move

the car began to tip, when he evidently sought safety in flight. A witness for plaintiff named Trinder, who gave his business as hoisting engineer of the Kings Bridge Company, which built or assisted in building the completed bridge on which the derrick car was working on the day in question, witnessed the accident and testified as follows in regard to lifting the fourth and heavy stone: "As to what I observed in regard to the hitching onto and lifting of this stone, when I got there the engine had just started working, the boom stood facing Buffalo, as we called it, the east there; you have been calling it Buffalo here; facing down the track. As the engine started to the stone started to rise, but from where I was I couldn't see the stone yet. It came up to where I could see the top of the stone; and I noticed it kind of stop, and the engine looked from where I was, the exhaust, it looked as though it was dying again, the exhaust, steam from the engine." Witness had previously testified that the engine "stalled" and stopped in raising the third stone. "It went kind of 'shoo,' as if it was choking off, and the stone stopped. I could just see it from where I was. As the stone came down their car tipped over a foot to 18 inches off the track, and as the stone raised up again the car settled back, and the boom had been swung out in the meantime; and Mr. Cole stood off about from 50 to 75 feet from this track with the tag line in his hand, holding this stone, naturally pulling it to him to steady it. * * The boom was standing towards Buffalo, and as it got about here, at an angle of about 45 degrees, it had sprung down and tilted the car, and kept working out, going by jerks. It kept working out by jerks. # 串 * Cole hollered two or three times for Nick to pull in the boom. He didn't pull in the boom. It kept going out. It got around pretty near at right angles with the tracks and the car went over. As the stone swung down the second or third time, it took the car right over with it. The engine stayed stopped. ** It was not possible, with this derrick and appliance as I have described it, with the engine stopped, for Wagner to swing in this boom when told to by Mr. Cole." This is the testimony of a disinterested witness, and under the rule the plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable inferences to be drawn from it. It is clear that this weight, more than twice as heavy as the derrick was ever subjected to, caused the engine to stop shortly after the hoisting began. The vivid description of this trained engineer shows precisely what happened. The great weight proved too much for the power of this engine, which was described by one of the witnesses as a fourhorse power. The steam ran down and the engine stopped. The intestate was then powerless to operate the boom; and it is a fair inference that he could not have done so with the great weight of the stone if the engine had been working. What then happened was that the stone began to descend by "jerks," as the witness put it.

It remains to consider whether Isaac Cole, the superintendent of defendant on the work in question, was its alter ego. If he was, it will render unnecessary the consideration of some questions that would otherwise be material. Mr. Cole was sworn by the defendant, and testified in an honorable and straightforward manner, apparently without being swayed by the fact that he was still in the employ of the defendant and that his testimony might have a serious effect on this case. He swore that he was the supervisor of bridges and buildings on the Eastern Division of the defendant, and that his division included about 245 miles from Buffalo to Bellevue. He further testified: "I have been on with the 'Nickle Plate' since the spring of 1884. *** I have been supervisor for the 'Nickle Plate' people about 16 years. * * * In the performance of my duties I go anywhere

