National Convention of the abuses of the Long Parliament, combined with far greater excesses, so deeply impressed mankind with the need of some check upon a popular assembly that the bicameral system is now almost universal.9

As the nineteenth century approaches its close, we see criticisms of second chambers similar to those which were rife at the end of the eighteenth century.10 "If a second chamber," said Siéyès, "dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees, it is superfluous." The two principal advantages of such a system are the prevention of tyranny and self-seeking by a single house, and the check to rash, ill-considered measures which may be demanded by the people.12 The former, men have now learned to prevent by

The only single legislative chambers now in existence which the researches of the writer have been able to discover are in Servia, Bulgaria, Greece, the Orange Free State, San Domingo, Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the Colony of British Columbia; and the history of most of them has not tended to commend the institution. The councils of Montenegro and Andorra seem to belong to the earlier type, where the voters have an immediate share in legislation. In Finland representatives of the four estates are still occasionally convoked.

10 Milton, in his Ready and Easy Way to Establishe a Free Commonwealth, Sir James Mackintosh, in Vindiciae Gallicae (§ iv), and Franklin in the first Pennsylvania Convention (supra, over note 8), all men of deep learning and broad political experience, were believers in the advantages of a single legislative chamber. So also were Turgot (letter to Dr. Price on the American Revolution) and the leaders of the French Revolution. John Stuart Mill expressed a preference for a single chamber with minority representation (Representative Government, ch. xiii). See also the remarks of Goldwin Smith in

the Bystander for May, 1880, quoted by Doutre, Constitution of Canada, p. 66; infra, note 11; and the debates in the committee on the French Constitution of 1848, Souvenirs d'Alexis de Tocqueville, Paris, 1893, p. 368.

11 See Maine's criticism of this epigram in Popular Government, p. 178. "Nominated Senates are nullities with a latent possibility for mischief," said Goldwin Smith in the Bystander (Toronto, May, 1880, quoted by Doutre, Canadian Constitution, p. 67).

66

12 I attach little weight to the argument oftenest urged for having two Chambers - -to prevent precipitancy, and compel a second deliberation; for it must be a very ill-constituted representative assembly in which the established forms of business do not require many more than two deliberations. The consideration which tells most to my judgment, in favor of two Chambers (and this I do regard as of some moment), is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only themselves to consult. It is important that no set of persons should be able, even temporarily, to make their sic volo prevail

means of the powers vested by written constitutions in the executive and the courts. The latter has seemed less important to those who have been accustomed for more than a century to see the people govern themselves without resulting injury; and the stubborn opposition of the House of Lords to almost every salutary measure of reform, whether social, religious or political, has aroused storms of public indignation which have destroyed its influence and greatly weakened its powers. It is now usually conceded to be a rule of the Constitution in Great Britain and its colonies where the Crown has the power to appoint members of the upper chamber, that the House of Lords, Senate or Council, must pass a bill which it has once rejected, if in the meantime the leaders of the lower branch have appealed to the people by a dissolution, and a new house of representatives has been elected and passed the same measure a second time.13 In case of a refusal the Crown, at the request of the leaders of the elective assembly, will appoint enough members to overcome the opposition.14 The elective upper chambers in other countries have little hold on popular respect; and on any difference of importance with the lower houses they are nearly always brought to terms by a threat to cut off the supplies, which they know will produce a crisis wherein the people will take sides with their more immediate representatives. The bicameral system was at one time in favor for cities in the United States, but is now generally abandoned there. It persists in full vigor in the State legislatures, but few if any instances have

without asking any one else for his consent. A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a permanent character when composed of the same persons habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in their own House- easily becomes despotic and overweening if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority" (Mill, Representative Government, ch. xiii).

