in which it was not previously fixed by law, and which thus excluded five cities from its operation, was held special and void.14 An act approved and in effect April 13, 1889, provided that any city which contained more than two assembly districts wholly within the city should be redivided into wards to correspond with the assembly districts. An act approved March 27 and in effect July 4 of the same year so arranged the assembly districts that this condition would exist only in Newark. It was held that the effect of the two was to make the former act special and void.15 Townships situated in counties of the first class do not constitute a class for legislation.16 So of cities situated in counties of 60,000 population or more." An Illinois revenue act provided that in counties having a population in excess of 125,000, of which there was only one, the aggregate rate of taxation should not exceed five per cent., and that the county, school and municipal tax rates should be scaled pro rata, if necessary, to bring the aggregate within that limit. The provision was held void as special legisla-tion, because it made a class of cities, towns and school districts situated in that county without any reasonable foundation therefor. "By this act," says the court, "restrictions are put upon cities, townships, school districts and other municipal corporations simply because they are within Cook county, which is the only county in the state with a population of more than 125,000. There can be no reason, in the nature of things, why a city, village or school district or other public corporation in that county should be deprived of powers that a similar corporation situated in some other county is permitted to exercise. It is an arbitrary and unnatural classification of municipalities not 14 Tetrault v. Orange, 55 N. J. L. 99, 25 Atl. 268. 15 State v. Newark, 53 N. J. L. 4, 20 Atl. 886, 10 L. R. A. 700. 16 Crookall v. Matthews, 61 N. J. L. 349, 39 Atl. 659. 17 Scowden's Appeal, 96 Pa. St.. 422. different in population, needs or requirements, and exercising the same general powers in other respects." 18 An act permitted an area not exceeding two square miles and having taxable property of at least $100,000 to become incorporated as a borough, provided that during any portion of the year a population of not less than 200 resided thereon. It was held special and void by reason of the condition in the proviso.19 An act which permitted the organization of a township from part of an incorporated town, while a similar area with the same population not so situated was not given the privilege, was held to be special legislation and void.20 An act providing for the incorporation of any township, or part of a township, containing not more than four square miles and not more than 5,000 inhabitants, into a borough, was held to be a general law and valid. While such laws usually fix a minimum of population, it was held valid to fix a maximum. An act in regard to the construction of sidewalks applied to villages which had not constructed walks under a certain act. This was held an illusory classification." Municipalities organized under the general law may be legislated for as a class.23 21 18 People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, the provision submitting the pro56 N. E. 155. posed organization to a vote, have used population as fixing a limit beyond which municipal powers 19 Attorney-General v. Anglesea, 58 N. J. L. 372, 33 Atl. 971. 20 People v. Martin, 178 Ill. 611, 53 of the limited extent provided for N. E. 309. 21 State v. Clayton, 53 N. J. L. 277, 21 Atl. 1026. After referring to the principles of classification by population, the court says: "But the act has been made to operate upon a population within a fixed number. Hence a different question arises, but to be settled by an application of the same principle. The legislature, probably conceiving that the imposition of the burden of such a corporation on a too limited population without necessity was guarded against by in this act should not be acquired. This requires the inference that the legislature determined that such a borough organization, appropriate and sufficient for a population not exceeding five thou sand, would not be appropriate or sufficient for a greater number. Can we pronounce this erroneous, or such classification illusive? I think not." p. 282. 22 Costello v. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St. 202, 30 N. E. 613. 23 Flynn v. Little Falls Elec. & Water Co., 74 Minn. 180, 77 N. W. 214. Classification based on existing or past conditions only. A classification based upon existing or past conditions or facts, and which would exclude the persons, places, things or objects thereafter coming into the same situation or condition, is special and void. Thus a classifi cation of cities or counties based upon existing population or upon the population shown by specified census is of this character. 25 An act applicable to all counties having by the last census a population of 150,000 or upwards was held not to fix the last census before the passage of the act as the criterion for all time, but to mean the last census from time to time.26 The following were held within the principle stated: An act providing for the changing of county seats, with a proviso that it should not apply to any county "wherein the court-house and jail now erected excced in value the sum of $35,000;" an act granting certain privileges for the planting and raising of oysters in lands under tidewaters to those who now use and have used such lands since January 1, 1880; 28 an act providing for licensing race tracks, but providing that no license should be granted to any race course not in use prior to a given date, unless 27 180; Butler v. Montclair, 67 N. J. Trenton, 56 N. J. L. 469, 29 Atl. 183; L. 426, 51 Atl. 494. 