between Buffalo, N. Y., and Bellevue, Ohio. Under me I have four or five gang foremen with all their gangs. They report to me and I in turn report to the chief engineer of the division. I was at Idlewood on this day that Mr. Wagner was killed. I am familiar with this derrick car. I had it built under my instructions. It was built about six months prior to the accident, the accident occurring on the 16th of April, 1901." After having testified at length in regard to the construction of the derrick car and the details of the accident, he said: "We did not have the car anchored because I thought it was unnecessary. In my judgment I did not regard it necessary to anchor the car. Had I deemed it necessary I could have anchored the car. There were appliances there to anchor it at that particular time. * * I knew that the car wasn't anchored, and whatever necessity there was for anchoring it I fully understood." He also testified that he was in the shanty of the derrick car all the forenoon, and that later he went down to supervise the fastening of the hoisting hooks to the heavy stones; that he used in that work the chain that was employed for anchoring the car. Cameron, the foreman. testified for plaintiff in this connection that he was foreman of the carpenter gang engaged in this work, and that the intestate was a member of his gang. He further testified that the intestate had worked under him for nearly eight years. We thus have the undisputed evidence that this gang of workmen were in charge of a foreman, and over him was the supervisor of bridges, who had under him four or five foremen with all their gangs, this being one of them. Under these circumstances to hold that Cole was a fellow servant of the intestate is to ignore all the evidence in the case bearing on the point. The presence of Cole on this work is to be accounted for on no other theory than that he was there in full control, and the inference is that this was the regular work in which he was engaged with his five separate gangs. As above pointed out, he spent the morning in the shanty of the derrick car. He had no other duty to perform there except to superintend the work from that point, and had every opportunity to anchor the car if he deemed it necessary. This gang of workmen had their own foreman (Cameron), and it is undoubtedly true that if it had been Cameron's duty to anchor the car, and he had failed to do so, although in possession of appliances for the purpose, it would be the negligence of a fellow servant and a detail of the work which would not charge the master. Vincent v. Alden, 75 App. Div. 615, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1142, affirmed without opinion 177 N. Y. 545, 69 N. E. 1132; Vogel v. American Bridge Co., 180 N. Y. 373, 73 N. E. 1. We, however, have here no such situation. Cole frankly admits that he knew the car was not anchored and had not been anchored because he deemed it unnecessary. His act in this connection was the act of the master, and, if he failed in exercising good judgment under the circumstances, it was the failure of the master to properly protect the men employed. There is evidence in the record which would seem to justify the conclusion reached by the superintendent that during the forenoon there was no necessity for anchoring the car; that the work had gone on smoothly, and loads weighing nearly a ton were raised without disturbing the equilibrium of the derrick car. Be that as it may, the plaintiff is entitled to insist, first, that the necessity for anchoring the car was to be determined by the superintendent in charge, and if the superintendent had so ordered it would have been the duty of intestate to obey if appliances were at hand; second, that under the rule of directed verdict she is entitled to have it stand as a fact in this case that no appliances were furnished intestate that day, even had it been his duty to anchor the car; also, that it was no part of his duty to see that it was anchored. It is not

contended that intestate rested under the duty of anchoring the car, but that he assumed the obvious risk. It may be observed in this connection that the intestate could not be reasonably held to determine whether the car should be anchored or not, when the place that he occupied in working is recalled. He was in the shanty, 70 feet above the place where loads were attached to the hoisting apparatus, and obliged to constantly operate the wheel when the derrick was working. It was impossible that he should know what was going on below. He was an ordinary laborer, assigned to the duty of craneman on the derrick car, and had no knowledge whatever of the weight the derrick would be required to lift from time to time. The claim is not made that Cameron, the foreman, was obliged to anchor this car. In fact, there is no evidence to that effect, and, consequently, the question of the negligence of the foreman is not presented at this time. The undisputed evidence shows Cole to have been the superintendent, the vice principal, of the defendant in charge of this work, and the sole duty devolved upon him to determine at what time the derrick car should be anchored. If he failed in the discharge of that duty, his negligence was that of the master.

This distinction between superintendent and foreman or boss is recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346, 16 Sup. Ct. 843, 40 L. Ed. 994. At page 355, 166 U. S., p. 846, 16 Sup. Ct. (40 L. Ed. 994), Mr. Justice Peckham said: "When the business of the master or employer is of such great and diversified extent that it naturally and necessarily separates itself into departments of service, the individuals placed by the master in charge of these separate branches and departments of service, and given entire and absolute control therein, may properly be considered, with respect to employés under them, vice principals and representatives of the master as fully and as completely as if the entire business of the master were placed by him under one superintendent. * Page 357 of

