is not repealed by a later grant to an electric street railway company to use the same streets.26 In 1884 the legislature of Kentucky passed an act to encourage railroad building, which provided that all railroads thereafter built should be exempt from all taxation for five years after the commencement of the road. In 1886 a general revenue act was passed which provided for the taxation of all property not expressly exempted by the act and which repealed all acts, general and special, and parts of acts, inconsistent therewith. It was held to repeal the earlier act by implication as to roads thereafter commenced. In 1888 the laws of the state were compiled and both the above acts were included therein and re-enacted. This was held not to change the result." An act gave power to the railroad and warehouse commissioners to revoke warehouse licenses, but no provision was then in existence for licensing warehouses. A later act authorized the circuit court to grant and revoke licenses to certain warehouses. The former act was held to be repealed or suspended as to such licenses. Some additional cases are referred to in the margin.29

28

267. Repeals by implication avoided if possible.— If two statutes can be read together without contradiction, or repugnancy, or absurdity, or unreasonableness, they should

26 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Electric Ry. Co., 93 Tenn. 492, 29 S. W. 104, 27 L. R. A. 236.

27 Commonwealth V. Railroad Companies, 95 Ky. 60, 23 S. W. 868. 28 Cantrell v. Seaverns, 168 Ill. 165, 48 N. E. 186.

29 Held repeal by implication: Edwards v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 13 Colo. 59, 21 Pac. 1011; Smith v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 86 Iowa, 202, 53 N. W. 128; State v. Rogers, 22 Ore. 348, 30 Pac. 74; Sproul v. Standard Plate Glass Co., 201 Pa. St. 103, 50 Atl. 1003; Norfor v. Busby, 19

Wash. 450, 53 Pac. 715; StetsonPost Mill Co. v. Brown, 21 Wash. 619, 59 Pac. 507, 75 Am. St. Rep. 862. Held no repeal: Hewitt v. People, 87 IIL App. 367; S. C. affirmed, 186 Ill. 336, 57 N. E. 1077; Jarvis v. Bradford, 88 IIL App. 685; Chicago v. Hanseddy, 102 Ill. App. 1; Negrotts v. Monett, 49 Mo. App. 286; Walcott Tp. v. Skauge, 6 N. D. 382, 71 N. W. 544; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis & Clark County, 28 Mont. 484; Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274; Snowden v. State, 69 Md. 203, 14 Atl. 528

30

31

be read together, and both will have effect. It is not enough to justify the inference of repeal that the later law is different; it must be contrary to the prior law. It is not sufficient that the subsequent statute covers some or even all the cases provided for by the former, for it may be merely affirmative, accumulative or auxiliary; there must be positive repugnancy; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only to the extent of the repugnancy.32 If, by fair and reasonable interpretation, acts which are seemingly incompatible or contradictory may be enforced and made to operate in harmony and without absurdity, both will be upheld, and the later one will not be regarded as repealing the others by construction or intendment.33 As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with a full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. In the endeavor

30 Regina v. Mews, 6 Q. B. Div. 47; S. C., L. R. 8 App. Cas. 339, reversing the ruling below; Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276; Enloe v. Reike, 56 id. 500; Wagner v. Stoll, 2 Rich. (N. S.) 539; Robb v. Gurney, id. 559.

31 Nixon v. Piffet, 16 La. Ann. 379; Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154; Landis v. Landis, 39 N. J. L. 274.

32 Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363, 10 L. Ed. 987; Coats v. Hill, 41 Ark. 149; Connors v. Carp River Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168, 19 N. W. 938; People v. Supervisors, 67 N. Y. 109, 23 Am. Rep. 94.

