intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is ' intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures by confining each act to one subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title."

7 Montgomery, etc. Ass'n v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; Stein v. Leeper, 78 Ala. 517; Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 539; City Council v. National B. & L. Ass'n, 108 Ala. 336, 18 So. 816; Lindsay v. U. S. Savings & L. Ass'n, 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171, 42 L. R. A. 783; Mobile Trans portation Co. v. Mobile, 128 Ala. 335, 30 So. 645, 86 Am. St. Rep. 143; Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 Pac. 251; People v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 230, 3 Pac. 70; Catron v. County Com'rs, 18 Colo. 553, 33 Pac. 513; State v. Green, 36 Fla. 154, 18 So. 334; Brieswick v. Mayor, 51 Ga. 639; Blair v. State, 90 Ga. 326, 17 S. E. 96, 35 Am. St. Rep. 206; People v. Institute, 71 Ill. 229; Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 312; Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295; Henderson v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 23, 34 N. E. 565, 41 Am. St. Rep. 410, 20 L. R. A. 827; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. 469; State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 282; State v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush,

108; Rogers v. Jacob, 88 Ky. 502, 11 S. W. 513; Conley v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. 285; Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann. 298; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 160; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 531, 69 Am. Dec. 226; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 74 Am. Dec. 522; Mayor v. State, 30 Md. 118; County Com'rs v. Franklin R. R. Co., 34 Md. 163; McGrath v. State, 46 Md. 633; County Com'rs v. Meekins, 50 Md. 39; State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 16 Atl. 445; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 494; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 84 N. W. 788; St. Louis v. Teifel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78; State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W. 677; Hotchkiss v. Marion, 12 Mont. 218, 29 Pac. 821; State v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 23 Mont. 498, 59 Pac. 854; White v. Lincoln, 5 Neb. 505; Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Frey, 30 Neb. 790, 47 N. W. 87; Van Horn v. State, 46

The supreme court of Minnesota, in speaking of the provision, says: "Its purposes are two: first, to prevent what is called 'logrolling legislation' or 'omnibus bills,' by which a number of different and disconnected subjects are united in one bill, and then carried through by a combination of interests; second, to prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the legislature by including provisions in a bill whose title gives no intimation of the nature of the proposed legislation, or of the interests likely to be affected by its becoming a law; and, in deciding whether an act is obnoxious to this provision of the constitution, a very good test to apply is whether it is within the mischiefs intended to be remedied." 8

The supreme court of Colorado, after referring to the objects of the provision, in similar language says: "So far as the first of the above evils is concerned, unfortunately, neither this nor any other provision yet devised upon the subject has produced the desired result. Even a casual in

Neb. 62, 64 N. W. 365; Cooperrider v. State, 46 Neb. 84, 64 N. W. 372; State v. Tibbets, 52 Neb. 228, 71 N. W. 990, 66 Am. St. Rep. 492; Ne braska L. & B. Ass'n v. Perkins, 61 Neb. 254, 85 N. W. 67; State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; State v. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; Gifford v. N. J. R. R. Co., 2 Stockt. 172; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 241; Harris v. People, 59 N. Y. 602; Fishkill v. F. & B. Co., 22 Barb. 634; State v. Woodmansee, 1 N. D. 246, 46 N. W. 970, 11 L. R. A. 420; Power v. Kitching, 10 N. D. 254, 86 N. W. 737; Clemensen v. Peterson, 35 Ore. 47, 56 Pac. 1015; Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 427; Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Commonwealth v. Samuels, 164 Pa. St. 462, 29 Atl. 909; Commonwealth v. Severus, 164 Pa. St. 462, 30

Atl. 391; In re Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. St. 349, 43 Atl. 985; State v. Morgan, 2 S. D. 32, 48 N. W. 314; State v. Becker, 3 S. D. 29, 51 N. W. 1018; State v. Lusater, 9 Baxt. 584; Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 782, 73 Am. Dec. 213; Henrico Co. Sup'rs v. McGruder, 84 Va. 828, 6 S. E. 232; Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S. E. 357; Percival v. Cowychee, etc. Dist., 15 Wash. 480, 46 Pac. 1035; Slack v. J^cob, 8 W. Va. 640; In re Fourth Judicial District, 4 Wyo. 133, 32 Pac. 850; Omaha v. U. P. Ry. Co., 73 Fed. 1013, 20 C. C. A. 219, 36 U. S. App. 615; Missis sippi, etc. Co. v. Prince, 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 391.