162 U. S., page 847 of 16 Sup. Ct. (40 L. Ed. 994). This boss of a small gang of 10 or 15 men, engaged in making repairs upon the road wherever they might be necessary, over a distance of three sections, aiding and assisting the regular gang of workmen upon each section as occasion demanded, was not such a superintendent of a separate department, nor was he in control of such a distinct branch of the work of the master as would be necessary to render the master liable to a co-employé for his neglect." In Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan, 168 U. S. 86, 18 Sup. Ct. 40, 42 L. Ed. 390, where it was sought to hold the foreman or boss of a particular gang for negligence, the headnote reads: "Where the business of a mining corporation is under the control of a general manager, and is divided into three departments, of which the mining department is one, each with a superintendent under the general manager, and in the mining department are several gangs of workmen, the foreman of one of these gangs, whether he has or has not authority to engage and discharge the men under him, is a fellow servant with them, and the corporation is not liable to one of them for an injury caused by the foreman's negligence in managing the machinery or in giving orders to the men." Mr. Justice Gray, writing the opinion of the court, said: "Finley was not a vice principal or representative of the corporation. He was not the general manager of its business or the superintendent of any department of that business. But he was merely the foreman or boss of the particular gang of men to which the plaintiff belonged." This decision follows Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Peterson, supra; that is, that it is the negligence of the superintendent, and not the foreman or boss, that charges the master.

As to the duty of the defendant to furnish a safe place in which the intestate was to work, the Appellate Division held that the derrick car was an appliance, rather than a place in which he was called upon to work, and that he assumed the obvious risks. I am of opinion that whenever it was necessary for the intestate, as craneman, to work upon the derrick car, it was in law the place furnished by the master, and the risks that a servant assumes are those only which occur after the due performance by the master of those duties which the law enjoins upon him; that under the established facts in this case as now presented it was the duty of the master, by its vice principal Cole, who was superintending the work, to see to it that the derrick car was from time to time anchored as the exigencies of the case demanded. To this extent the defendant was bound to make the derrick car a safe place in which the intestate was to work, and the law of assumed risks does not apply to the anchoring of the car under the circumstances disclosed.

At the close of all the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict on ten separate grounds, but before the decision of this motion the plaintiff asked to go to the jury upon all the grounds and all the evidence in the case, upon the question of the negligence of the defendant, upon the question of freedom from contributory negligence on the part of Nicholas Wagner, deceased, and also upon the question presented of the assumption of risk by the deceased raised by the defendant's counsel. I am of opinion that on the condition of the record as now presented, under the rule of directed verdict, the questions of defendant's negligence, of intestate's freedom from contributory negligence, and all the other issues in the case, should have been submitted to the jury. The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant in all the courts to abide the event.

VANN, J., concurs.

WHEELER, Respondent, v. ECKERT et al., Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 27, 1905.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department (94 App. Div. 614, 88 N. Y. Supp. 1102), entered June 6, 1904, which affirmed a judgment of the Erie County Court foreclosing a mortgage on certain property of the defendants. M. Fillmore Brown and Charles A. B. Smith, for appellants. Samuel F. Moran and William L. Marcy, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, BARTLETT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur. HAIGHT, J., not sitting. O'BRIEN, J., absent.

WARTH, Appellant, v. KUH, NATHAN & FISCHER CO., INC., Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New York. Feb. 13, 1906.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (99 App. Div. 623, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1117), entered April 27, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term and an order denying a motion for a new trial. J. Newton Fiero, for appellant. Lawrence E. Sexton, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, WERNER, HISCOCK, and CHASE, JJ., concur.

WATTENGEL, Respondent, V. ACKER PROCESS CO., Appellant. (Court of Appeals

of New York. Jan. 9, 1906.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department (97 App. Div. 643, 90 N. Y. Supp. 1117), entered November 4, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at an Equity Term. A. K. Potter, for appellant. P. F. King, for respond

ent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur.

