eral doctrine, in which all the cases concur. In its practical administration other rules obtain suggested by the nature of the cases which occur, and the forms of legislation raising the question of repeal. There is an obvious difference in repealing effect between negative and affirmative statutes. We will endeavor to elucidate this distinction. § 248 (139). Negative and affirmative statutes.—A negative statute is one expressed in negative words; as, for example: "No person who is charged with an offense against the law shall be punished for such offense unless he shall have been duly and legally convicted," etc. "No indict ment for any offense shall be held insufficient for want of Pa. St. 468, 30 Atl. 931; Plymouth Borough, 167 Pa. St. 612, 31 Atl. 933; Kuhlman v. Smeltz, 171 Pa. St. 440, 33 Atl. 358; Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 178 Pa. St. 308, 35 Atl. 816; School District v. Pittsburgh, 184 Pa. St. 156, 39 Atl. 64; Clarion Borough's Appeal, 189 Pa. St. 79, 41 Atl. 995; Uhler v. Moses, 200 Pa. St. 498, 50 Atl. 231; Mellor v. Pittsburgh, 201 Pa. St. 397, 50 Atl. 1011; Commonwealth v. Huffman, 6 Pa. Supr. Ct. 211; McHenry's Petition, 6 Pa. Supr. Ct. 464; Denniston's Appeal, 8 Pa. Supr. Ct. 212; Marshall v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 16 Pa. Supr. Ct. 615; Kulp v. Luzerne County, 20 Pa. Supr. Ct. 7; Road in Green & G. Tps., 21 Pa. Supr. Ct. 418; Commonwealth v. Vetterlein, 21 Pa. Supr. Ct. 587; Blake v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co., 11 Pa. Dist. Ct. 151; McDonald v. New York, etc. R. R. Co., 23 R. I. 558, 51 Atl. 578; State v. Beaufort, 39 S. C. 5, 17 S. E. 355; Heston v. Mayhew, 9 S. D. 501, 70 N. W. 635; Durham v. State, 89 Tenn. 723, 18 S. W. 74; Taylor v. Badoux, 92 Tenn. 249, 21 S. W. 522; Harrington v. Galveston, 1 Tex. Ct. App. 437; Aaron v. State, 34 Tex the averment of any matter unnecessary to be proved," etc. An affirmative statute is one enacted in affirmative terms. Alderson, B., observed in Mayor of London v. The Queen,50 that "the words 'negative' and 'affirmative' statutes mean nothing. The question is whether they are repugnant or not to that which before existed. That may be more easily shown when the statute is negative than when it is affirmative, but the question is the same." If a statute contrary to a former one be expressed in negative words it operates to repeal the former; so expressed it takes away any different common-law right or remedy. In that form it is prohibitory and generally mandatory.52 An act providing that "no corporation" shall interpose the defense of usury repeals the laws against usury as to corporations.53 An act that "no beer" shall be sold without a license abrogates any previous exemptions from licensing regulations.54 An act which absolutely forbids prize fighting repeals a prior act which permitted a prize fight on the payment of a tax of five hundred dollars.55 The repugnance of any previous statute contrary to an enactment in negative words is very readily seen. Not so in the case of affirmative statutes. It is upon such enactments that debatable questions of repeal more frequently arise. The repeal in either case results from repugnancy, 50 13 Q. B. 33. 51 Bac. Abr., tit. Statute, G. 52 Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464; State v. Smith, 67 Me. 328; People v. Allen, 6 Wend. 486; Koch v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247; Rex v. Newcomb, T. R. 368; Rex v. Leicester, 9 D. & R. 772, 7 B. & C. 12; Reg. v. Fordham, 11 A. & El. 73; Bowman v. Blyth, 7 El. & Bl. 47; Williams v. Swansea C. Nav. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 158; Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 2 De G., F. & J. 502; Great Central Gas C. Co. v. Clarke, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 814. "Negative statutes are mandatory, and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions, unless the contrary can be clearly seen." State v. Washoe Co. Com'rs, 22 Nev. 203, 37 Pac. 486. 53 Ballston Spa Bank v. Marine Bank, 16 Wis. 120; Curtiss v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 1, 85. 54 Read v. Storey, 6 H. & N. 423. See Strauss v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292. 55 Sullivan v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. App. 50, 34 S. W. 131. 56 but this is not so easily perceived when the repealing statute is affirmative in form. When it prescribes an exclusive rule it implies a negative, and repeals whatever of existing law stands in the way of its operation. The intention to make the enactment exclusive may be deduced from the nature of the subject, and its necessary operation in comparison with the necessary effect of prior laws. A statute in derogation of an existing statute will be strictly construed in consequence of implied repeals being regarded with disfavor.57 § 249 (140). Repealing effect of affirmative statutes conferring power and regulating its exercise.—In organizing the powers of government there is a definite and precise scheme or plan, and a unity and singleness of means employed to carry it into effect. There is but one chief magistrate, one legislature, one judiciary. There is but one revenue system, one police system. Public duties are defined and imposed on officers designated with certainty, without duplication or confusion, except by inadvertence. The exercise of power by one over another must be authorized by law; its possession and scope will be such as is granted; when granted, if the mode of its excrcise be also prescribed, it must be followed. In the grants, and in the regulation of the mode of exercise, there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than the expressly granted power passes by the grant; that it is to be exercised only in the prescribed mode.58 While an affirmative 56 Ex parte Joffee, 46 Mo. App. 360; Gassenheimer v. Dist. of Columbia, 6 App. Cas. (D. C.) 108. 