eral rule the insertion of this general repealing clause does not add anything to the effect of the general act to repeal local or special laws. But where there was only one gen- eral act upon which the clause could operate and there were many inconsistent local acts, it was held that the lat- ter were repealed.95
When the legislator frames a statute in general terms or treats a subject in a general manner, it is not reasonable to suppose that he intends to abrogate particular legislation to the details of which he had previously given his atten- tion, applicable only to a part of the same subject, unless the general act shows a plain intention to do so.96
Omaha, 63 Neb. 52, 54, 88 N. W. 117; Buffalo Cem. Ass'n v. Buffalo, 118 N. Y. 61, 66, 22 N. E. 962; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Haynes, 8 Okl. 576, 585, 58 Pac. 738.
94 Reading v. Shepp, 2 Pa. Dist. Ct. 137; Casterton v. Vienna, 163 N. Y. 368, 57 N. E. 622. See State v. Butcher, 93 Tenn. 679, 28 S. W. 296; Felts v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 170 Pa. St. 432, 33 Atl. 97; S. C., 178 Pa. St. 290; Felts v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 195 Pa. St. 21, 45 Atl. 493.
95 Commonwealth v. Middletown, 3 Pa. Dist. Ct. 639; Commonwealth v. McDonnell, 3 Pa. Dist. Ct. 767. 96 Crow Dog, Ex parte, 109 U. S. 556, 3 S. C. Rep. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030; Dwarris on St. 532; Sedgw. St. & Const. L. 98; State v. Judge of St. Louis P. Ct., 38 Mo. 529; Brown v. County Commissioners, 21 Pa. St. 37; State v. Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16, 24; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472; Robbins v. State, 8 id. 131, 191; Williams v. Pritchard, 4 T. R. 2; Fitzgerald v. Champneys, 30 L. J. Ch. 782; S. C., 2 Johns. & H. 31; Thompson v. State, 60 Ark. 59, 28
S. W. 794; Mills v. Sanderson, 68 Ark. 130, 56 S. W. 779; Home for Inebriates v. Reis, 95 Cal. 142, 30 Pac. 205; Bateman v. Colgan, 111 Cal. 580, 44 Pac. 238; People v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486, 50 N. E. 599; Kelly v. School Directors, 66 Ill. App. 134; Rankin v. Cowden, 66 Ill. App. 137; McDonough County v. Thomas, 84 Ill. App. 408; Arnold v. Council Bluffs, 85 Iowa, 441, 52 N. W. 347; Boyd v. Ran- dolph, 91 Ky. 472, 16 S. W. 133; Music v. Kansas City, etc. Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 309, 21 S. W. 491; State v. District Court, 14 Mont. 452, 37 Pac. 9; Mantle v. Largey, 15 Mont. 116, 41 Pac. 1077; Rymer v. Lu- zerne County, 142 Pa. St. 108, 21 Atl. 794, 12 L. R. A. 192; Altoona v. Calvert, 21 Pa. Co. Ct. 362; Hayes v. Arrington, 108 Tenn. 494, 68 S. W. 44; People v. Utah Com'rs, 7 Utah, 279, 26 Pac. 577; State v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 Pac. 428; State v. Purdy, 14 Wash. 343, 44 Pac. 857; Callvert v. Winsor, 26 Wash. 368, 67 Pac. 91; State v. Hobe, 106 Wis. 411, 82 N. W. 336. In State v. McCurdy, 62 Minn.
§ 275 (158). The special act must conflict, so far as it operates to the extent of its lesser scope, with the general act; otherwise there would generally be no question of re- peal; it expresses a particular intent incompatible, pro tanto, with the intent of the general law. The general law can have full effect beyond the scope of the special law, and, by allowing the latter to operate according to its special aim, the two acts can stand together. Unless there is plain. indication of an intent that the general act shall repeal the other, it will continue to have effect, and the general words with which it conflicts will be restrained and modified ac- cordingly. Where there are in one act or several contem- poraneously passed, specific provisions relating to a par- ticular subject, they will govern in respect to that subject as against general provisions contained in the same acts.98
509, 516, 517, 64 N. W. 1133, the court says: "Repeals by implica- tion are not favored. The ques- tion is one of legislative intent, and its intent is to be ascer tained, as legislative intent is ascertained in other respects, when not expressly declared, by con- struction. Considerations of con- venience, justice and reasonable- ness, when they can be invoked against the implication of repeal, are always very potent. Where a general intention is expressed, and also a particular intention is ex- pressed which is incompatible with the general one, the particular in- tention shall be considered an ex- ception to the general one. Thus, when the legislature enacts a stat- ute in general terms it is not rea- sonable to suppose that they in- tended to abrogate particular legis- lation, to the details of which they had previously given their atten- tion, unless the general act shows
a plain intention to do so. The general law can have full effect beyond the scope of the particular or special act, and, by allowing the latter to operate according to its special aim, the two acts can stand together."