WELK, Respondent, v. JACKSON ARCHITECTURAL IRON WORKS, Appellant, et al. (Court of Appeals of New York. Feb. 6, 1906.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (98 App. Div. 247, 90 N. Y. Supp. 541), entered November 18, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial. Frank Verner Johnson, for appellant. Charles Caldwell, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide event, on dissenting opinion of WOODWARD, J., below.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, O'BRIEN, and BARTLETT, JJ., concur. WERNER, J., concurs in result on the ground that the structure in question was a scaffold, but not completed, and that plaintiff's participation in the erection thereof precluded his recovery. HISCOCK and CHASE, JJ., dissent.

WELSTEAD, Respondent, v. JENNINGS, Appellant. (Court of Appeal of New York, Dec. 12, 1905.) Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (104 App. Div. 179, 93 N. Y. Supp. 339), entered April 28, 1905, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term. The motion was made upon the ground that the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, it bringing up for review solely a unanimous decision of the Appellate Division that the findings of fact were supported by the evidence. Joseph R. Swan, for the motion. Harri M. Howell, opposed.

PER CURIAM. Motion denied, with $10 costs.

WILLIAMS et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF ESSEX COUNTY, Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 5, 1905.) Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department (105 App. Div. 197, 94 N. Y. Supp. 996), entered May 6, 1905, which reversed an order of Special Term granting a motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the defendant board to reconvene and correct certain alleged errors in its canvass of votes cast at the election of 1904, and denied such motion. Richard L. Hand and Francis A. Smith, for appellants. Edward T. Stokes and R. Corbin, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs, on opinion below.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur.

WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY, Appellant. (Court of

WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER, Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 13, 1905.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (97 App. Div. 84, 89 N. Y. Supp. 671), entered August 3, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial. Louis S. Phillips and Jerome A. Peck, for appellant. Frederick W. Sherman, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

CULLEN. C. J., and GRAY, O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur.

WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER, Appellant. (Court of Ap peals of New York. Jan. 16. 1906.) No opinion. Motion to reinstate appeal. See 183 N. Y.

-, supra.

PER CURIAM. Motion denied, upon the ground that a question of fact is involved. See Walden v. City of Jamestown, 178 N. Y. 213, 70 N. E. 466.

WILLIAMSON, Respondent, v. McCOL LUM, Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Feb. 27, 1906.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department (96 App. Div. 638, 89 N. Y. Supp. 119), entered July 26, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at an Equity Term. P. F. King, for appellant. A. K. Potter, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, EDWARD T. BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, WILLARD BARTLETT, and CHASE, JJ., concur.

WINEHILL, Respondent, v. CONSOLIDATED GAS CO. OF NEW YORK, Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 21, 1905.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (93 App. Div. 614, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1151), entered May 3, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial. Paul Gorham and David McClure, for appellant. Daniel P. Hays and Ralph Wolf, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

CULLEN, C. J., and BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur. GRAY, J., not sitting. O'BRIEN, J., absent.

WOOD, Respondent, v. WHELEN, Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Jan.

9, 1906.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (92 App. Div. 612, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1151), entered March 14, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term. T. M. Tyng, for appellant. Henry Warren Beebe and William Willett, Jr., for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur.

In re ZIEGLER et al. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 5, 1905.) Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (95 N. Y. Supp. 1167), entered July 7, 1905, which affirmed an order of Special Term directing the appellant receiver to pay to the petitioner a dividend upon her claim against the Harlem River Bank. George M. Mackellar, for appellant. Sydney W. Stern and Arthur J. Stern, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed, without costs.

GRAY, O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur. CUL LEN, C. J., dissents.

YOUNGS et al. v. YOUNGS et al. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 15, 1905.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (102 App. Div. 444, 92 N. Y. Supp. 546), entered April 11, 1905, which affirmed a judgment construing the will of Thomas F. Youngs, deceased, and directing a sale of real estate and distribution of the proceeds, entered upon the report of a referee. Abel Crook, Charles De Kay Townsend, and Mortimer S. Brown, for appellants. John M. Bowers and Charles P. Northrop, for respondents Youngs and others. Elliot Norton, for respondent Meyer.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

CULLEN, C. J., and GRAY, O'BRIEN, BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, and WERNER, JJ., concur.

