91 ject of a general nature which must be regulated by general laws of uniform operation, and that a special act creating a particular school district is local and void.90 The same ruling has been made in Oklahoma. The constitution of Pennsylvania forbids local or special laws "regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes."" It is held that school districts may be classified as well as municipalities, and that districts coterminous with cities of the third class may constitute a class for legislation concerning their government and affairs. There would seem to be no reason why school districts may not be classified according to population for purposes of their administration and government, as well as municipalities." 93 An act providing a method for the government of schools in municipalities divided into wards, different from that in other localities was held not to be a legitimate classification.95 School districts whose territory has been changed by a change of municipal boundaries may constitute a class for legislation with reference to the conse 90 State v. Spellmire, 67 Ohio St. 77, 65 N. E. 619, overruling State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St. 275, 20 N. E. 335, and confirming State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54. The following are earlier cases following State v. Powers: State v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio C. C. 152; State v. Board of Education, 3 Ohio C. D. 703. 91 Territory v. School District, 10 Okl. 556, 64 Pac. 241. But where there is no constitutional provision applicable except that requiring general laws of uniform operation, other states have held that a law creating a particular school district, or applicable to only one, is valid. Chicago, R. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Avoca, 99 Iowa, 556, 68 N. W. 881; Eichholtz v. Martin, 53 Kan. 486, 36 Pac. 1064. 92 Art. 3, sec. 52. 93 Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. St. 504, 46 Atl. 124; Commonwealth v. Shires, 195 Pa. St. 515, 46 Atl. 1102; Commonwealth v. Howell, 195 Pa. St. 519, 46 Atl. 1102; Commonwealth v. Hitchens, 200 Pa. St. 508, 50 Atl. 91; Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 203 Pa. St. 209, 52 Atl. 254; School District v. Smith, 195 Pa. St. 515, 46 Atl. 127. Compare Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. St. 246, 33 Atl. 1048. 94 Lewis v. Jersey City, 66 N. J. L. 582, 50 Atl. 346. 95 State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W. 677; State v. Long, 21 Mont. 26, 52 Pac. 645. 96 quences of such change. An act to pension teachers is of a general nature, and its operation cannot be limited.97 A law annexing school districts under the general law to school districts under special charters was held special and void.99 § 219 (126). Railroads.- Railroad companies have for some purposes constituted a class for general legislation; for other purposes such companies may be divided into subclasses, and legislation in regard to one of such classes made to differ from that applied to another. An Iowa act divided the railroads of the state into classes according to business in regulating rates of freight. It was held not in conflict with the constitution, requiring laws of a general nature to have a uniform operation throughout the state." Waite, C. J., said: "It operates uniformly on each class, and this is all the constitution requires. It is very clear that a uniform rate of charges for all railroad companies in the state might operate unjustly upon some. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances of the different roads; and the general assembly, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do this by a system of classification." An act provided that "Every railroad company shall be liable for all damages sustained by any person, including employees of the company, in consequence of any neglect of the agents, or by any mismanagement of the engineers. or other employees of the corporation, to any person sustaining such damage." It was objected to this law that it was limited in its operation to railroad companies, and subjected them to a rule or liability from which other persons, both natural and artificial, were exempt. The objection was held untenable. The court said: "These laws are general and uniform, not because they operate upon every per 96 Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. St. 349, 43 Atl. 985. 97 State v. Kuntz, 21 Ohio C. C. 261. 98 In re School Districts, 26 Colo. 136, 56 Pac. 173. 99 C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. Ed. 94. son in the state, for they do not, but because every person who is brought into the relation and circumstances provided for is affected by it. They are general and uniform in their operation upon all persons in the like situation; and the fact of their being general and uniform is not affected by the number of persons within the scope of their operation." A Missouri statute gave an exceptional measure of damages against railroad companies for injury to animals. It was objected that the act was partial in regard to the rule of damages, because if any private person, or any other person than a railroad corporation, caused a like damage, the act did not apply, and the most that could be recovered would be the value of the animal. The objection was overruled. The court said: "This right of action is given to all persons who may be thus injured. It is given as well to any association of people, and to railroad corporations whose stock may be injured by a railroad." Another act put all owners and operators of railroads, whether natural persons, companies or corporations, on an equal footing, by making the term "railroad corporation" to include them. Though directed against railroads alone, while no other common carriers are brought within its operation, it was not partial for that reason. And the court thus remarks upon it: "Had the legislature deemed it essential to the protection of human life and private property they would doubtless have extended the statute to carriers by coach and water; but as the class of property and human life protected by this provision of the statute is not exposed to like perils incident to coach and water travel, the occasion and necessity for so extending the statute did not exist. Class legislation is not necessarily obnoxious to the constitution. 