97 Dwarris on St. 765; Stockett v.. Bird, 18 Md. 484; Crane v. Reeder, 22 Mich. 322, 334; Fosdick v. Perrys- burg, 14 Ohio St. 472; Williams v. Pritchard, 4 T. R. 2.
98 Felt v. Felt, 19 Wis. 193, 196; State v. Goetz, 22 id. 363; Crane v. Reeder, 22 Mich. 322. In Nusser v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. St. 126, the question was whether an act impos- ing a fine of $50 for selling liquors on Sunday within the county of Allegheny, and authorizing a sum- mary conviction before a single justice of the peace, was repealed by a later statute imposing the same penalty for the same offense committed anywhere in the state, and prescribing a mode of proced-
It seems to be immaterial which statute is first enacted. If the special statute is later the enactment operates neces- sarily to restrict the effect of the general act from which it differs.99
These interpretations harmonize with the rule that when a general intention is expressed, and also a particular in- tention, which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention shall be considered an exception to the general one. The special act is in the nature of an excep- tion to the general law and suspends its operation in the field covered by the special act, and when the latter is re-
ure by indictment and jury trial. It was held to have the effect of repeal. The court say: "Where the prior enactment is local and the new one general in its opera- tion, the maxim [that a repugnant statute is a repeal of a'l inconsist- ent provisions in a prior] applies with undiminished force, because the whole includes the several parts, and all local laws establish- ing one rule for one portion of the community, and a different one for the remaining portion, are in- convenient and of doubtful pro- priety, except where they relate to matters which are local in their nature, and are enacted by the proper municipal authorities of the territories over which they are designed to operate."
99 McGavick v. State, 34 N. J. L. 509; Smith, Ex parte, 40 Cal. 419; Galway Presentments, Ex parte, 9 W. R. C. L. 114 (Q. B.); The Mayor v. Macon, etc. R. R. Co., 7 Ga. 221; Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 504, 3 S. C. Rep. 357, 27 L. Ed. 1012; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Breden v. State, 88 Ala. 20, 7 So. 358; Cot- ton v. State, 62 Ark. 585, 87 S. W.
48; Beatty v. Commonwealth, 91 Ky. 313, 15 S. W. 856; Louisville v. Garr, 97 Ky. 583, 31 S. W. 281, 32 S. W. 748; State v. Towner, 26 Mont. 339, 67 Pac. 1004: Harrison v. Board of Sup'rs, 117 Mich. 215, 75 N. W. 456; Matter of Murray Hill Bank, 153 N. Y. 199, 47 N. E. 298; Barber County Com'rs v. Society for Sav- ings, 101 Fed. 767, 41 C. C. A. 667; Howard v. Hulbert, 63 Kan. 793, 66 Pac. 1041, 88 Am. St. Rep. 267.
1 Dwarris on St. 765; Stockett v. Bird, 18 Md. 484, 489; Churchill v. Crease, 5 Bing. 180; Pilkington v. Cooke, 16 M. & W. 615; Taylor v. Oldham, 4 Ch. Div. 395; In re Rouse, Hazard & Co., 91 Fed. 96, 33 C. C. A. 356. "It is a well settled rule of construction that, when there are two provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and an- other is particular and relating only to one subject, the particular provision must prevail and must be treated as an exception to the general provision." Dahnke V. People, 168 Ill. 102, 111, 48 N. E. 137, 39 L. R. A. 197.
