tution. The subject-matter of the act of 1898 is plainly within the power of Congress, and the courts can not amend or modify any of the provisions of that act so as to bring them within what may seem to be reasonable bounds. They can not examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Considerations of that nature must, in general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions of policy determined there are conclusive with the courts. (License cases, 5 Wall., 462, 475.) If, by the plain words of an act of Congress, an impossible thing was required to be done, or some thing done in an impossible manner (if such legislation could be rationally supposed to occur), in such case the courts would have no alternative but to declare the statute to be incapable of enforcement in the particular case. But statutes are not to be declared void because of difficulty of construction, or because of apparent hardship in their application; nor are the plain words of a statute to be refused their application upon any theory that a more reasonable provision could have been adopted for the state of case presented. All statutes must receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. (Law Ow Bow v. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 213.) It is true a municipal ordinance professed to be passed under a general or implied power given by a statute must be reasonable and lawful, and not oppressive, and if it be not so it will be declared void. But this is upon the presumption that the legislature did not intend by the general terms of the statute to authorize the making of such an ordinance. (1 Dill., Mun. Corp., sec. 319; Cooley, Const. Lim., 192, 193, 6th ed.) And it has therefore been held that an ordinance can not be held to be unreasonable and void which is expressly authorized by the legislature. (Coal Float . The City of Jefferson, 112 Ind., 15: Cooley, Const. Lim., 241.)

In this case the offer was made to show, and the court was requested to declare, not that the act of Congress required milk to eonform to an impossible standard or test, or that the milk offered for sale should contain constituents that nature did not supply, but that the standard prescribed was unreasonably high, and could not by ordinary care be maintained through all seasons of the year. There may be difficulty in keeping up the standard throughout the year, and more expense and greater effort may be required at some seasons of the year than at others. But the very object of the statute was to require this more than ordinary expense and labor, on the part of the owner of cows, to keep up and maintain the prescribed standard of milk when necessary; and this is accomplished by proper care of and food supplied to the animals producing the milk. For it is well known that the quality and richness of milk depend largely upon the condition of the animal, the care with which it is kept, and the kind and quantity of food supplied to it. It is not attempted to be shown that 34 per cent of fat, as a constituent of good milk, is greater than can be supplied by proper care of, and good and abundant food supplied to, the cows. If the proposition of the defendant were sustained, the question of the reasonableness of the statute would be one of fact for the jury, and we should likely have different juries determining the question in different ways. We think the court was clearly right in its ruling upon this question, and in holding that the question, whether the standard of milk prescribed by the statute was reasonable or not, was not open to inquiry on the trial.

In the police court Weigand had been denied, too, the right to show by evidence the specific purpose for which he had in his pos

session the milk from which the sample was taken, but the appellate court found no error in the exclusion of such evidence, saying:

But under section 3 of the act of 1898 the question is whether the sale was made of the article, which was in fact under the standard prescribed by the I law. The party making the sale is bound at his peril to know what he is seling, and, to keep within the law, he must know that the article complies with the standard of excellence and purity prescribed by the law. Unless this be so, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, ever to convict a party of a violation of the law. And for the same reason the court below was right in refusing to allow the defendant to introduce evidence to show for what purpose he had kept the milk on hand-that being entirely immaterial, if he sold the milk that did not bear the test prescribed.

The other questions decided by Weigand . District of Columbia are not material for present purposes.

The third case, District of Columbia . Garrison," decided May 23, 1905, arose under the provisions of "An act relating to the adulteration of foods and drugs in the District of Columbia," approved February 17, 1898, and required the determination of the extent of the right of the inspectors in the service of the health department to purchase samples of food for analysis, under section 6 of the act, which is as follows;

That every person offering for sale or delivering to any purchaser any drug or article of food included in the provisions of this act shall furnish to any analyst or other officer or agent of the health department, who shall apply to him for the purpose and shall tender him the value of the same, a sample sufficient for the purpose of analysis of any such drug or article of food which is in his possession.

The defendant had declined to sell to an inspector one-half pint of milk upon the tender of the usual price therefor, 2 cents, but had offered to sell one entire pint for 4 cents, alleging that he sold milk only in the original packages in which he received it, that he had no package containing less than 1 pint, and that if he sold a half-pint from such a package the remaining half pint would represent a loss to him, since his customers knew that he did not sell milk in quantities less than a pint, and that therefore he had no demand for half pints. The police court having sustained the position taken by the defendant, an appeal was taken on the recommendation of the health officer. It was apparent that if one dealer were permitted to refuse, on the grounds taken by the defendant in this case, to sell less than a pint, another might fairly claim the right to refuse, on the same grounds, to sell less than a quart, and so on; that if inspectors were required to accept and to bring to the laboratory samples as large as 1 quart, or even as large as 1 pint, their return trips to the laboratory from the field must be correspondingly more frequent and their

a 25 Appeals, D. C., 563.

b30 Stats., 246.

66

working capacity correspondingly diminished, and that if, on the other hand, the inspector undertook to mix the pint of milk thoroughly in the pint jar in which it was delivered to him or to mix a quart of milk in a quart jar, and to abstract there from a sample for analysis, the fairness of the sample might readily be called into question in event of prosecution. Moreover, the act under which the prosecution was brought limited the size of the sample which the inspector might demand to “ a sample sufficient for the purpose of analysis;" and onehalf pint of milk was sufficient, the inspector could not demand more, and it was not apparent why he should be required to accept more; and the court of appeals had already declared (Weigand v. D. C., 22 Appeals, D. C., 559) that the subject-matter of the act of 1898, under which act the right to purchase the sample had been claimed, was plainly within the power of Congress, and that the courts could not amend or modify any of the provisions of that act so as to bring them within what might seem to be reasonable bounds; that they could not examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic.