1 McAnnich v. Miss. & M. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; United States Express Co. v. Ellyson, 28 Iowa, 370; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73; Phillips v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 86 Mo. 540, 24 Am. & E. R. Cas. 368; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; State v. Spaude, 37 Minn. 322, 34 N. 2 Humes v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 82 Mo. 221. It is a settled construction of similar constitutional provisions that a legislative act which applies to and embraces all persons who are or who may come into like situation and circumstances is not partial."3 And a like conclusion was arrived at in respect to an act which gave a justice an exceptional jurisdiction in the particular class of actions just mentioned." 6 The following acts relating to railroads were held not to be special or class legislation: An act authorizing the appointment of a receiver of any railroad which has neglected for ten days to run trains over any part of its road, and which excepted roads at seaside resorts, not exceeding four miles in length, intended merely for the transportation of summer travelers and tourists; exempting railroad employees from working on the public roads; an act requiring railroads at all stations where there are telegraph offices to post information as to whether trains are on time or not; an act giving an action against railroad companies. for negligently causing the death of any one not an employee of the company; making a class of railroads extending into two or more counties for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes; an act which provides for assessing railroads by a state board and all other property by county assessors; 10 an act providing for the assessment of railroads omitted in specified years;" an act imposing at 8 9 3 Humes v. Missouri, etc. Ry. Co., 82 Mo. 221; Snyder v. Warford, 11 Mo. 513; Merritt v. Knife Falls B. Corp., 34 Minn. 245; Central Trust Co. v. Sloan, 65 Iowa, 655; Peoria, etc. R. R. Co. v. Duggan, 109 Ill. 537, 50 Am. Rep. 619. 7 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. State, 142 Ind. 428, 41 N. E. 937. 8 Schoolcraft v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 92 Ky. 233, 17 S. W. 567. 9 People v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 105 Cal. 576, 38 Pac. 905. Compare People v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 83 4 Phillips v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Cal. 393, 23 Pac. 303. Mo. 540. 5 Delaware Bay & Cape May R. R. Co. v. Markley, 45 N. J. Eq. 139, 16 Atl. 436. State v. Womble, 112 N. C. 862, 17 S. E. 491, 19 L. R. A. 827. 10 Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 437. 11 Bloxham v. Florida, etc. R. R. Co., 35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902. 14 privilege tax upon all railroads not paying an ad valorem tax; an act authorizing passenger railways in cities of the first class to use other power than horse power, with the consent of the city; 13 acts requiring persons or corporations operating electric cars, or cars propelled by steam, cable or electricity,15 to protect the motorman from the weather. An act imposing upon railroads a double liability for damages by fire was held valid and not class legislation.16 So of acts imposing upon railroads a special liability for inju ries to stock by reason of a failure to fence their tracks." But an act making railroad companies absolutely liable for stock killed was held to be class legislation.18 An act provided for the presentation of certain claims against railroad companies by filing the same with a station agent and enacted that, if the same were not paid within thirty days and suit was brought thereon and sustained, the plaintiff should recover an attorney's fee. This was held to be class legislation and void.19 § 220. Particular acts-Courts and judicial procedure. An act permitting plaintiff to expedite a cause was held not local or special because the same privilege was not accorded the defendant.20 So of an act requiring the plaintiff to give bond for costs in actions for slander and libel." An 12 Knoxville & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 S. W. 115. 13 Reeves v. Phila. Traction Co., 152 Pa. St. 153, 25 Atl. 516. 14 State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L. R. A. 317; State v. Whitaker, 160 Mo. 59, 60 S. W. 1068. Schimmele v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 34 Minn. 216, 25 N. W. 347; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 5 S. C. Rep. 110, 29 L. Ed. 463; Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 9 S. C. Rep. 207, 32 L. Ed. 585. 18 Catril v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 2 15 State v. Smith, 58 Minn. 35, 59 Idaho, 576, 21 Pac. 416. N. W. 545. 16 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews. 174 U. S. 96, 19 S. C. Rep. 609. 43 L. Ed. 909; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 58 Kan. 447, 49 Pac. 602. 17 Johnson v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.. 29 Minn. 425, 13 N. W. 673; 19 Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 S. C. Rep. 255, 41 L. Ed. 666. 20 Louisville & N. A. & C. R. R. Co. v. Wallace, 136 Ill. 87. 26 N. E. 493, 11 L. R. A. 787. 21 Smith v. McDermott, 93 Cal. 421, 29 Pac. 34. To same effect, |