On the following day, in imitation of the practice of the Confederation: "The house went into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected to the chair by ballot. The proposi specifies the functions of the President, no provision is contained in the paper for the election of such an officer, nor indeed for the appointment of any executive magistracy, notwithstanding the evident purpose of the author to provide an entire plan of a federal government. Again, in several instances where the paper corresponds with the Constitution, it is at variance with the ideas of Mr. Pinckney, as decidedly expressed in his propositions, and in his arguments, the former in the Journal of the Convention, the latter in the report of its debates. Thus, in Article VIII of the paper, provision is made for removing the President by impeachment, when it appears that, in the Convention, on the 20th of July, he was opposed to any impeachability of the executive magistrate. In Article III it is required that all money bills shall originate in the first branch of the legislature; which he strenuously opposed on the 8th of August, and again on the 11th of August. Article V, members of each House are made ineligible to, as well as incapable of holding, any office under the Union, etc., as was the case at one stage of the Constitution, a disqualification highly disapproved and opposed by him on the 14th of August. A still more conclusive evidence of error in the paper is seen in Article III, which provides, as the Constitution does, that the first branch of the legislature shall be chosen by the people of the several States; whilst it appears that on the 6th of June, according to previous notice, too, a few days only after the draught was laid In before the Convention, its author opposed that mode of choice, urging and proposing, in place of it, an election by the legislatures of the several States." "The remarks here made, though not material in themselves, were due to the authenticity and accuracy aimed at in this record of the proceedings of a public body so much an object, sometimes, of curious research, as at all times of profound interest." 66 Striking discrepancies will be found on a comparison of his plan as furnished to Mr. Adams, and the view given of that which was laid before the Convention, in a pamphlet published by Francis Childs at New York, shortly after the close of the Convention. The title of the pamphlet is 'Observations on the plan of government, submitted to the Federal Convention on the twenty-eight of May, 1789, by Charles Pinckney,' etc. A copy is preserved among the 'Select Tracts,' in the library of the Historical Society of New York. But what conclusively proves that the choice of the House of Representatives by the people could not have been the choice in the lost paper, is a letter from Mr. Pinckney to James Madison, of the 28th of March, 1789, now on his files, in which he emphatically adheres to a choice by the State legislatures. The following is an extract: 'Are you not, to use a full expression, abundantly convinced that the theoretical nonsense of an election of the members of Congress by the people, in the first instance, is clearly and practically wrong - that it will in the end be the means of bringing our councils into tions of Mr. Randolph, which had been referred to the committee, being taken up, he moved, on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first of his propositions, to wit: Resolved, that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defense, security of liberty, and general welfare,' should mutually be postponed, in order to consider the three following : — 1. That a union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the objects proposed by the Articles of Confederation, namely, common defense, security of liberty, and general welfare. 2. That no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as individual sovereignties, would be sufficient. “That a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary.' "The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr. G. Morris, and unanimously agreed to. "Some verbal criticisms were raised against the first proposition, and it was agreed, on motion of Mr. Butler, seconded by Mr. Randolph, to pass on to the third, which underwent a discussion, less, however, on its general merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms national and supreme. "Mr. Charles Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Randolph, whether he meant to abolish the State governments altogether. Mr. Randolph replied, that he meant by these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which explained the outlines of the system he had in view. "Mr. Butler said, he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general observations, he concluded with saying, that he had opposed the grant of powers to Congress, heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one body. The proposed distribution of the powers with different bodies changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths. "Gen. Pinckney expressed a doubt whether the act of Congress recommending the Convention, or the commissions of the deputies to it, would authorize a discussion of a system founded on different principles from the Federal Constitution. "Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt. contempt and that the legislatures (of the States) are the only proper judges of who ought to be elected?'" Note by Madison. Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, pp. 570-579. "Mr. Gouverneur Morris explained the distinction between a federal and a national supreme government; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties, the latter having a complete and compulsive operation. He contended that in all communities there must be one supreme power, and one only. "Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confederation was deficient in not providing for coercion and punishment against delinquent states, but argued very cogently, that punishment could not, in the nature of things, be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that such a government was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it. "Mr. Sherman admitted that the Confederation had not given sufficient power to Congress, and that additional powers were necessary; particularly that of raising money, which, he said, would involve many other powers. He admitted, also, that the general and particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed, however, not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing system; intimating, as one reason, that it would be wrong to lose every amendment by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States. "It was moved by Mr. Reed, and seconded by Mr. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, to postpone the third proposition last offered by Mr. Randolph, viz., that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary,' in order to take up the following, viz.: Resolved, That, in order to carry into execution the design of the states in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation, a more effective. government, consisting of a legislative, executive, and judiciary, ought to be established.' The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost. "Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, ay, 4; New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, no, 4. 6 "On the question, as moved by Mr. Butler, on the third proposition, it was resolved, in committee of the whole, that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary.' "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 6; Connecticut, no, 1; New York, divided (Col. Hamilton, ay, Mr. Yates, no.)"5 New Jersey and the other States were not represented." 5 Madison Papers. Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, pp. 132-134. 6 Yates' Minutes, ibid., vol. i, p. 392. The Committee of the Whole, after a subsequent discussion in which there was a sharp conflict between the larger and smaller States, reported to the Convention, "that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary";7 and that the national legislature ought to consist of two branches, the members of the first branch to be elected by the people of the several States, and those of the second branch to be chosen by the individual legislatures.8 "That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles of Union or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union."" "That the rights of suffrage in the first branch of the national legislature ought not to be according to the rules established in the Articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation; namely, in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each State." 10 "That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the national legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first." "Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person; to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years; with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, to be ineligible a second time, and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the national treasury." "1 On the following day, "Mr. Patterson observed to the Convention, that it was the wish 7 Madison Papers. Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, p. 189. 8 Ibid., p. 189. 9 Ibid., p. 190. 10 Ibid., 11 Ibid., of several deputations, particularly that of New Jersey, that further time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said, they hoped to have such a one ready by to-morrow to be laid before the Convention: and the Convention adjourned, that the leisure might be given for the purpose.' "12 This plan was prepared by the deputations from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Delaware, with the aid of Luther Martin of Maryland. The motive which inspired the smaller States was the fear that their interests would be injured by the loss of their equal right of suffrage. Dickinson of New Jersey said to Madison: "You see the consequences of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in the general legislature, and are friends to a good national government; but we would sooner submit to foreign power than submit to be deprived, in both branches of the legislature, of an equality of suffrage, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the larger States." 18 This plan, which is known as "The Propositions from New Jersey," contains, as its first resolution, "That the Articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected, and enlarged, as to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the Union.” It gave Congress the power to raise revenues by a tariff on imports and postage, "and to pass acts for the regulation of trade and commerce, as well with foreign nations as with each other." It provided, for the collection of other revenues by the requisition among the States, "That, if such requisition be not complied with in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non-complying States, and for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the same." Neither of these powers was to be exercised without the consent of more States than a majority. A debate then ensued upon 12 Madison Papers. Elliot's Debates, vol. v, p. 191. 18 Ibid., p. 191. |