The court of appeals, however, after denying that any principle was involved in the case, and after a scathing criticism of the health department for the course it had pursued, said:

A reasonable sample is what is required by the act of Congress. Under the circumstances of this case a pint was a reasonable sample, and a half pint was not such a reasonable sample. The appellee was fully within his right, and fully performed his duty in tendering the former; the inspector was wholly at fault in demanding the latter and insisting upon it against the will of the appellee.

What may or may not be a reasonable sample is a question for which perhaps no positive rule can be laid down applicable to all cases. This is not for the determination exclusively either of the inspector or the dealer. The act requires that it shall be sufficient for the purpose of analysis," but it is not competent for the inspector to require, because he thinks a half pint of milk sufficient to enable him to make a satisfactory analysis of such milk, that therefore the dealer must sell him such half pint, when thereby the value of another half pint would be destroyed or lost to the dealer, and the dealer is willing to sell an entire pint at an additional cost of merely 2 cents to the inspector.

II. ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES OF THE MILK-INSPECTION SERVICE.

Nothing worthy of the name of a milk-inspection service can be said to have existed in the District of Columbia prior to the passage of the act of Congress of March 2, 1895, for the regulation of the sale of milk. Not even, in fact, was a milk-inspection service established by that act. The necessary authority was conferred, but no special inspectors or funds were provided through which to exercise that authority, and the health officer in the execution and enforcement

of the law had to rely upon the inspectors already provided for the sanitary and food inspection service generally, and upon the allotment made by the Commissioners for the contingent expenses of the health department from the general appropriation for that purpose. The health department had no veterinary surgeon in its employ, and for such assistance as was needed in the way of inspec tions requiring the education and training of a veterinarian had to rely upon the veterinary surgeon employed by the District government, at a salary of $400 per annum, for all departments of the District government. The situation of the health department under the circumstances was most unfortunate; errors that were made in the early days of the service because of an insufficient and untrained inspection force have come up from time to time to embarrass the department, and have been corrected with difficulty, if at all.

The conditions found as the result of such early inspections as were made showed in many cases entire ignorance of even the most rudimentary sanitary principles connected with the production and marketing of milk. The stables were small, poorly lighted, and poorly drained. Many of the producers of milk had no idea of the importance of cooling it immediately after milking, and sometimes did not hesitate to store it in living rooms and kitchens." The condition of the cattle can be best understood from the statement made by Doctor Schroeder, of the Bureau of Animal Industry, as the result of the examination of over 800 of our dairy cattle during 1893 and 1894. that between 5 and 6 per cent had defective udders. Those who are sometimes inclined now to criticise existing conditions would be able to do so more intelligently and fairly were they familiar with the conditions found in the early days of the milk-inspection service. No good purpose would be served by here recounting at length the various steps taken for the improvement of the service that was established. It is sufficient to say that improvement generally has been possible only as appropriations have been made by Congress to bring them about, and that requests for such appropriations have not always met with favorable response. A statement showing the growth of the milk-inspection service is appended. It is enough here to describe the milk-inspection service as it now exists.

The law regulating the sale of milk in the District of Columbia prohibits the maintenance of a dairy or a dairy farm within the District without a permit from the health officer. It does not define what a dairy or a dairy farm is. In practice, the health department has held the term "dairy" to mean the business arising from

a Report of the Health Officer, 1896, page 21.

Bureau of Animal Industry, Bulletin No. 7, published in 1894, page 87. C See page 723.

milk products, or a store devoted to the sale of milk and its products, and has held the term "dairy farm" to mean any premises upon which milk is produced for sale. Any place where milk is sold is regarded by the law of the District as a dairy for purposes of inspection but not for other purposes." Permits issued under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1895, have been issued, therefore, in three distinct series: First, permits to maintain dairies within the District of Columbia; second, permits to maintain dairy farms within the District of Columbia; third, permits to bring or to send milk into the District of Columbia. In order that the records of the health department might show the number and the location of places from which milk is distributed as distinguished from the number and location of places where milk is produced, persons maintaining dairy farms within the District of Columbia and distributing milk directly to consumers have been regarded as maintaining dairies as well as dairy farms and have been required to obtain a permit for each purpose. A similar practice has been established with respect to persons maintaining dairy farms in adjacent States and distributing the milk directly to consumers within the District; they have been required to take out permits not merely to bring or send milk into the District, but also to obtain permits to maintain dairies within the District. In the issue of permits to maintain dairies to persons already authorized to bring or to send milk into the District they have not been required to maintain fixed places of business within the District, but their dairy farms have been regarded as the points of distribution. Copies of the forms now in use for application and for permits are appended."

The inspection service is naturally divided into two branches: On the one hand the inspection of dairy farms and on the other the inspection of dairies. But whenever a permit is issued for the maintenance of a dairy on a licensed dairy farm, either within or without the District, then inspections of the dairy are intrusted solely to the inspector of dairy farms already having the premises under his supervision, and the inspector of dairies is not required to visit the premises.

The inspection of dairy farms requires not only a knowledge of the conditions under which milk should be produced, but also a knowledge of cattle, their selection, their feeding, their general management, and their diseases. Such work is therefore best intrusted to veterinary surgeons, and inspectors of this class have always been required. to have had a proper veterinary training before appointment. The inspection of dairies, places from which milk is sold at retail, requires, however, only a good working knowledge of the sanitary principles

a See page 694.

See page 724.