§ 135. Words of act restrained or qualified by title.The words of an act will be restrained or qualified by the title. "By force of our constitutional provision, requiring the object of every law to be expressed in its title, the title limits the sphere within which the enacting clause can operate." 67 "An act to make it unlawful for a person to fraudulently dispose of the property of another," made it penal for any person to sell, dispose of, or convert to his own use, the property of another without his consent. It was held that the general words of the act were qualified or limited by the title to a fraudulent disposition of another's property. 68 § 136. Acts to prohibit, regulate, protect, etc., imply penalties and civil liabilities. An act to regulate any specified business, or the use of property, or regulating human conduct in any way, or to prohibit acts or things, or to protect persons or property or public or private rights, may include penal provisions," or provisions imposing a civil lia legislate, and this renders it suffi. cient." 67 Allen v. Bernards Tp., 57 N. J. L. 303, 31 Atl. 219. To same effect: State v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 Ala. 221, 13 So. 362; Comer v. State, 103 Ga. 69, 29 S. E. 501; Martin v. South Salem Land Co., 94 Va. 28, 26 S. E. 591. 68 Commonwealth v. Barney, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2352, 74 S. W. 181. See further on the subject, post, ch. IX. 69 In re Pratt, 19 Colo. 138, 34 Pac. 680; Alberson v. Mayor, 82 Ga. 30, 8 S. E. 869; McCook v. State, 91 Ga. 740, 17 S. E. 1019; Maynard v. Marshall, 91 Ga. 840, 18 S. E. 403; Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S. E. 759; Sykes v. People, 127 Ill. 117, 19 N. E. 705; People v. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill. 370, 21 N. E. 923; Cohn v. People, 149 Ill. 486, 37 N. E. 60, 41 Am. St. Rep. 304, 23 L. R. A. 821; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. 469; State v. Stunkle, 41 Kan. 456, 21 Pac. 675; State v. Bush, 45 Kan. 138, 25 Pac. 614, 632; Helvenstine v. Yantis, 88 Ky. 695, 11 S. W. 811; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485, 38 N. W. 474; People v. Miller, 88 Mich. 383, 50 N. W. 296; Burrows v. Delta Trans. Co., 106 Mich. 582, 64 N. W. 501, 29 L. R. A. 468; State v. Power, 63 Neb. 496, 88 N. W. 769; State v. Corson, 67 N. J. L. 178, 50 Atl. 780; Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N. E. 643; State v. Koshland, 25 Ore. 178, 35 Pac. 32; Commonwealth v. Depuy, 148 Pa. St. 201, 23 Atl. 896; Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Pa. Supr. Ct. 362; Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Supr. Ct. 5; State v. Morgan, 2 S. D. 32, 48 N. W. 314; Hathaway v. McDonald, 27 Wash. 659, 67 Pac. 710, 91 bility or giving a civil remedy," without such penalties, liabilities or remedies being referred to in the title. The imposition of both civil and criminal liabilities in the same act does not create a duality of subjects." § 137 (101). The title and subject of amendatory and supplementary acts - General principles. The constitutional requirement under discussion as applied to acts of this character when they contain matter which might appropriately have been incorporated in the original act under its title is satisfied generally if the amendatory or supplemental act identifies the original act by its title, and declares the purpose to amend or supplement it.72 Under such a title, Am. St. Rep. 889; Alberson v. Mayor, 82 Ga. 30, 8 S. E. 869. Compare State v. McDonald, 25 Wash. 122, 64 Pac. 912. 70 Barnhill v. Teague, 96 Ala. 207, 11 So. 444; Beebe v. Tolerton, 117 Iowa, 593, 91 N. W. 905; De Both v. Rich Hill Coal & Min. Co., 141 Mo. 497, 42 S. W. 1081; Peterson v. State, 104 Tenn. 127, 56 S. W. 834. 71 Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Pa. Supr. Ct. 162. 72 Street v. Hooten, 131 Ala. 492, 32 So. 580; Leake v. Colgan, 125 Cal. 413, 58 Pac. 69; Beach v. Von Detten, 139 Cal. 462, 73 Pac. 187; Davidson v. Von Detten, 139 Cal. 467, 73 Pac. 189; Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291; Saunders v. Provisional Municipality, 24 Fla. 226; Jones v. Columbus, 25 Ga. 610; Alberson v. Mayor, 82 Ga. 30, 8 S. E. 869; Newman v. State, 101 Ga. 534, 28 S. E. 1005; Jones v. Lake View, 151 Ill. 663, 38 N. E. 688; Morrison v. People, 196 Ill. 454, 63 N. E. 989; Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197; Bell v. Marsh, 137 Ind. 226, 36 N. E. 358; Lewis v. State, 148 Ind. 346, 47 N. E. 675; Udell v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., 152 Ind. 507, 52 N. E. 799; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Williams v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88; Iowa Savings & L. Ass'n v. Selby, 111 Iowa, 402, 