that the right of women to vote must depend upon the same terms and conditions as applied to men, and that therefore a condition that all male voters should be tax-payers was void because it did not apply to female voters.13 Under the California Constitution, which provided that "no person shall on account of sex be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business, vocation or profession," it was held that a board of supervisors could not prohibit the employment of women in drinking cellars and other places where liquors were kept for sale, but that a higher license might be charged for drinking-places where women were employed.15 In the absence of a State constitutional prohibition, women may be excluded from admission to the bar.1 14 16 Four States Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Mississippi - impose an educational qualification, which usually consists in capacity to read the Constitution of the United States in the English language.17 A few States confine the right of suffrage to tax-payers, with certain exceptions. In Texas, "in all elections to determine expenditures of money or assumption of debt, only those shall be qualified to vote who pay taxes on property in said city or incorporated town." 18 And in Rhode Island, at elections of the Providence city councils and for the expenditure of money in a town or city, only those can vote who have paid a tax assessed upon property therein valued at at least one hundred and thirtyfour dollars.19 There are no other property qualifications for the right of suffrage in the United States. A large number of the States allow aliens to vote for members of Congress and presidential electors as well as State officers, as soon as they have declared their intention to become citizens, although they have not been naturalized. This was a practice of 13 Lyman v. Martin, 2 Utah, 136. 14 Matter of Maguire, 57 Cal., 604. 15 Ex parte Felchin, 96 Cal., 360; S. c. 31 Pac. Rep., 224. 16 Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall., 130. 17 In Mississippi the direction is that the voter must be able either to read or to understand the part of the Constitution shown or read to him, and thus the election officers are able to allow illiterate whites to vote while disfranchising illiterate blacks. The South Carolina Convention is now considering the propriety of adopting a similar provision. 18 Texas Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 3. 19 Rhode Island Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 2. which South Carolina complained in her declaration of independence, 20 and which was forbidden by the Confederate Constitution.21 Where the constitution simply required that a person should have a residence in the locality where he offered to vote, without prescribing any period of residence, it was held that a statute which required a residence in such a locality for twenty days previous to the election was void.22 Where the Pennsylvania Constitution provided that a voter must have resided in his election district ten days immediately preceding the election," it was held that an act was void which attempted to authorize a voter who had changed his residence within ten days of the election to vote where he formerly resided.23 It has been said that persons of unsound mind are impliedly excepted from the class of electors specified in a constitution or statute, although not expressly named.24 Drunkenness is considered as a temporary insanity.25 The crimes, a conviction of which operates as a disfranchisement, are usually all or a specified class of infamous crimes; ordinarily include treason and often duelling and bribery. Most State constitutions contain a provision concerning the residence of voters in substance like that of New York: "For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence, by reason of his presence or absence, while employed in the service of the United States; nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of this State, or of the United States, or of the high seas; nor while a student of any seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse, or other asylum, wholly or partly supported at public expense, or by charity; nor while confined in any public prison.' 1926 Under similar provisions it has been held in some States that where the persons therein described showed that they had actually acquired a permanent residence at their official post,27 or place of 20 Supra, § 36. 21 Supra, § 37. 22 Quinn v. State, 35 Ind., 485. 23 Thompson v. Ewing, 1 Brewster (Pa.), 67, 103. 24 See Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill., 98; Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, §§ 24, 27; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 753. 25 Ibid. 26 N. Y. Constitution, Article II, Section 3. 27 People ex rel. Orman v. Riley, 51 education,28 or asylum,29 they might vote there. The New York courts construe the provision more strictly against the voter.30 § 56. Constitutionality of Registration Laws. Although a State legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of electors, it may establish such reasonable regulations for the conduct of the elections and for the determination of the right to vote at the same as do not impair the constitutional right of suffrage. It is the better opinion that where the constitution is silent upon the subject, a State legislature has still the power to make a reasonable law compelling the registration of all voters before an election.2 A few State courts, however, have held registration laws unconstitutional unless expressly authorized.3 In consequence, express provisions authorizing registration laws are now usually inserted in the modern State constitutions.+ Registration laws, and all other laws providing for the conduct of elections, must not unreasonably restrict the right of qualified Cal., 48; People ex rel. Budd v. Holden, 28 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass., 488; Opinion of Justices, 5 Met. (Mass.), 587; Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me., 158; Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind., 148; Berry v. Wilcox, Nebraska, 62 N. W. Rep., 249. 29 Stewart v. Kyser (California), 39 Pac. Rep., 19. 30 Silvey v. Lindsay, 107 N. Y., 55; People v. Cady, 143 N. Y., 100; Re Goodman, 84 Hun., 53; s. c. 146 N. Y., 256. Re Garvey, 84 Hun., 611. § 56. 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 756-760; McCrary on Elections, 3d ed., § 91. 2 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 485; s. c. 23 American Decisions, 632; Davis v. School District, 45 N. H., 398; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich., 342; State v. Bond, 38 Mo., 425; Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo., 450; State v. Hil mantel, 21 Wis., 566; State v. Baker, 38 Wis., 71; Byler v. Asher, 47 Ill., 101; People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill., 587; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St., 665; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa, 267, See also In re Polling Lists, 13 R. I., 729; State v. Butts, 31 Kan., 537; Hawkins v. Carroll Co., 50 Miss., 735; McMahon v. Mayor, 66 Ga., 217. Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. St., 54; Commonwealth v. McClelland, 83 Ky., 686. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 757, and McCrary on Elections, 3d ed., § 92. An excellent note on this subject in 29 Am. Law Rep., N. S., 872. 8 Dell v. Kennedy, 49 Wis., 555; s c. 35 Am. Rep., 786; White v. County of Multnomah, 13 Oregon, 317. See Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St., 548; State v. Corner, 22 Neb., 265; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St., 338; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 757. 4 The Constitutions of Arkansas (Art. III, Sec. 2) and of West Virginia electors to vote. The only lawful object of a registration law is the prevention of frauds at an election. Consequently, when one is so drawn as to practically disqualify a class of citizens and residents of the State, authorized by the constitution to vote, who through their want of permanent homes or migratory habits do not remain in any locality a long period of time, it is void. It has been held that a law which closes the registration three weeks before the election, and allows no one not then registered to vote, is reasonable and constitutional.7 An act which provided that "no person hereafter naturalized in any court shall be entitled to be registered as a voter within thirty days of such naturalization," was held unconstitutional, as imposing a new qualification upon voters not authorized by the State constitution.8 Where the Illinois Constitution provided that "all elections shall be free and equal," it was held that this did not require a uniformity of regulation in regard to elections in all portions of the State; and that a registration law which operated only in such cities, villages and towns as adopted it was not a local or a special law. But in Indiana it was held, that the (Art. VI, Sec. 43) expressly forbid a registration law. That of Missouri (Art. V, Sec. 5) only authorizes them in cities and counties with a population of over 100,000; and in cities with a population of over 25,000. 5 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 485; s. c. Brightly's Election Cases, 51; s. c. 23 Am. Decisions, 632; Daggett r. Hudson, 43 Ohio St., 548; State v. Corner, 22 Neb., 265; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass., 497; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St., 765; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 758; Morris v. Powell, 125 Ind., 281; s. c. 25 N. E. Rep., 221; McCrary on Elections, 3d ed., § 91. 6 Morris v. Powell, 125 Ind., 281; In re Appointment of Supervisors, 52 Fed. R., 254. People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill., 587. In Nebraska, it was held that a law closing the registration ten days before the election was invalid, and that an elector might subsequently claim the right to register and vote. State v. Corner, 22 Neb., 265. Contra, State v. Butts, 31 Kansas, 537; Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. R., 865, 871. In Ohio, it was held that a law closing the registration five days before the election was similarly unconstitutional. Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St., 548. These cases are, however, contrary to the current of authority. The Mississippi Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 249) compels a registration four months before an election. In Rhode Island (Art. VII, Sec. 1) a registration in the previous December is required. 8 Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass., 497; See also Attorney-General v. City of Detroit (Mich.), 44 N. W. Rep., 388. In the New York Constitution of 1894 (Art. II, Sec. 1), a similar provision was inserted. People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill., 587. provision in the State Constitution which required the general assembly to provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote impliedly forbade a law for the registration of a special class of voters.10 10 See also McMahon v. Mayor of Savannah, 66 Ga., 217; Commonwealth v. McClelland, 83 Ky., 686; Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. St., 54, 77. 10 Morris v. Powell, 125 Ind., 281; s. c. 25 N. E. Rep., 221. Judge Speer of the District Court of the United States has said that the enactment of local registration-laws which differed in different parts of the State was a violation of a State constitutional requirement that "laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law." He said further: "But if this were not true, it would be none the less our duty to disregard them. They are plainly in conflict with section 2,005 of the Revised Statutes, which provides: When, under the authority of the constitution or laws of any State, any act is required to be done as a prerequisite or qualification for voting, and by such constitution or laws persons or officers are charged with the duty of furnishing to citizens an opportunity to perform such prerequisites, or to become qualified to vote, every such person and officer shall give to all citizens of the United States the same and equal opportunity to perform such prerequisite and to become qualified to vote.' "Now, it is not enough that all the citizens of the same county shall have an equal opportunity, but all the electors of the State, voting, or desiring to vote, at the same general election, must have the equal opportunity to perform the prerequisites, and to become qualified to vote. And it is a necessary implication of the language of this statute of the United States, that the prerequisites for voting at the same general election must be equal to each elector. Indeed, it is true, if a State of the American Union prescribes for a portion of its citizens, otherwise entitled to vote, prerequisites for voting from which other citizens are relieved, to that extent the State ceases to maintain a republican form of government, and enactments with such effect are contrary to the Constitution of the common country. It will be easy to understand how, with such a system or want of system of registration laws, as hereinbefore described, the most injurious and unfair political results might be attained. If a congressional district be' gerrymandered' with unequal registration laws, according to the political complexion of certain localities, the fundamental laws of the United States, guaranteeing equal political rights, could be set at naught. The power of Congress over national elections is no longer in question. This being a national election of general character, it will be well to remember that it is clearly within the scope of the national laws." "It follows, therefore, that since the federal law requires uniformity in the prerequisites of the right to vote as affecting the citizen, otherwise entitled to vote, at the national election, and further requires that each citizen shall have an equal opportunity to do the act made a prerequisite to the right of voting, varying and inconsistent registration enactments mak. |