Introduction to Theory of Control in OrganizationsCRC Press, 2 мар. 2015 г. - Всего страниц: 346 Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations explains how methodologies from systems analysis and control theory, including game and graph theory, can be applied to improve organizational management. The theory presented extends the traditional approach to management science by introducing the optimization and game-theoretical tools required |
Содержание
Control and Mechanisms in Organizations | 1 |
Examples of Control Mechanisms | 57 |
Incentive Mechanisms | 73 |
Planning Mechanisms | 121 |
Informational Control Mechanisms | 169 |
Mechanisms of Organizational Structure Design | 233 |
Conclusion | 305 |
Topics for SelfStudy | 307 |
Literature | 309 |
Back Cover | 321 |
Другие издания - Просмотреть все
Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations Vladimir N. Burkov,Mikhail Goubko,Nikolay Korgin,Dmitry Novikov Ограниченный просмотр - 2015 |
Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations Vladimir N. Burkov,Mikhail Goubko,Nikolay Korgin,Dmitry Novikov Недоступно для просмотра - 2019 |
Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations Vladimir N. Burkov,Mikhail Goubko,Nikolay Korgin,Dmitry Novikov Недоступно для просмотра - 2015 |
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activity agent chooses agent's costs analyze Arg max Assume Automation and Remote awareness structure behavior beliefs Burkov chooses the action common knowledge condition Consider constraint control problem control theory corresponding cost function decision defined definition depends dominant strategy economic efficiency enterprise evaluate example experts feasible actions Figure flow formal func game theory goal function graph Hence immediate subordinates impact incentive function incentive problem incentive scheme incentive-compatible informational control informational equilibrium interaction manager's cost mathematical maximal maximum mechanism design motivating Nash equilibrium optimal hierarchy organization organizational system parameter Pareto-efficient payoff phantom agents planning mechanism players profit quantity r-tree r₁ reflexion reflexive game remaining agents resource allocation result reward s₁ Section set of feasible solution solve span of control strategy-proof Suppose tion transfer price types uniform tree vector w₁ workers x₁ zero Σ₁