82 N. W. 968; Second German Am. B. Ass'n v. Newman, 50 Md. 62; Swartwout v. Railroad Co., 24 Mich. 389; Hoffman v. Parsons, 27 Minn. 236; Holden v. Supervisors, 77 Mich. 202, 43 N. W. 969; Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 112 Mich. 317, 70 N. W. 894; Fort St. Union Depot Co. v. Com'r of R. R., 118 Mich. 340, 76 N. W. 631; Attorney-General v. Bolger, 128 Mich. 355, 87 N. W. 366; State v. Madson, 43 Minn. 438, 45 N. W. 856; Willis v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140, 50 N. W. 1110, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; Perry v. Gross, 25 Neb. 826, 4 N. W. 799; In re White, 33 Neb. 812, 51 N. W. 287; Kleckner v. Turk, 45 Neb. 176, 63 N. W. 469; State v. Bemis, 45 Neb. 724, 64 N. W. 348; State v. Cornell, 54 Neb. 72, 74 N. W. 432; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; Rahway Savings Inst. v. Rahway, 53 N. J. L. 48, 20 Atl. 756; People v. Willsea, 60 N. Y. 507; Matter of New York & L. I. alterations by excision, addition or substitution may be made, and any provisions may be enacted which might have Bridge Co., 148 N. Y. 540, 42 N. E. 1088; Bohmer v. Haffen, 161 N. Y. 390, 55 N. E. 1047; Wilcox v. Baker, 22 App. Div. 299, 47 N. Y. S. 900; Ex parte Howe, 26 Ore. 181, 37 Pac. 536; State Line, etc. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 429; Craig v. First Presb. Church, 88 Pa. St. 42; Millvale v. Evergreen Ry. Co., 131 Pa. St. 1, 18 Atl. 993, 7 L. R. A. 369; Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Ry. Co., 142 Pa. St. 484, 21 Atl. 982, 24 Am. St. Rep. 512; Mt. Joy v. Turnpike Co., 182 Pa. St. 581, 38 Atl. 411; Rodgers' Petition, 192 Pa. St. 97, 43 Atl. 475; Commonwealth v. Gilli gan, 195 Pa. St. 504, 46 Atl. 124; Commonwealth v. Shiras, 195 Pa. St. 515, 46 Atl. 127; Commonwealth v. Howell, 195 Pa. St. 519, 46 Atl. 1102; Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S. E. 357; Robey v. Shepard, 42 W. Va. 286, 26 S. E. 278; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, 9 Am. Rep. 578; Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214, 224; National Bank v. Commissioners, 14 Fed. 239. See Hyman v. State, 87 Tenn. 109, 9 S. W. 372; Hyde Park v. Chicago, 124 Ill. 156, 16 N. E. 222. In State v. Smith, 35 Minn. 257, it appears that outside of the general law for the assessment and collection of taxes an independent or cumulative act in pari materia was in force requiring notice of the expiration of redemption after a tax sale. A subsequent statute, entitled generally as an act to amend the general law, contained a provision expressly repealing this separate statute, which was probably equivalent to providing that redemption should expire absolutely by lapse of the redemption period without notice to the party who had the right of redemption. This was matter germane to the original bill which was amended, and under the rule stated in the text the title was sufficient. The court, however, held otherwise, and Dick. inson, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: “An amendatory law is for the amendment not of what might have been enacted under the title of the original statute, but of what was enacted; not of what the original law might have been, but of what it was Hence the sufficiency of the title of an act merely declared to be amendatory of a prior law, to justify the legislation which may be enacted under it, depends not alone upon the fact that the title of the original statute was so comprehensive that the legislation might have been properly enacted in such prior law, but it depends also upon the nature and extent of the prior enactment to amend which is the declared purpose or subject of the latter act. This seems self-evident; but to test the correctness of the rule invoked, let us apply it to supposable cases. We will assume that under the title of the law of 1878, "An act to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes," the only legislation adopted had been a change of the prior law in respect to the time of meeting of the state board of equalization or been incorporated in the original act." "A title which expresses a purpose to amend an earlier enactment, referring to the earlier enactment by its title, in which the subject of the proposed legislation is clearly expressed, is no more or less than the expression of a purpose to deal with the subject so expressed in the title of the earlier enactment." 