§ 238 (134). Repeal and re-enactment-Construction. and effect. Where there is an express repeal of an existing statute, and a re-enactment of it at the same time, or a repeal and a re-enactment of a portion of it, the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal so far as the old law is continued in force. It operates without interruption where the re-enactment takes effect at the same time." 52 The intention manifested is the same as in an amendment enacted in the form noticed in the preceding section. Offices are not

lost; 53 corporate existence is not ended;" inchoate statutory rights are not defeated; 55 a statutory power is not taken. away, nor pending proceedings 57 or criminal charges affected 58 by such repeal and re-enactment of the law on which they respectively depend. This rule was applied in Walker State, though after a conviction for murder and a sentence of death pronounced, and, pending an appeal therefrom, the revised penal code took effect and changed. the previous penalty for the offense from "death" to "death

or confinement in the penitentiary for life." If a greater penalty is imposed for an offense defined in the re-enacted law, the previous law is deemed repealed; and after such repeal takes effect there can be no punishment inflicted for any offense committed contrary to its provisions while they were in force.60 A repeal is not rendered inoperative by a re-enactment where they are not simultaneous, where there is an interval of time after the repeal takes effect before the re-enactment goes into operation; or where, instead of the old law ceasing to operate by repeal, it has served its purpose is exhausted and spent before the re-enactment. Where in a revision the sections of an act are separated but re-enacted, they are to be construed the same as when part of one act.63

§ 239 (135). Amendments by implication not within the constitutional requirement — Acts complete in themselves. Where an act does not purport to be amendatory, but is enacted as original and independent legislation, and is complete in itself, it is not within the constitutional requirement as to amendments, though it may, by implica tion, modify or repeal prior acts or parts thereof. "The

60 State v. Van Stralen, 45 Wis. 437; State v. Campbell, 44 id. 529. 61 Kane v. New York, etc. Ry. Co., 49 Conn. 139.

62 Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236. 63 Tise v. Shaw, 68 Md. 1, 11 Atl. 363.

64 Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77; Tuskaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 340; Ware v. St. Louis, etc. Co., 47 Ala. 667; Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579; State v. Rogers, 107 Ala. 444, 19 So. 909; Ex parte Thomas, 113 Ala. 1, 21 So. 369; Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476, 1 S. W. 769, 58 Am. Rep. 768; Little Rock v. Quindley, 61 Ark. 622, 33 S. W. 1053; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark.

83, 40 S. W. 705, 62 Am. St. Rep. 154, 37 L. R. A. 504; Nations v. State, 64 Ark. 467, 43 S. W. 396; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 45 Pac. 1068; Denver Circle R. R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403; Lake v. State, 18 Fla. 501; Smith v. State, 29 Fla. 408, 10 So. 894; Collins v. Russell, 107 Ga. 423, 33 S. E. 444; Chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. 266, 41 S. E. 691; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388; Timm v. Harrison, 109 III. 593; School Directors v. School Directors, 135 Ill. 464, 28 N. E. 49; People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155; Barnham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. 469; State v. Cross, 38 Kan. 696, 17 Pac. 190; Aikman v. Ed

constitution does not make the obviously impracticable requirement that every act shall recite all other acts that its operation may incidentally affect, either by way of repeal, modification, extension, or supply. The harmony or repugnance of acts not passed with reference to the same subject can only be effectually developed by the clash of conflicting interests in litigation, and the settlement of such questions belongs to the judicial, not the legislative depart

It has been held in Nebraska that if a statute is intended to be amendatory, and is clearly so, it is within this provision of the constitution, though framed as an independent act and complete in itself; that being amendatory, it should be expressly so; that the law as amended should be given

in full with such reference to the old law as will clearly show for what the new law is substituted. But the later cases fully establish the law of that state in harmony with the current of authority. A statute which merely furnishes a rule of construction for prior statutes, and is not in terms an amendment, is not within the meaning of this constitutional regulation; it need not set forth the statutes affected. Nor is a statute amendatory which repeals in general terms all acts and parts of acts which are inconsistent with its provisions.69

An act was entitled "An act to amend an act entitled an act to more effectively secure competent and well qualified jurors in the county of Montgomery, approved February 21, 1887." The body of the act did not purport to amend, and

66 Smails v. White, 4 Neb. 357; Sovereign v. State, 7 id. 409, 413; In re House Roll 284, 31 Neb. 505, 48 N. W. 275: Stricklett v. State, 31 Neb. 674, 48 N. W. 820; State v. County Com'rs, 47 Neb. 428, 66 N. W. 434.

