an attorney's fee in suits against railroad companies for injuries to stock are held valid in some cases and void in others." There is a similar difference of opinion as to the validity of statutes allowing the plaintiff an attorney's fee in mechanic's lien suits.62 § 227 (125). Same-Criminal laws.-Criminal laws must be general and have a uniform operation.63 In Ex parte Falk it was held that a statute providing punishment for an act which is malum in se wherever committed, being a law of a general nature, cannot be made local on the ground that the inhibited act is a greater evil in a large city than in other parts of the state. The court, by Okey, J., say: "The act inhibited [having burglars' tools in his possession] is not merely immoral but plainly vicious; it is one of very serious and dangerous character; it is not merely malum prohibitum but malum in se; and it is a wrong to society-not merely to Cincinnati; not merely in cities, but in every county, in every township, in fact in every part of the state; and no reason can be given why it might not properly be made punishable by Co. v. Bush, 60 Neb. 116, 82 N. W. 313; Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 62 Neb. 213, 86 N. W. 1070; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 86 Tex. 654, 26 S. W. 982, 24 L. R. A. 504; Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301, 23 S. C. Rep. 565; Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 22 S. C. Rep. 662. 61 Held valid: Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co. v. Duggan, 109 Ill. 537; Perkins v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co., 103 Mo. 52, 15 S. W. 320, 11 L. R. A. 426; Briggs v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., 111 Mo. 168, 20 S. W. 32; Railroad Co. v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 489, 19 S. W. 618; Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 87 Tex. 19, 26 S. W. 985. Held to be class legislation and void: Wilder v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 70 Mich. 382, 38 N. W. 289; Schut v. Railway Co., 70 Mich. 433, 38 N. W. 291; Lafferty v. Railway Co., 71 Mich. 35, 38 N. W. 660; Grand Rapids Chair Co. v. Runnels, 77 Mich. 104, 43 N. W. 1006. 62 Held valid: Wortman v. Kleinschnidt, 12 Mont. 316, 30 Pac. 280; Helena Steam Heating & Supply Co. v. Wells, 16 Mont. 65, 40 Pac. 78. Held void: Los Angeles Gold Min. Co. v. Campbell, 13 Colo. App. 1, 56 Pac. 246; Burleigh Bldg. Co. v. Merchant Brick, etc. Co., 13 Colo. App. 455, 59 Pac. 83. 63 Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550; Ex parte Koser, 60 id. 187, 191. 64 42 Ohio St. 638. statute throughout the whole state as a criminal offense. Perhaps it is true that such acts may be a greater evil in large cities; possibly a greater evil in Cincinnati than in any other part of the state. But the same thing may be truthfully said with respect to many, perhaps a majority, of criminal offenses. Take the crime of arson. It is a grievous evil everywhere, and under some circumstances a most atrocious crime. It is an evil alike in town and country, but a far greater evil in a large compact city like Cincinnati than in a small village or hamlet or in a sparse rural district. But does this reason, or any other with which it may be supplemented, afford any ground, in view of our constitution, for punishing under local law? So, a person having possession of instruments for counterfeiting, or custody of a large quantity of counterfeit money, may be in a better position to carry on a nefarious business successfully, and therefore more likely to occasion harm in a crowded city than in the rural portions of the state; but a general law upon the subject, applicable to the whole state, has effected all that can be done by legislation to remedy the evil.” “ 65 This opinion is instructive in the remarks which follow: "To the end that these statements may not mislead, it is proper to say that the general assembly is clothed in the most general terms with legislative power, and this, unrestrained by other provisions, would authorize the legislature to pass local penal statutes of every sort, and it will be seen that there is no inhibition against the passage of penal statutes which are local and even special in character. Hence it may be that a statute punishing even with death any person who should break and enter the state treasury in Columbus, Ohio, with intent to steal, or, having so broken and entered, rob the treasurer of state, would not be subject to any constitutional objection, however objectionable it might be on the ground of propriety. And other and perhaps more apt illustrations of the principle may be suggested. On the other hand, a statute, general in form, prohibiting the sale of liquors in the immediate vicinity of any college would perhaps be regarded as a general and therefore valid enactment, in force throughout the state, although every county does not contain a college. . . Attention has been called to the fact that in State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653, 658, it was held that the power to classify mu nicipal corporations expressly authorized by the constitution is ad § 228. Same-Miscellaneous.- An act regulating the methods and times of catching fish in the waters of the state was held not to be class legislation because it made different regulations for different waters, or because it excepted certain waters from its operation. An act declaring what shall constitute a legal and sufficient fence and requiring all fields and inclosures to be inclosed there with was held to be a law of a general nature. It did not extend to the whole state; it was not framed to have a uniform operation throughout the state, and was therefore held unconstitutional.67 An act prohibiting sheep from running at large in all the counties of the state except one was held liable to the same objection.68 So of an act relating to libel and confined to publishers of newspapers. Tax laws must provide a uniform rule. An act to regulate the collection 70 dressed in a large degree to the conscience and judgment of the legislature, and that statutory provisions with respect to any such class are, for governmental purposes, general legislation,' and not in conflict with the constitution. This