74 of the manner of publishing the delinquent list. Now, suppose a later act, declared in its title to be amendatory of that act, to consist of two sections; the first amend ing the prior act by prescribing a different time for the meeting of the state board or a different manner of publishing the delinquent list. The second section, we will suppose, simply declares the repeal of section 2 of a law of 1873 (Sp. Laws, 1873, ch. 111), authorizing railroad corporations to adopt the scheme of substituted taxation in that act provided; or let the supposed second section declare the repeal of the law of 1877 (chapter 105), which required an annual return by railroad corporations of land sold from their untaxable land grant, so that the same might be properly subjected to taxation; or again, let the supposed second section be like that now in question, simply the repeal of the act of 1877, respecting the giving of notice of the expiration of the period for redemption; or let us suppose that the so-called amendatory act had consisted only of such repeal of the law of 1877. In such cases the mind is at once impressed with the incongruity between the subject of the act as expressed in its title and the enactment under it. Yet the principle relied upon by the respondent would sustain such legislation, because it might have been adopted under the title of the original law. The fault in the asserted rule is that it does not regard the nature and extent of the original enactment which it is the declared purpose of the later act to amend, but only the title of it; it rests upon the assumption that the enactment was as comprehensive as under its title it might have been. We think it cannot be relied upon to aid in the determination of such cases, and, if recognized as a rule without qualification, that it would open a way to the accomplishment of the very evils which the constitutional provision was intended to prevent." Re-affirmed in State ex rel. Nash v. Madson, 43 Minn. 438, 45 N. W. 856. 78 Id.; Robinson v. Lane, 19 Ga. 337. 74 Street v. Hooten, 131 Ala. 492, 501, 32 So. 580. In State v. Porter, 53 Minn. 279, 285, 55 N. W. 134, it is said: "The substance of what has been said, so far as we need to repeat it at this time, is that an amendatory law is for the amendment, not of what might have been enacted under the title of the original statute, but of what was enacted. Hence the sufficiency of the title of an act merely declared The title of the amendatory act need not specify or indicate the nature of the amendment. And where it gives the title of the act amended it need not refer to its chapter number or date of passage. It of course follows that provisions of the amendatory act not germane to the subject expressed in the title of the original act are unconstitutional and void." In Idaho it has been held that an amendatory act may introduce new matter, not expressed in the title of the original act, nor germane thereto, provided the subject of such new matter is indicated in the title of the amendatory act.78 § 138. Effect of error or uncertainty in title of amendatory act. Where the title of the amendatory act recites the title of the act amended, and there is only one act with that title, an error in referring to the date of the passage or approval of the act amended will not vitiate the title.79 to be amendatory of a prior law, to justify the legislation which may be enacted under it, depends, not alone upon the fact that the title to the original statute was so comprehensive that the legislation in question might have been properly enacted in such prior law, but it depends also upon the nature and extent of the prior enactment, to amend which is the declared purpose or subject of the later act." The decision of the court does not go quite as far as the quotation, but is to the effect that an amend ment to one act cannot introduce matter which is covered by another independent act, although the matter so introduced is germane to the title of the act amended. See post, § 139. 75 Leake v. Colgan, 125 Cal. 413, 58 Pac. 69; Fort St. Union Depot Co. v. Com'r of R. R., 118 Mich. 340, 76 N. W. 631. 76 Willis v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140, 50 N. W. 1110, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626. 77 State v. Davis, 130 Ala. 148, 30 So. 344, 89 Am. St. Rep. 23; Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 Ill 229, 21 N. E. 1; Kennedy v. Le Moyne, 188 Ill. 255, 58 N. E. 903; State v. Pierce, 51 Kan. 241, 32 Pac. 924; Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. 638, 6 L. R. A. 102; Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N. W. 869; State v. Bowen, 54 Neb. 211, 74 N. W. 615; Mack v. State, 60 N. J. L. 28, 36 Atl. 1088; Parfitt v. Ferguson, 3 App. Div. 176, 38 N. Y. S. 466; Crowther v. Fidelity Ins, Trust & Safe Dep. Co., 85 Fed. 41, 29 C. C. A. 1; Walling v. Dickertown, 61 N. J. L. 203, 44 Atl. 864; Astor v. Arcade Ry. Co., 113 N. Y. 93, 20 N. E. 594, 2 L. R. A. 789. 78 Andrews v. Ada County, 7 Iaaho, 453, 63 Pac. 592. 79 Alberson v. Mayor, 82 Ga. 30, 8 S. E. 869; Citizens' St. R. R. Co. v. |