13 See Lord Salisbury's Speech on the Irish Church Bill, cited by Maine, Popular Government, p. 117.

14 Such an appointment of twelve peers was made once in Great Britain, by Queen Anne in 1712, in order to create a Tory majority in the House of Lords; but the threat of a similar proceeding secured the passage of the Reform Bill by the peers in 1832, and has undoubtedly prevented the defeat of other salutary measures. In May, 1894, a similar threat secured the passage of the Civil Marriage bill by the Hungarian House of Magnates, which had previously rejected it. (New York Sun, Oct. 6, 1895.)

occurred in recent years where State senates have withstood strong currents of public opinion; 15 while since they are smaller they are usually more easily purchased than the houses of assembly. The Senate of the United States alone preserves the public respect, and has in numerous cases done public service by its defeat of mischievous measures, pushed through the House of Representatives by waves of popular excitement, which have subsequently subsided, leaving the bills without further support,16 while until recent years at least the confidence in the beneficial effects of the institution has not been shaken.17 The reason for this lies in the fact that the Senate represents the Federal system in the Constitution, and that faith in such a representation has been a habit of the people since the opening of the Revolution, so that the custom is so strong that it would require a great shock for its destruction.18

15 The earlier State Senates usually represented property, more especially than the lower houses.

16 See infra, § 80.

17 See infra, § 80.

18 See Maine, Popular Government, Essay III; and again Essay IV, p. 229: "Nothing but an historical principle can be successfully opposed to the principle of making all public powers and all parliamentary assemblies the mere reflection of the average opinion of the multitude."

In Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Bavaria, Hungary, Saxony, Baden and Wurtemberg, the upper chambers are composed chiefly of hereditary members or those appointed for life or elected to represent an hereditary class; although in Portugal and Hungary a few members seem to be chosen by a method of election which indirectly represents the people. In Germany members of the upper house are appointed for each session by the governments of the members of the empire. In most of the other countries and the British colonies members of the upper chambers are appointed

for life or elected for a term longer than the assembly, either immediately or indirectly by the people; with in some countries the requirement of a property qualification. In Italy the senators have a limited choice of new members. The practice in New Zealand and Japan also presents some peculiarities. (See The Parliaments of the World, Nineteenth Century for 1894, p. 708.) John Stuart Mill was in favor of a single chamber with minority representation; but considered that the best second chamber would be a body of men who had held important offices, or employments, legal, political, military or naval :

"Of all principles on which a wisely conservative body, destined to moderate and regulate democratic ascendency, could possibly be constructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate, itself the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that ever administered public affairs. The deficiencies of a democratic assembly, which represents the general public, are the deficiencies of the public itself, want of special train

§ 76. Proceedings in the Federal Convention Concerning the Composition of the Senate.

Nearly all the members of the Federal Convention were firmly convinced of the necessity of two legislative houses, if a national

government was to be established. their session the resolution,

On the third active day of

"that the national legislature ought to consist of two branches,' was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably out of complaisance to Dr. Franklin, who was understood to be partial to a single house of legislation." 1

Upon a subsequent vote, New York, New Jersey and Delaware voted against the proposition; Pennsylvania joined the majority of seven States, and Maryland was divided; 2 but the real dispute at that time was whether the United States should continue as a confederacy or be made a nation; and the minority were influenced by the desire of accomplishing the former rather than by a conviction of the advantages of a single chamber in a national government. Randolph's resolutions proposed also that the second branch be elected by the first out of nominations by the State

nence are too indefinite and disputable: they imply a power of selection, whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves; if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the special qualities required, while if political they would allow successive ministries to deluge the House with party tools." (Representative Government, ch. xiii.) It may be doubted, whether a body composed of aged and gouty men on the retired list which would be used as a shelf upon which to lay politicians who had outlived their usefulness or had temporarily lost their seats in the lower house, could be expected to favor any novel measures of reform or to have any effect not of a reactionary character. See Woolsey, Political Science, vol. ii, p. 315.

"We may imagine very easily in a moment's reflection what would have been the condition of this country at this moment had the Senate of the United States been constituted on a different principle. If the size and

populations of the several States had been the test of representation in the Senate of the United States, I think it is not too much to say in sober minded truth that this Republic would not have endured until now. Many and many have been the times when, if the right of the Senators of each State to resist and defeat the current of popular passion and prejudice which arises sometimes in the action of the popular body, the House of Representatives, had failed to exert itself as it would have failed if the Senate had been constituted as the national House of Representatives, discord and revolution would almost certainly have caused the dismemberment of the Union." Senator George F. Edmunds, in reply to the toast, "The United States Senators of Vermont," at the reunion of the survivors of the members of the Vermont Legislatures at Montpelier, Vermont, reprinted in The New York Times.

§ 76. 1 Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, p. 135. 2 Ibid., p. 223.