33 Elizabethtown, etc. R. R. Co. v. Elizabethtown, 12 Bush, 233; Higgins v. State, 64 Md. 419, 423, 1 Atl. 876; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459, 17 L. Ed. 218; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; Howard Association's Ap

34

peal, 70 Pa. St. 344; Kansas City v. Kimball, 60 Kan. 224, 56 Pac. 78; Conley v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. 285; Albert v. Twohig, 35 Neb. 563, 53 N. W. 582; CoOperative S. & L. Ass'n v. Fawick, 11 S. D. 589, 79 N. W. 847; Groff v. Miller, 20 App. Cas. (D. C.) 353; Farwell v. Des Moines Brick & Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa, 286, 66 N. W. 176, 35 L. R. A. 63; George v. Lillard, 106 Ky. 820, 51 S. W. 793; Gowen v. Conlow, 51 Minn. 213, 53 N. W. 365; State v. Smith, 35 Neb. 13, 52 N. W. 700; State v. Hay, 45 Neb. 321, 63 N. W. 821; Williams v. McLendon, 44 S. C. 174, 21 S. E. 616; Appleton W. W. Co. v. Appleton, 116 Wis. 363, 93 N. W. 262.

34 Jobb v. Meagher County 20 Mont. 424, 51 Pac. 1034; Ridgeway

37

to harmonize statutes seemingly incompatible, to avoid repeal by implication, a court will reject absurdity as not enacted, and accept with favorable consideration what is reasonable and convenient. In cases of doubt, repeal of a statute or of the common law may be deemed intended in favor of convenience.35 An argument based on inconvenience is forcible in law; 36 no less so is one to avoid what is unjust or unreasonable. Like considerations of what is convenient, just or reasonable, when they can be invoked against the implication of repeal, will be still more potent. The act being silent as to repeal and affirmative, it will not be held to abrogate any prior law which can reasonably and justly operate without antagonism.38 A statute which does not take away any right, or impose any substantially new duty, but regulates with additional requirements a duty imposed by a previous statute, is not to be deemed inconsistent with the previous act.39 Two statutes are not repug nant to each other unless they relate to the same subject and are passed for the same purpose.40 "It is a reasonable presumption that all laws are passed with a knowledge of those already existing, and that the legislature does not intend to repeal a statute without so declaring."

v. Gallatin County, 181 Ill. 521, 55 N. E. 146; Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill, 221, 226.

35 Steward v. Greaves, 10 M. & W. 711; Davison v. Farmer, 6 Ex. 242, 256.

36 Co. Litt. 97a.

37 Rex v. Whiteley, 3 H. & N. 143; Johnson v. Bush, 3 Barb. Ch. 207, 238. See Harris v. Jenns, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 152.

38 Ante, § 248; McNeely v. Woodruff, 13 N. J. L. 352, 356, 357: Evergreens, Matter of, 47 N. Y. 216, 221; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 id. 424, 438; State v. Stinson, 17 Me. 154; Smith v. Pcople, 47 N. Y. 330;

99 41

Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 8
S. & M. 9, 46.

39 Staats v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 4 Abb. App. Dec. 287.

40 People v. Bartleson, 14 Utah, 258, 47 Pac. 87.

41 Booth's Will, 40 Ore. 154, 61 Pac. 1135, 66 Pac. 710. In Speer v. Boggs, 204 Pa. St. 504, the court says: "When an apparent conflict is presented by different parts of the same act, it is the duty of courts to reconcile them, if possible, by such construction as will give effect to all the parts. The presumption is that the legislature did not intend any inconsistency.

§ 268 (153). Acts passed at same session - Provisions in same act. The presumption is stronger against implied repeals where provisions supposed to conflict are in the same act or were passed at nearly the same time. In the first case it would manifestly be an inadvertence, for it is not supposable that the legislature would deliberately pass an act with conflicting intentions; in the other case the presumption rests on the improbability of a change of intention, or, if such change had occurred, that the legislature would express it in a different act without an express repeal of the first.42 "Statutes enacted at the same session of the legislature should receive a construction, if possible, which will give effect to each. They are within the reason of the rule governing the construction of statutes in pari materia. Each is supposed to speak the mind of the same legislature, and the words used in each should be qualified and restricted, if necessary, in their construction and effect, so as to give validity and effect to every other act passed at the same session." 43 The presumption is that different acts passed at the same session of the legislature are imbued by the same spirit and actuated by the same policy, and that one was not intended to repeal or destroy another, unless so expressed. Where two acts are passed or go into effect on

44

But when there is a conflict between a prior and a subsequent act, the presumption is that the latter repeals the former. The courts are not bound, nor even authorized, to seek a construction that will reconcile them, further than to inquire if the conflict is real and not merely apparent. If it is real, the result is the repeal of the prior act." p. 508.