pealed the general law operates as if the special law had never existed.2
276 (159). The question is one of intent.-There is no rule of law which prohibits the repeal of a special act by a general one, nor is there any principle forbidding such repeal without the use of words declarative of that intent. The question is always one of intention, and the purpose to abrogate the particular enactment by a later general statute is sufficiently manifested when the provisions of both cannot stand together. A special and local law provided that certain property should be subject to taxation; a subsequent general one that all such property should be exempt, and repealed all local or special acts inconsistent with its provisions. It was held that the special act was repealed. Special or local laws will be repealed by general laws when the intention to do so is manifest, as where the latter are intended to establish uniform rules for the whole state. Where there is an express repeal of all acts and parts of acts, general or special, which are inconsistent, the intent is manifest. A general law for the care of the poor provided that it should not be construed to repeal any local acts under which poor-houses had been built, or lands bought, or buildings commenced. This was held to show an intent to repeal all other local or
2 Santa Barbara v. Eldred, 95 Cal. 378, 30 Pac. 562; Territory v. Pratt, 6 Dak. 483, 43 N. W. 711; Buckwalter v. Lancaster County, 12 Pa. Supr. Ct. 272.
3 New Brunswick v. Williamson, 44 N. J. L. 165; Pausch v. Guer rard, 67 Ga. 319; Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Bridges, 30 N. J. L. 112; State v. Miller, id. 368, 86 Am. Dec. 188; Great Central Gas Cons. Co. v. Clarke, 13 Com. B. (N. S.) 838; Bramston v. Colchester, 6 E. & B. 246; Evansville v. Bayard, 39 Ind. 450; Willing v. Boz man, 52 Md. 44.
4 State v. Pearcy, 44 Mo. 159; People v. Miner, 47 Ill. 33; People v. Furman, 85 Mich. 110, 48 N. W. 169; Buffalo v. Neal, 86 Hun, 76, 33 N. Y. S. 346; People v. Brady, 49 App. Div. 238, 63 N. Y. S. 145; Barker v. Floyd, 61 App. Div. 92, 60 N. Y. S. 1109; Fraim v. Lancaster County, 171 Pa. St. 436, 33 Atl. 339; Jadwin v. Hurley, 10 Pa. Supr. Ct. 104; People v. Dalton, 158 N. Y. 175, 52 N. E. 1113.
5 Louisville Water Co. v. Clark. 143 U. S. 1, 12 S. C. Rep. 346, 36 L. Ed. 55; State v. Swanson, 85 Minn. 112, 88 N. W. 416.
special acts. An act provided that a president of each and every village and incorporated town should be elected annually. The language was held to show an intent to repeal the special charter provisions of such municipalities as were inconsistent. A general statute provided that the real es tate of every educational, benevolent and ecclesiastical corporation or association, which is leased or used for other purposes than the specific purposes of such corporation or association, should be subject to taxation as if held by an individual taxpayer. This was held to repeal an exemption in the charter of a theological institution. Other cases are to the same effect."
A general act prescribing a mode of punishment for a specific offense throughout the state will repeal an act limited to a single county prescribing a different punishment.10 A general statute for the suppression of prostitution is inconsistent with a local statute authorizing a regulation of it." A local or special law which adopts, by reference, provisions relating to procedure from an existing general statute, is not necessarily abrogated or affected by the subsequent repeal of the act containing the adopted provisions.12
§ 277. Illustrations — Local and special acts held to be repealed by general acts.- A general law authorizing counties to issue bonds to build roads and bridges was held to repeal a special law forbidding a particular county to issue bonds except for the purpose of refunding its indebtedness."
6 Commonwealth V. Summerville, 204 Pa. St. 300, 54 Atl. 27.
7 McCormick v. People, 139 Ill. 499, 28 N. E. 1106.
8 Hartford v. Hartford Theological Seminary, 66 Conn. 475, 34 Atl. 483.
9 In re House Resolution, 12 Colo. 289, 21 Pac. 484; Hunt v. Card, 94 Me. 386, 47 Atl. 921; Quinn v. Cum. berland County, 162 Pa. St. 55, 29 Atl. 289; Wagner Free Institute v. Philadelphia, 132 Pa. St. 612, 19
Atl. 297, 19 Am. St. Rep. 613; Wahl v. Nauvoo, 64 Ill. App. 17; Matter of Dobson, 146 N. Y. 357, 40 N. E 988; State v. Angel, 71 N. H. 224. 51 Atl. 905.
10 Nusser v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa St. 126; Keller v. Commonwealth, 71 id. 413.
11 State v. Lewis, 5 Mo. App. 465. 12 Schwenke v. Union Depot & R. R. Co., 7 Colo. 512, 5 Pac. 816. 13 State v. West Duluth Land Co., 75 Minn. 456, 71 N. W. 115.
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