations to man; there he will find the source and explanation of every law, in the knowledge of the final object to which all things are tending among men ; there his perplexities will cease, so far at least as principles are concerned. Let him not then be eager to throw away what he has learned, as a Christian, of the Divine character, for, in so doing, he is casting aside his best and only sure guide. No man, it may be confidently asserted, will attain the highest results or derive the greatest good from the study of history, who does not enter upon it with his mind fully and deeply imbued with belief