61 of a statute, the pre-existing law, and the reason and purpose of the new enactment, are considerations of great weight. It is more accurate to say that after it is repealed it is, as regards its operative effect, considered as if it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions past and closed.62 The repeal of an exception extends the purview.63 § 283 (163). Effect on inchoate rights.― Rights depending on a statute and still inchoate, not perfected by final judgment or reduced to possession, are lost by repeal or expiration of the statute. This rule applies to mechanics' liens given by statute where the requisite proceedings to fix the lien have not been completed at the date of the re lector, 3 Wall. 495, 18 L. Ed. 207; Crow Dog, Ex parte, 109 U. S. 556, 3 S. C. Rep. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030; Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, 24 L. Ed. 471; Attorney-General v. Lamplough, L. R. 3 Ex. D. 223; Commonwealth v. Bailey, 13 Allen, 541; Flanders v. Merrimack, 48 Wis. 567; Whitcomb v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ind. 513, 55 N. E. 440. 61 Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 380, 23 L. Ed. 47; Heydon's Case, 3 Rep. 7b. 62 Attorney-General V. Lamplough, L. R. 3 Ex. Div. 223. 63 Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252; Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 id. 127; Bank for Savings v. The Collector, 3 Wall. 495, 18 L. Ed. 207. 64 Bechtol v. Cobaugh, 10 S. & R. 121; Van Inwagen v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 31; Town of Belvidere v. Warren R. R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 193; S. C., 35 id. 587; Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677; People v. Livingston, 6 Wend. 526; Tivey v. People, 8 Mich. 128; Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y. 610; Hampton v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 329; State v. Baldwin, 45 Conn. 134; Bay City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Austin, 21 Mich. 390; Bennet v. Hargus, i Neb. 419; Williams v. Middlesex, 4 Met. 76; Oriental Bank v. Freese, 18 Me. 109, 36 Am. Dec. 701; Bailey v. Mason, 4 Minn. 546; The Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cr. 329, L. Ed. 239; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507, 71 Am. Dec. 559; Gregory v. German Bank, 3 Colo. 332, 25 Am. Rep. 760; Gaul v. Brown, 53 Me. 496; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 152; Turnipseed v. Jones, 101 Ala. 593, 14 S. E. 377; Callahan v. Jennings, 16 Colo. 471, 27 Pac. 1055; Miller v. Hageman, 114 Iowa, 195, 86 N. W. 281; Nations v. Lovejoy, 80 Miss. 401, 31 So. 811; Wirt v. Supervisors, 90 Hun, 205, 35 N. Y. S. 887; Detroit v. Chapin, 108 Mich. 136, 66 N. W. 587, 37 L. R. A. 391; Lawrence County v. New Castle, 18 Pa. Supr. Ct. 313. See Restall v. London, etc. Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 141, which is dissented from in Butcher v. Henderson, L. R. 3 Q. B. 335. See, also, Morgan v. Thorne, 7 M. & W. 400. 65 peal. A sale under a decree for a mechanic's lien, made after the repeal of the statute, was held void, though the decree was entered before such repeal.66 An assessment of taxes on corporate stock was made under a statute which was subsequently repealed. The collection of the taxes was regulated by another law. The repeal of the statute under which the assessment had been made was not held to affect it. The assessment was closed and ended, and therefore not subject to the rule applicable to pending proceedings when the law under which they were commenced has been repealed. There was a sentence of condemnation of a vessel for trading contrary to a temporary act of congress; the vessel had been sold and the proceeds paid over to the government while the law was in force. Pending an appeal from the sentence the act expired. It was held that the sentence could not, under such circumstances, be affirmed after the expiration of the law, and restitution was ordered. An informer who commences a qui tam action under a penal statute does not thereby acquire a vested right to the forfeiture; his claim to the penalty is inchoate, and cannot be fixed except by judgment. The repeal of the statute before judgment prevents the imperfect right from being consummated. It matters not whether the whole penalty when received is given to the public or the informer, or is divided between them.69 The repeal of a statute giving a lien for taxes destroys the lien.70 § 284 (164). Effect on vested rights. When a right has arisen on a contract, or a transaction in the nature of a contract authorized by a statute, and has been so far perfected that nothing remains to be done by the party asserting such right, the repeal of the statute will not affect it or 65 Bailey v. Mason, 4 Minn. 546. 66 Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill 294, 37 N. E. 1031. ton v. United States, 5 Cr. 281, 3 L. Ed. 101. 69 Bank of St. Marys v. State, 12 67 Town of Belvidere v. Warren Ga. 475. R. R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 193. 68 The Schoonor Rachel v. United States, 6 Cr. 329, 3 L. Ed. 239; Yea 70 Gull River Lumber Co. v. Lee, 7 N. D. 135, 73 N. W. 430. an action for its enforcement. It has become a vested right which stands independently of the statute." A contractor for grading streets was authorized by the existing law to sue delinquent abutters for unpaid assessments. This right of action was held a part of the contract and not taken away by repeal of the law creating it." Causes of action barred by the statute of limitations are not revived by a repeal of the statute. The repeal of a statute giving a lien for advances of money for certain purposes will not affect the lien as to such advances as were made prior thereto." Rights that pass and become vested under the existing law are supposed to be beyond the control of the state through its legislature. A mere change of the law does not divest or impair rights of property acquired previously, even though the legislature intended the new law so to operate.7 A law can be repealed by the law-giver; but the rights which have been acquired under it while it was in force do not thereby cease. It would be an act of absolute injustice to abolish with a law all the effects which it had produced. 