67 State v. Arnold, 31 Neb. 75, 47 N. W. 694; Smith v. State, 34 Neb. 689, 52 N. W. 572; Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 64 N. W. 365; Cooperrider v. State, 46 Neb. 84, 64 N. W. 372; State v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 67 N. W. 876; State v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526, 70 N. W. 56; Henry v. Ward, 49 Neb. 392, 68 N. W. 518; Bryant v. Dakota County, 53 Neb. 755, 74 N. W. 313; Nebraska L. & B. Ass'n v. Perkins, 61 Neb. 254, 85 N. W. 67. In State v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 873, 67 N. W. 876, the court says: "This constitutional provision has been frequently before this court for consideration, and it is a rule well settled that where an act of the legislature is not complete in itself, but is amendatory of a former law to

which it does not refer, it is within the constitutional inhibition quoted above. In other words, the fundamental law of the state requires all the parts of an amended law to be incorporated in the act. and the old law so amended to be repealed. . . . It is also firmly established in this state by a long line of decisions that an act complete in itself is not inimical to said constitutional provision, although such act may be repugnant to, or in conflict with, a prior law which is not referred to nor in express terms repealed by the former act. In such case the earlier statute will be construed to be repealed by implication." This same language was quoted and approved in State v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526, 70 N. W. 56.

68 State v. Geiger, 65 Mo. 306.

69 Medical College v. Muldon, 46 Ala. 603; State v. Gaines, 1 Lea, 734; Matter of Emsworth Borough, 5 Pa. Supr. Ct. 29.

proceeded as a new and independent act. It affected only one of the eighteen sections of the act of February 21. It was held that the words "to amend an act entitled an act" and "approved February 21, 1887," in the title, could be treated as surplusage, and the act was sustained as an independent act.70

$ 240. Whether act amendatory within the constitutional provision - Illustrations.- An act of Illinois entitled "An act for the assessment of property and providing the means thereof, and to repeal a certain act therein. named," provided a new mode and new machinery for the assessment of property for taxation, but left the old revenue law in force in various parts, so that it was necessary to use parts of the old law in connection with the new in order to make a complete law for the assessment of property for taxation. The new act proceeded as a new and independent act and was complete in itself, as far as it went. It was held not to be amendatory within the constitution." An act which is independent and complete in

70 Thomas v. State, 124 Ala. 48, 27 So. 315. To same effect, Peed v. McCrary, 94 Ga. 487, 21 S. E. 232; Bagwell v. Lawrenceville, 94 Ga. 654, 21 S. E. 903.

71 People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155. The court says: "So far as the title goes, the act purports to be a complete law in itself and to make provision for the assessment of property throughout the state and to provide the means therefor. If it can be held to be such a law, constituting a complete and entire act of legislation on the subject which it purports to deal with, it will be deemed good and not subject to the constitutional prohibition, notwithstanding it may repeal by implication, or modify the provisions of prior

existing laws. On the other hand, if the act is merely an attempt to amend the old law for the assessment of property by intermingling new and different provisions with the old ones or by adding new provisions, so as to create out of the existing laws and this act together an act for the assessment of property, then the act is clearly amendatory of the old law, and the requirement of the constitution is that the law so amended must be inserted at length in the new act. The character of the act in this respect must be determined, not by the title alone nor the question whether the act professes to be an amendment of existing laws, but by an examination and comparison of its provisions with prior laws