24 Thomas v. Austin, 103 Ga. 701, 30 S. E. 627; Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479, 27 S. W. 711; State v. O'Connor, 54 N. J. L. 36, 22 Atl. 1091; State v. Trenton, 55 N. J. L. 72, 25 Atl. 113; Burlington v. Pennsyl vania R. R. Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 259, 38 Atl. 849; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Burlington, 58 N. J. Eq. 547, 43 Atl. 700; State v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 83, 30 Atl. 186; Cincinnati v. Rosche Bros., 50 Ohio St. 103, 33 N. E. 408, 40 Am. St. Rep. 653; Silberman v. Hay, 59 Ohio St. 582, 53 N. E. 258; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 60 N. W. 270: State v. Trenton, 54 N. J. L. 444, 24 Atl. 478; State v. Lougher v. Soto, 129 Cal. 610, 62 Pac. 184; Hetland v. County Commissioners, 89 Minn. 492, 95 N. W. 305; Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258; Scowden's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 422. 25 Campbell v. Indianapolis, 155 Ind. 186, 57 N. E. 920; State v. Les Moines, 96 Iowa, 521, 65 N. W. 818; General Trust Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., 80 Fed. 218. 26 Verges v. Milwaukee County, 116 Wis. 191, 93 N. W. 44. 27 Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N. D. 270, 50 N. W. 970, 14 L. R. A. 725. 28 State v. Post, 55 N. J. L. 264, 26 Atl. 683. the board of chosen freeholders of the county should declare that it was a public necessity.29 An act in regard to the removal of county seats required a three-fifths vote in favor of the proposition, but provided that where the county seat of any county had been relocated by a special act of the legislature since a given time, a majority vote should be sufficient. It was held to be a local and special law. The court said: "This is classification run mad." 30 An act applicable to all counties in which were cast at the general election of 1882 more than 1,150 votes was held to be special and void. But in another case an act which excepted from its operation counties in which the vote at the last election. for president was less than 3,000 was held not to be local or special. A remedial act is held not to be local or epecial because applying only to present emergencies and not to like emergencies in the future.33 § 215. Validity of class not dependent upon number Classes of one or a few.-The number of persons affected by a law does not control or determine the question of its validity; it is enough that the law relates to a subject of a general nature, and is general and uniform in its operation upon every person who is brought within the relation and circumstances provided for by it." A class of cities or counties, based upon population, may be valid, though it embraces but one city or county, if others may come into the class on attaining the specified population.35 29 State v. Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. 71, mann v. Guttenberg, 63 N. J. L. 616, .8 Atl. 51. 44 Atl. 758; Alexander v. Duluth, 77 Minn. 445, 80 N. W. 623. See ante, § 201. 30 Fitzgerald v. Phelps & B. Wind mill Co., 42 W. Va. 570, 26 S. E. 315. ee Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258, for the origin of this expression. 31 State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735. 34 McAnnich v. Miss. & M. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 14 Pac. 615, 35 Indianapolis v. Navin, 151 Ind. 139, 47 N. E. 525, 41 L. R. A. 337; 32 Clark v. Finley, 93 Tex. 171, 54 Campbell v. Indianapolis, 155 Ind. S. W. 343. 33 State v. Guttenberg, 62 N. J. L. 605, 43 Atl. 703; S. C. affirmed, Her 186, 57 N. E. 920; Smith v. Indianapolis St. Ry. Co., 158 Ind. 425, 63 N. E. 849; People v. Onahan, 170 36 An act which prohibited the deposit of material in the waters of New York harbor was held to be a general and not a local or special law. In the case first cited the court says: "The fact that an act operates only upon a limited area or upon persons within a specified locality and not generally throughout the state is, in most cases, a reasonably accurate test by which to determine whether the act is general or local. But it is not decisive in all cases. The entire state may be interested in the enactment and execution of a law operating territorially upon a particular section of the state only." "The citizens of New York city may possibly have a greater stake in the matter than citizens in other localities, but the destruction or serious impairment of the harbor of New York would directly affect the prosperity of the state. It would impair its revenues, imperil its system of river, canal, and railroad transportation, and it is not too much to say that every industrial interest, agricultural or mechanical, would feel its blighting influence." On the same reasoning an act providing for the sale and lease of school lands in a particular part of the state was held not to be a local law.37 So of an act regulating the taking, planting and cultivating of oysters in particular tide waters but not in all. A statute of New Jersey gave the Ill. 449, 48 N. E. 1003; Winston v. 36 Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954; Ferguson v. Sandford, 59 Hun, 207, 13 N. Y. S. 398. In the latter case the court says: "We think that, inasmuch as the act in question operates upon a subject in which the whole people are interested, and prescribes a rule of conduct for all persons and renders all persons liable to its penalties wherever they reside, it is to be considered a general, as contradistinguished from a local, act.” p. 209. So of an act relating to the port of New Orleans. Duffy v. New Orleans, 49 La. Ann. 114, 21 So. 179. Says the court: "The fertile valley is interested; the traffic and commerce on seas and oceans are concerned." 37 Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S. W. 255. 38 State v. Carson, 67 N. J. L. 178, 50 Atl. 780. The court says of the |