75 71 Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 17 L. Ed. 805; Bibb v. Hall, 101 Ala. 79, 14 So. 98; Thompson v. West, 59 Neb. 677, 82 N. W. 13, 49 L. R. A. 337; Hanscom v. Meyer, 61 Neb. 798, 86 N. W. 381; Florence Gas, Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Hanby, 101 Ala. 15, 13 So. 343; Beav ers v. Myar, 68 Ark. 333, 58 S. W. 40; Commonwealth v. Newcomb, 109 Ky. 18, 58 S. W. 445; People v. Common Council, 140 N. Y. 300, 35 N. E. 485, 37 Am. St. Rep. 563; Ewing v. Van Wagenen, 6 Wash. 39, 32 Pac. 1009; State v. Bridges, 22 Wash. 64, 60 Pac. 60, 79 Am. St. Rep. 914. 72 Creighton v. Pragg, 21 Cal. 115. 73 Cassity v. Storms, 1 Bush, 452; Right v. Martin, 11 Ind. 123; Cooley's Const. L. *365; Whitney v. Wegler, 54 Minn. 235, 55 N. W. 927; 74 Commissioners V. Northern Bank, 1 Met. (Ky.) 174. 75 Rice v. R. R. Co., 1 Black, 358, 17 L. Ed. 147; Mitchell v. Doggett, 1 Fla. 356; Naught v. Oneal, 1 Ill. 36; James v. Dubois, 16 N. J. L. 285; Den v. Robinson, 5 id. 689; McMechen v. Mayor, etc., 2 H. & J. 41; Davis v. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.) 183, 90 Am. Dec. 358; Taylor v. Rushing, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 160; Graham, Ex parte, 13 Rich. 277; Lincoln County v. Oneida County, 80 Wis. 267, 50 N. W. 344. 76 Rock Hill College v. Jones, 47 Md. 1, 17. This is a principle of general jurisprudence; but a right to be within its protection must be a vested right. It must be something more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law. It must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand made by another." If, before rights become vested in particular individuals, the convenience of the state induces amendment or repeal of the laws, these individuals have no cause to complain. The legislature, unrestrained by any constitutional provision, may grant an exclusive franchise,79 but the grant will be strictly construed and must be clearly expressed. It is competent for the legislature, after granting to one person or a corporation a franchise which affects the rights of the public, to grant a similar franchise to another person or corporation, though the use of the latter should impair or even destroy the value of the first franchise; and this grant does not depend on a reservation of the power in the original grant. Nothing but plain English words will grant an exclusive franchise, and thus create a monopoly. The repeal of a statute after judgment will not defeat an appeal previously taken. And if the 77 Id.; Cooley, Const. Lim. 359; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 213; Wilderman v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 551; State v. Warren, 28 id. 338; Worthen v. Ratcliffe, 42 Ark. 330; James v. Dubois, 16 N. J. L. 285; Graham v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 53 Wis. 473; Grey v. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ala. 387, 28 Am. Rep. 729; Streubel v. Milwaukee, etc. R. R. Co., 12 Wis. 67; Aspinwall v. Daviess Co., 22 How. 364, 16 L. Ed. 296; Bennet v. Hargus, 1 Neb. 419; Kent's Com. 455; 2 Story on Const., § 1399. See Wolfe v. Henderson, 28 Ark. 304. 78 Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 213. 81 79 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394. 80 Id. 81 The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L. Ed. 773, 938; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica, etc. R. R. Co., 6 Paige, 554; Oswego Bridge Co. v. Fish, 1 Barb. Ch. 547; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44. 82 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Canal Commissioners, 21 Pa. St. 22; Richmond R. R. Co. v. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71, 14 L. Ed. 55; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 87. 83 Backes v. Dant, 55 Ind. 181. 1 statute be essential to that judgment, its repeal or expiration after the appeal will necessitate a reversal of the judgment.84 85 A statutory right is to be distinguished from the remedy for its enforcement. But after the right has vested it cannot be taken away by new legislation directly against the right nor indirectly by taking away the remedy. A statute of Tennessee provided that foreign insurance companies doing business in the state should file with the insurance commissioner a power of attorney authorizing the secretary of state to acknowledge service of process on behalf of such companies, and provided that such service should be binding, though the company had retired or been excluded from the state. This statute was repealed and a different method provided. It was held that the provisions of the earlier statute became a part of contracts made while it was in force and that the secretary of state could bind a company which had retired from the state before the repeal took place, by an acknowledgment of service made after such repeal. A statute made it a duty to provide fireescapes and declared that failure to comply with the statute should be deemed negligence. It was held that a repeal of the statute did not affect right of action which had occurred before such repeal and was founded on such failure.87 The remedy may be changed. And of this nature are stat 86 84 The Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cr. 329, 3 L. Ed. 239; Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cr. 281, 3 L. Ed. 101. 88 St. 139; Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322; Knoup v. Piqua Bank, 1 Ohio St. 603; Danforth v. Smith, 23 Vt. 247; Cooley's Const. Lim. *287, 361, 362; 85 Cooley's Const. Lim. *361; Less Colby v. Dennis, 36 Me. 9, 13; Musley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790; Birdsall grove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co., v. Wheeler, 58 Conn. 429, 20 Atl. 50 Miss. 677; Dean v. Mellard, 15 C. 607; Dow v. Electric Co., 68 N. H. B. (N. S.) 19; Linton v. Blakeney, 59, 31 Atl. 22. etc. Society, 3 H. & C. 853; Temple86 D'Arcy v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 108 ton v. Horne, 82 Ill. 491; Harris v. Tenn. 567, 69 S. W. 768. Townshend, 56 Vt. 716; Mechanics' 87 Gorman v. McAidle, 67 Hun, & Farmers' Bank's Appeal, 31 Conn. 484, 22 N. Y. S. 479. 63; Treasurer v. Wygall, 46 Tex. 447; 88 The Hickory Tree Road, 43 Pa. Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Su |