8 Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382.

vestigation into the methods adopted by modern legislation will show that the passage of any bill upon its intrinsic merits is of rare occurrence, logrolling being as successfully carried on to secure the passage of a number of bills upon different subjects as if the same legislation could, as formerly, be included in a single bill. The constitutional provision, it is believed, however, does furnish a remedy for the other evils against which it is directed."

§ 112 (79). Regarded as mandatory. The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be expected to continue notwithstanding that that obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutional injunction, if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them, and only directory. It would, in a general sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is clear beyond all question that such was the intention of the framers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure.10 The fact is this: that whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded."

§ 113 (80). The provision has been held mandatory in Tennessee on its particular language. Thus, in Cannon v.

9 Catron v. County Com'rs, 18 Colo. 553, 33 Pac. 513, 558.

10 Commissioners of Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 607.

11 Cooley, Const. Lim. *78.

13

Mathes,12 Nicholson, C. J., called attention to the words: "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject." "This," he said, "is a direct, positive and imperative limitation upon the power of the legislature. It matters not that a bill has passed through three readings in each house on different days, and has received the approval of the governor, still it is not a law of the state if it embraces more than one subject." So, in Central & G. R. Co. v. People, the last clause in the provision, as adopted in Colorado and several other states, was held decisive. That clause is, "but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed." 14 But in all the states having such a restrictive provision in which the question has arisen, except Ohio,15 and California under her former constitution,16 the command has been held to be mandatory.17

§ 114 (81). The courts possess and exercise the same power to expound and apply the provision of the constitution under

128 Heisk. 504.

13 5 Colo. 39.

14 Art. 5, sec. 21.

15 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176; Steamboat Northern Indiana v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St. 383; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573; State v. Covington, etc., 29 Ohio St. 102; Oshe v. State, 37 Ohio St. 500.

16 Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Pierpont v. Crouch, 10 Cal. 315.

17 People v. Hills, 35 N. Y. 449; Gaskin v. Meek, 42 N. Y. 186; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 378; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 185; Huber v. People, 49 N. Y. 132; People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 635; People v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 230, 3 Pac. 70; Central & G. R. Co. v. People, 5 Colo. 39, 9 Am. & Eng. T. R. R. Cas. 546; Montgomery, etc. Ass'n v. Robin

son, 69 Ala. 413; Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184; Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504; State v. McCann, 4 Lea, 1; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 85; Phillips v. Covington, etc. Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 221; Commissioners of Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 607; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Union Passenger Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 81* Pa. St. 91; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 782, 73 Am. Dec. 213; City of San Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49; State v. McCracken, 42 Tex. 383; Pennington v. Woolfolk, 79 Ky. 13; Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 Pac. 251; State v. Morgan, 2 S. D. 32, 48 N. W. 314; Saunders v. Savage, 108 Tenn. 340, 67 S. W. 471.

consideration as they do to construe and enforce any other. It is as fatal to an act to be framed contrary to the constitution in its title and by embracing a plurality of subjects, as it would be to insert provisions to operate contrary to its other limitations.18

The courts of Ohio, in holding this constitutional clause directory, are not to be understood as conceding that it is without obligatory force. On the contrary it is declared to be a direction to the general assembly which each member is under the solemn obligation of his oath to observe and obey. To the legislature it is of equal obligation with a mandatory provision, but a failure to observe it does not. render the act void. It is there a rule of decision based on grounds of expediency.19

The present constitution of California, besides adding to the clause as it stood in the former constitution, another direction implying that provisions in an act on a subject not expressed in the title are void, contains a general provision that "the provisions of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." 20

The constitutional provision under consideration does not apply to statutes lawfully enacted before its adoption," nor to city ordinances,22 unless the constitution is broad enough in terms to embrace municipal legislation, or the same requirement is enacted in the charter; 23 nor does it apply to resolutions proposing constitutional amendments.24

§ 115 (82). Liberally construed to sustain legislation not within the mischief. The courts with great unanim

18 Id.; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 61 Am. Dec. 331, and reporter's note, 340.

22 Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412, 44 Pac. 725, 32 L. R. A. 527; Topeka v. Raynor, 61 Kan. 10, 58 Pac. 557;

19 State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 25 S. W. 102.

20 Const. 1879, art. 1, sec. 22; Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 29 Pac. 251.

21 Rogers v. Windoes, 48 Mich. 628.

202, 41 Am. St. Rep. 678; State v. Gibbs, 60 S. C. 500, 39 S. E. 1.

23 Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am. Rep. 830.

24 Julius v. Callahan, 63 Minn. 154, 65 N. W. 267.