57 Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; State v. Norton, 23 N. J. L. 33; Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass. 471; Dwelly v. Dwelly, 46 Me. 377; Burnside v. Whitney, 21 N. Y. 148; Gibson v. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205; Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284; Bailey v. Bryan, 3 Jones (N. C.), 357, 67 Am. Dec. 246; Schuyler v. Mercer, 4 Gilm. 20; Lock v. Miller, 3 Stew. & Port. 13; White v. Johnson, 23 Miss. 68; Clarke v. State, id. 261; Williams v. Potter, 2 Barb. 316; Peyton v. Moseley, 3 T. B. Mon. 77, 80; Street v. Commonwealth, 6 Watts & S. 209; Morlot v. Lawrence, 1 Blatch. 608, Fed. Cas. No. 9815. 58 People v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., provision in one statute does not necessarily negative affirmative provisions on the same subject in the same or other statutes," yet affirmative words may and often do imply a negative, not only of what is not affirmed, but of what has been previously affirmed, and as strongly as if expressed. An affirmative enactment of a new rule implies a negative of whatever is not included, or is different; and if by the language used a thing is limited to be done in a particular form or manner, it includes a negative that it shall not be done otherwise.60 An intention will not be ascribed to the law-making power to establish conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of law by which the later will of the legislature may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.61 An act which required trustees to collect debts due to banks whose charters were forfeited will be repealed by a later act which requires the trustees to sell all such debts.62 If there are two acts for the assessment and collection of a tax, and by one a notice of the election to vote it must be posted ten days, and published two weeks, and the tax is not to exceed one dollar and fifty cents on the hundred dollars, and by the other the notice is posted twenty days, and pub 32 Larb. 102, 121; State, the United R. & Can. Co. pros., v. Commissioner, 37 N. J. L. 240; Rex v. North leach & W. Road, 5 B. & Ad. 978; Janney v. Buell, 55 Ala. 408; Lessee of Moore v. Vance, 1 Ohio, 1-10; Phillips v. Ash, 63 Ala. 414; Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Embury, 67 Barb. 261; Rochester v. Barnes, 26 Barb. 657; Johnston's Estate, 33 Pa. St. 511; Townsend's Case, Plowd. 113; State, N. Hudson Co. R. R. Co. pros., v. Kelley, 34 N. J. L. 75; Evansville v. Bayard, 39 Ind. 450; North Canal St. Road Case, 10 Watts, 351, 86 Am. Dec. 185; New 59 Plattsburg v. People's Telephone Co., 88 Mo. App. 306. 60 Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 625, 26 L. Ed. 122; Chandler v. Hanna, 73 Ala. 390; Ex parte Joffee, 46 Mo. App. 360; Webb v. Midway Lumber Co., 68 Mo. App. 546. 61 Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218, 10 N. E. 155. 62 Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Chambers, 8 Sm. & M. 9. lished three weeks, and the rate of taxation is not to exceed seventy cents on the hundred dollars, the two acts are repugnant, and the later repeals the former.63 An act pro vided that in case of land damages for laying out roads, the county court should institute and prosecute in their names, in the circuit court, proceedings to ascertain the just compensation to be paid. It was held to be inconsistent with and to repeal a prior statute which, in such cases, required that the county court award a writ of ad quod damnum returnable to itself. Two acts related to the same subjectmatter, the ferries of New York; the former to the ferries to Long Island, and the latter to all the New York ferries. They provided different and inconsistent modes of leasing or licensing the same. The last prevailed, displacing the other.65 An act granting the exclusive right to construct and use street railroads in all the streets of a city will repeal a prior act of the same tenor. If two independent officers or public boards have each power to number and alter the numbers of houses in a city, for the purpose of distinguishing them, the purpose would be frustrated by the duplication if both could act; therefore the power last granted was held exclusive.67 66 A statute creating a board of public works for cities of the first class and conferring powers on such boards impliedly repeals so much of former statutes as confers the same powers upon the city councils." And generally an act vesting the control of a thing in one body or board is repealed by a subsequent act vesting the same control in another body or board. An act vesting in a court the power to change the name of any corporation was held to 63 People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 560: State v. Newark, 28 N. J. L. 491; Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill, 221. 64 Herron v. Carson, 26 W. Va. 62. 65 People v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 32 Barb. 102, 121. 66 West End, etc. R. R. Co. v. Atlanta St. R. R. Co., 49 Ga. 151. 67 Daw v. Metropolitan Board, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 161. 71 Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah, 382, 59 Pac. 524, 77 Am. St. Rep. 917. 72 Hawkins v. Roberts, 122 Ala. 130, 27 So. 327; Sinking Fund Com'rs v. George, 104 Ky. 260, 47 S. W. 779, 84 Am. St. Rep. 454. |