UNITED STATES EXPRESS CO. V. JOYCE. (Supreme Court of Indiana. June 22, 1905.) The order of the Supreme Court granting a rehearing in the above-entitled cause on May 23, 1905, was vacated, and the opinion announced by Judge Dowling (72 N. E. 865) ordered stricken from the files, and the cause remanded to the Appellate Court, where it stands affirmed. 69 N. E. 1015.

CAMPBELL et al. v. BRADFORD et al. (No. 5.668.) (Appellate Court of Indiana. Feb. 23, 1906.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Morgan County; James W. Williams, Judge. Action between Albert T. Campbell and others and Perry Bradford and others. From a judgment in favor of the latter, the former appeal. Case transferred to Supreme Court because of inability of the judges of the Appellate Court to agree. George W. Grubbs, R. C. Minton, and H. J. Everett, for appellants. O. Matthews, Renner & McNutt, and W. E. McCord, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. Four of the judges of this court failing to concur in a decision upon the merits of this cause, it is transferred to the Supreme Court under the provisions of section 13370, Burns' Ann. St. 1901.

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS ▼. KEELEY. (No. 5,343.) (Appellate Court of Indiana. Nov. 14, 1905.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Johnson County; W. J. Buckingham, Judge. Action by Frank Keeley against the city of Indianapolis. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Henry Warrum and Edward B. Raub, for appellant. M. J. Beckett and Elliott, Elliott & Littleton, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. The judgment of the trial court is af rmed.

COVAULT et al. v. DIAMOND PLATE GLASS CO. et al. (No. 5,468.) (Appellate Court of Indiana. Jan. 4, 1906.) Appeal from Superior Court, Grant County; B. F. Harness, Judge. Action by William B. Covault and others, administrators, against the Diamond Plate Glass Company and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. B. C. Moon, for appellants. Bell & Purdum and Blacklidge, Shirley & Wolf, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. The questions presented on this appeal were considered in the case of Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co. (Ind. App.) 75 N. E. 659; and upon the authority of that case the judgment is affirmed.

LOGANSPORT & W. V. GAS CO. v. NULL. (No 5,476.) (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. Jan. 26, 1906.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Grant County; H. J. Paulus, Judge. Action by Mary E. Null against the Logansport & Wabash Valley Gas Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Brownlee & Brown and Blacklidge, Shirley & Wolf, for appellant. Strange & Charles, for appellee.

BLACK, P. J. This was an action brought by Mary E. Null, the appellee, to quiet her title to certain real estate. The question involved is like that decided in Logansport & Wabash Valley Gas Co. v. Null (No. 5,476, at the last term) 76 N. E. 125; and upon the authority of that case the judgment herein is affirmed.

PITTSBURGH, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. SIMPSON. (No. 5,556.) (Appellate Court of Indiana. Feb. 2, 1906.) Appeal from Circuit Court. Miami County; Jos. M. Tillett, Judge. Action by Edward Simpson against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed. Geo. E. Ross, for appellant. Bailey & Cole and Nelson, Myers & Yarlott, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appellee confesses error in the record and proceedings in the above-entitled cause, and asks that the judgment appealed from be reversed. On this confession of error the judgment of the trial court is reversed and a new trial ordered.

SWING v. EVANSVILLE ICE & COLD STORAGE CO. et al. (No. 5,575.) (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. March 6, 1906.) Appeal from Superior Court, Vanderburgh County; Jno. H. Foster, Judge. Action by James B. Swing against the Evansville Ice & Cold Storage Company and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff_appeals. Reversed. Patterson A. Reece and Van Buskirk & Osborn, for appellant. Gilchrist, De Bruler & Welman, for appellee.

