in senate and assembly, do enact.'" In the case in which the question was discussed, it appeared that an act was passed in the enacting clause of which there was omitted

the words "senate and." The act was held unconstitutional and void. In the opinion, the court responds to the declaration in the Maryland case that the enacting style is not of the essence and substance of the enactment. Hawley, C. J., said that statement is clearly erroneous and the opinion. fallacious. "How can it be said that these words are not of the essence and substance of a law when the constitution declares that the enacting clause of every law shall contain them." He quoted, with apparent approval, from the dissenting opinion of Stewart, J., in the Maryland case, that it is incumbent on the law-making department to pursue the constitutional mode. "If a positive requirement of this character can be disregarded, so may others of a different character; and where will the limit be affixed or practical discrimination made as to what parts of the organic law of the state are to be held advisory, directory or mandatory? Disregard of the requirements of the constitution, although, perchance, in matters of mere form and style, in any part, in law, may establish dangerous examples, and should in all proper ways be discountenanced. The safer policy, I think, is to follow its plain mandates in matters that may appear not to be material, in order that the more substantial parts may be duly respected. If those who are delegated with the trust of making the laws, from the purest motives improvidently omit the observances of the constitution under any circumstances, such oversight may be referred to in the future by others, with far different views, as precedents, and for the purpose of abuse. A higher responsibility is imposed upon those selected by the people for the discharge of legislative duty, and a greater obligation is demanded of them to exemplify, by their practice, a careful compliance with the constitution. By a vigilant observance of its commands, the more reasonable is the probability that the best order will be secured. It is unnecessary to illustrate, by any argument, the soundness. of this general consideration, which I am sure all will admit to be unquestionable, that a strict conformity is an axiom

in the science of government. I certainly entertain such profound conviction of its truth that I do not feel authorized to give my approval to this act as a valid law; but, on the contrary, am constrained to say that the omission of the style required by the constitution is fatal to its validity." A law without an enacting clause was held invalid in Michigan and in Minnesota, and the insertion of an enacting clause after the passage of an act by the houses and before approval by the governor was held ineffectual." In Louisiana it is intimated that the words: "Be it enacted by the general assembly," would be sufficient, though the constitution prescribes the words: "Be it enacted by the gen eral assembly of the state of Louisiana."

§ 73 (66). The modern constitutions go more and more into detail in regulating the exercise of the several powers which they grant. The object is manifestly to correct existing or apprehended mischief; not to legislate merely for order and convenient system. These regulations are in the fundamental law; they express the sovereign will of the people, and ought to be treated as limitations on the exercise of those powers. The modes prescribed for the exercise of the granted powers cannot be severed from the substantive things authorized to be done; the manner directed is the means the appointed action through which alone. the power is effective for the substantive objects intended to be accomplished. The legislature must be constituted, sit at the time and place, and proceed in the methods dic tated by its creator; otherwise it is not clothed with nor exercising the sovereign legislative power. The great weight of authority supports this view.43

40 Cushing's L. & Pr. Leg. Ass. J. 819, § 2102; Seat of Government Case, 1 Wash. T. 115.

41 People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich. 595, 77 N. W. 450, 44 L. R. A. 164; Sjoberg v. Security S. & L. Co., 73 Minn. 203, 75 N. W. 1116, 32 Am. St. Rep. 616.

42 State v. Harris, 47 La. Ann. 386, 17 So. 129.

43 See ante. §§ 31, 44; post, § 112: Cooley, Con. L. 94. This learned author says the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and manda

$74. Enrolled act conclusive as to words of statute.When there is a discrepancy between the printed statute and the enrolled act, all the authorities agree that the latter controls.4 But where the discrepancy was in the

tory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. "Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and they then must be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules, by which all departments of the government must at all times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper dignity of such an instrument and usurping the proper province of ordinary legislation. We are not, therefore, to expect to find in a constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the delegate as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only." State v. John

son, 26 Ark. 281; Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44; per Bronson in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 36; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 566; Opin. ion of Judges, 6 Sheply, 458. See People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177. "The essential nature and object of constitutional law being restric tive upon the powers of the several departments of the government, it is difficult to comprehend how its provisions can be regarded as merely directory." Nicholson, C. J., in Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 501, 517. Mr. Cooley adds that “We impute to the people a want of due appreciation of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that the people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as possible to implication." People v. Supervisors of Chenango,8 N. Y.328. 44 Hurlburt v. Merriam, 3 Mich. 144; Reed v. Clark, 3 McLean, 480, Fed. Cas. No. 11,613; People v. Commissioners, 54 N. Y. 276, 13 Am. Rep. 581; Greer v. State, 54 Miss. 378; De Bow v. People, 1 Denio, 9; Rex v. Jefferies, 1 Strange, 446; Wilson v. Duncan, 114 Ala. 659, 21 So. 1017; McLaughlin v. Menotti, 105 Cal. 572, 38 Pac. 973; Everett v.

amount of a penalty, the enrolled act providing a greater, the court refused to enforce it after an acquiescence of twenty years.45

An

§ 75. Adoption of code or revision by reference. It has always been common to adopt in one statute by reference certain provisions of another statute. There has never been any serious question as to the validity of such legislation, or as to its effectiveness to accomplish the intent of the legislature. It is also not uncommon to adopt a code or general revision of statutes in the same manner. instance of such an adopting act is as follows: "That the code of laws prepared under its authority by (giving the names) and revised, fully examined and identified by the certificate of its joint committee, and recommended and reported for adoption, and with the acts passed by the genral assembly of 1895 added thereto by the codifiers, be, and the same is, hereby adopted and made of force as the

State, 33 Fla. 661, 15 So. 543; Lampkin v. State, 87 Ga. 516, 13 S. E. 523; Ruckert v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 163 Mo. 260, 63 S. W. 814; Nugent v. Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493; Bruce v. State, 48 Neb. 570, 67 N. W. 454; Lowenstein v. Young, 8 Okl. 216, 57 Pac. 164; Weaver v. Davidson County, 104 Tenn. 315, 59 S. W. 1105; Ex parte Tipton, 28 Tex. Ct. App. 438, 13 S. W. 610; Johnson v. Barham, 99 Va. 305, 38 S. E. 136.

45 It was held in Town of Pacific v. Seifert, 79 Mo. 210, that the original roll, as deposited with the secretary of state, is the best evidence of a legislative enactment. Where, however, there is a discrepancy between the charter of the town as published in the printed laws of the state and the statute roll on file in the office of the secretary of state in this, that in the former it was

provided that the trustees of the town might impose fines for breach of any of the ordinances not to exceed twenty dollars in amount, and in the latter the word twenty was ninety, and for aught that appeared on the record this discrepancy was first brought to the attention of the defendant upon the trial, about twenty years after the enactment of the charter, in an action by the town to recover of him the penalty of $90 for refusing to take out a merchant's license as required by an ordinance, it was held that, under these exceptional circum. stances, the printed copy of the charter should control in determining the defendant's liability. See Att'y-General v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94; Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595, 15 L Ed. 518.

46 See post, §§ 372, 405.