we held to be a proper construction of article 13, section 6, which is in no sense in conflict with article 2, section 26. And in this connection it is proper to say that in Morgan v. Nolte, 37 Ohio St. 23, we sustained the validity of a conviction under an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati, passed by virtue of Revised Statutes, sections 1692, 2108, prescribing punishment by fine and imprisonment against any person who, being a known thief, should be found in that city; and there being no general statute punishing the act of having possession of burglars' tools, it is true, perhaps, that the substance of section 1924, if adopted in due form as an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati, 69 under authority of sections 1692 and 2108, would be entirely valid. Nor does this militate against anything I have said; for the constitutional provision we are considering would not, under such circumstances, have any application.” See Williams v. People, 24 N. Y. 405; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 483. 66 Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 588, 66 N. W. 805, 32 L. R. A. 380; Commonwealth v. Drain, 99 Ky. 162, 35 S. W. 269. See Peters v. State, 96 Tenn. 682, 36 S. W. 399, 33 L. R. A. 114. 67 Darling v. Rodgers, 7 Kan. 592, Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa. St. 417, 15 Atl. 782. 68 Robinson v. Perry, 17 Kan. 248; Utsey v. Hiott, 30 S. C. 360, 9 S. E. 338. 69 Allen v. Pioneer Press, 40 Minn. 117, 41 N. W. 936, 12 Am. St. Rep. 707, 3 L. R. A. 532. See Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479, 42 N. W. 396. 70 State v. Cumberland & Penn. R. R. Co., 40 Md. 22; State v. Ster of taxes provided that it should not apply to any taxes the collection of which was regulated by a local law. This was held not to make the act local or special, as such would be the effect of the act without such provision." A statute requiring the assessor to collect the tax on personal property at the rate of the preceding year at the time of making the assessment in cases where the same were not secured by real estate was held not to be a special law, as such unsecured taxes made a proper class.72 An act to enforce the payment of delinquent taxes applied only to counties. wherein the amount delinquent on a certain date exceeded three mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the real property of the county. This was held to be an arbitrary classification and the act was held void.73 A law imposing a tax on estates of over $3,000 in counties of over 150,000 inhabitants was held special and void." 75 Local option laws are not special legislation, nor are laws which make different regulations regarding the liquor traffic for municipalities of different population.76 A statute. which forbade the sale of liquor within one and one-half miles of a national soldiers' home and within one mile of ling, 20 Md. 502; Tyson v. State, 28 72 Rode v. Siebe, 119 Cal. 518, 51 Pac. 869, 39 L. R. A. 342; Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Dalton, 119 Cal. 604, 51 Pac. 1072. 73 Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, 81 Minn. 486, 84 N: W. 6. 74 State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469, 45 N. W. 51. 75 State v. Forkner, 94 Iowa, 1, 62 N.W. 683; Lloyd v. Dollison, 13 Ohio C. D. 571; ante. § 163. 76 State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 6 S. W. 469; Ex parte Swan, 96 Mo. 44, 9 S. W. 10; State v. Moore, 107 Mo. 78, 16 S. W. 937; State v. Wingfield, 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. 363; State v. Staats, 54 N. J. L. 286, 23 Atl. 667. a state soldiers' home was held not to be class legislation." So of a statute which forbade the granting of licenses to sell liquor by county boards within two miles of any city or village, but excepted counties of 150,000 population.78 The laying out, construction and repair of public roads and bridges is held to be a subject of a general nature, which must be provided for by general laws of uniform operation throughout the state, and laws applicable to a particular road or county are local and special and void.79 Different provisions may be made for working the roads in cities and towns than is applied to the rural districts.80 Acts giving special privileges to union soldiers and sailors or exempting them from burdens or conditions which apply to others are class legislation and void. An act to protect 77 Driggs v. State, 52 Ohio St. 37, passed at the second session of the 38 N. E. 882. 78 Henzinger v. State, 39 Neb. 653, 58 N. W. 194; Shannon v. State, 39 Neb. 658, 58 N. W. 196; Soehl v. State, 39 Neb. 659, 58 N. W. 196; Rowels v. State, 39 Neb. 659, 58 N. W. 197. 79 Commissioners v. State, 50 Ohio St. 653, 35 N. E. 887; State v. Com. missioners, 54 Ohio St. 333, 43 N. E. 587; Hixon v. Burson, 54 Ohio St. 470, 43 N. E. 1000; State v. Davis, 55 Ohio St. 15, 44 N. E. 511; Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. 75, 63 N. E. 594; Grove v. Leidy, 9 Ohio C. C. 272; Commissioners v. State, 12 Ohio C. C. 200; Maxwell V. Tillamook County, 20 Ore. 495, 26 Pac. 803. In Hixon v. Burson, 54 Ohio St. 470, 483, 43 N. E. 1000, the court says: "That the subject of roads and highways is capable of being legislated upon by general laws having a uniform operation throughout the state is conclusively shown by the fact that such laws were general assembly after the adoption of the constitution, and remain in force in substantially the same form to this day, and no local or special act on the subject of roads was passed for many years thereafter." See Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82, 65 S. W. 871. 80 McGinnis v. Ragsdale, 116 Ga. 245, 42 S. E. 492. 81 State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 N. E. 1007, 32 L. R. A. 253; Matter of Keyner, 148 N. Y. 219, 42 N. E. 667, 35 L. R. A. 447. See State v. Miller, 66 Minn. 90, 68 N. W. 732; State v. O'Connor, 54 N. J. L. 36, 22 Atl. 1091; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277. In the case first cited the court says: "The classification here attempted rests solely on a past and completed transaction, having no relation to the particular legislation enacted. All citizens are di vided into two classes, those who |