42 Houston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 514; Eckloff v. Dist. of Columbia, 4 Mackay, 572; Peyton v. Moseley, 3 T. B. Mon. 77; Gibbons

v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232; State ex rel. Kellogg v. Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16; State v. Clark, 54 id. 216; Nazareth L. B. L. v. Commonwealth, 14 B. Mon. 266; State v. Rackley, 2 Blackf. 249; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330; Dawson v. Horan, 51 Barb. 459; Sanders v. State, 77 Ind. 227; Beals v. Hale, 4 How. 37; Supervisors v. Board of Commissioners, 12 Minn. 403.

48 White v. Meadville, 177 Pa. St. 643, 35 Atl. 695, 34 L. R. A. 567.

44 Banks v. Yolo County, 104 Cal. 258, 37 Pac. 900; Hutchinson v. Self, 153 Ill. 542, 39 N. E. 27; State v.

45

the same day it is strong evidence that they were intended to stand together. So where the later law was the first to be introduced.46 An amendment of a law shows that the legislature did not intend to repeal it by a prior law." At the same session of the legislature two acts were passed relative to the place where actions against corporations might be brought. The act first passed provided that such actions might be brought in any county where the cause of action or a part thereof accrued, or in any county where the corporation had an agency or representative or in which was its principal office. The second act gave a right in terms to bring an action in any county in which the cause of action or a part thereof arose - it contained no repealing clause. It was held not to repeal the former.48

49

The different sections or provisions of the same statute or code should be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to each, but, if there is an irreconcilable conflict, the later in position prevails.50 But where an act divided the territory of Colorado into seventeen counties and defined the boundaries of each in separate sections, and there was a conflict in the descriptions, it was held that the descriptions

Archibald, 43 Minn. 328, 45 N. W. 606; Hawes v. Fliegler, 87 Minn. 319, 92 N. W. 223; State v. Stratton, 136 Mo. 423, 38 S. W. 83; State v. Rotwitt, 17 Mont. 41, 41 Pac. 1004; Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. State, 95 Tex. 507, 62 S. W. 114; Matter of Gannett, 11 Utah, 283, 39 Pac. 496; Town School District v. School District, 72 Vt. 451, 48 Atl. 697; In re Wilbur's Estate, 14 Wash. 242, 44 Pac. 262; Walser v. Jordan, 124 N. C. 683, 33 S. E. 139.

45 Commonwealth v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236, 30 N. E. 11?7, 15 L. R. A. 839; Solomon v. Denver, 12 Colo. App. 179, 55 Pac. 199; Territory v. Wingfield, 2 Ariz. 305, 15 Pac. 139.

46 Lien v. County Com'rs, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 1094.

47 People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349, 48 Houston, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364.

49 Groff v. Miller, 20 App. Cas. (D. C.) 353; Smith v. School Com'rs, 81 Md. 513, 32 Atl. 193; Westport v. Jackson, 69 Mo. App. 148; Cincinnati v. Connor, 55 Ohio St. 82, 44 N. E. 582; Bull v. Kirk, 37 S. C. 395, 16 S. E. 151.

50 Ex parte Thomas, 113 Ala. 1, 21 So. 369; Hand v. Stapleton, 135 Ala. 156, 33 So. 689; Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 64 N. W. 365; Omaha Real Est. & T. Co. v. Kragscow, 47 Neb. 592, 66 N. W. 658.