ROBY, C. J. This is an action brought by appellant, as trustee for the creditors of the Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Cincinnati, against appellees upon their liability as policy holders therein, for an assessment decreed by the

Supreme Court of the state of Ohio for the payment of the unpaid losses of said company incurred during the time appellees held their policies. The judgment herein depends upon the same propositions that are considered by the Supreme Court in Swing v. Hill (No. 20,628) 165 Ind., 75 N. E. 658. Upon the authority of that case the judgment herein is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for a new trial and for further proceedings.

WARE v. DIAMOND PLATE GLASS CO. et al. (No. 5,469.) (Appellate Court of Indiana. Jan. 4, 1906.) Appeal from Superior Court, Grant County; B. F. Harness, Judge. Action by Christopher M. Ware against the Diamond Plate Glass Company and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. B. C. Moon, for appellant. Bell & Purdum and Blacklidge, Shirley & Wolf, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. The questions presented by the record in this case were considered in the case of Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co. (Ind. App.) 75 N. E. 659; and upon the authority of that case the judgment is affirmed.

SNOW et al. v. WILLIAMS et al. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. Jan. 5, 1906.) Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County. Action by Seth P. Snow and others against Henry B. Williams and others. A verdict was ordered for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. Wm. H. Baker, for appellants. Roger F. Sturgis, for appellees.

HAMMOND, J. The evidence in this case is quite voluminous, but it has been carefully read and considered. It would serve no useful purpose to recite it in detail. We are of opinion that it is not sufficient to show that the plaintiffs had anything whatever to do with the trade which was finally made, or that they were in any way its efficient and predominating cause. The jury were rightly ordered to render a verdict for the defendants. Judgment on the verdict.

ADAMS v. BOYCE et al. (No. 8,559.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. Feb. 21, 1905.) Error to Superior Court of Cincinnati. O'Hara & Jordan, for plaintiff in error. D. Wulsin, C. J. Hunt, C. W. Scott, and Hieatt & Brown, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed. DAVIS, C. J., and SHAUCK and PRICE, JJ., concur.

ADDYSTON PIPE & STEEL CO. v. CAMPBELL. (No. 8,631.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. April 4, 1905.) Error to Superior Court of Cincinnati. Robertson & Buchwalter and Paxton & Warrington, for plaintiff in error. Shay & Cogan, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed. DAVIS. C. J., and PRICE, SUMMERS, and SPEAR, JJ., concur.

AKERS V. MCCAUSLAND BROS. (No. 8,601.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. March 28, 1905.) Error to Circuit Court, Summit County. Rogers, Rowley. Bradley & Rockwell, for plaintiff in error. Wilcox & Grant and Parsons

& Burch, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment of the circuit court reversed, and that of the common pleas affirmed.

DAVIS, C. J., and SHAUCK, PRICE, CREW, SUMMERS, and SPEAR, JJ., concur.

ANDREW et al. v. MITCHELL. (No. 9.073.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. May 16, 1905.) Error to Circuit Court, Greene County. T. L. Magruder and H. L. Smith, for plaintiffs in error. Snodgrass & Schnebly, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, on authority of Strauch v. Massillon Stoneware Co., 71 Ohio St. 295, 73 N. E. 211.

DAVIS. C. J.. and SHAUCK, PRICE, CREW, SUMMERS, and SPEAR, JJ., concur.

AYERS v. CITY OF TOLEDO et al. (No. 9,195.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. May 9, 1905.) Error to Circuit Court, Lucas County. B. A. Hayes, for plaintiff in error. U. G. Denman, F. G. Crane, and Smith & Baker, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment reversed. Grounds stated in the journal entry.

DAVIS, C. J., and SHAUCK, PRICE, CREW, SUMMERS, and SPEAR, JJ., concur.

BAKER V. BAKER et al. (No. 9.081.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. June 6, 1905.) Error to Circuit Court, Hamilton County. Stephens, Lincoln & Stephens, for plaintiff in error. J. C. Clore and O. M. Rogers, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed. DAVIS, C. J., and PRICE and SUMMERS. JJ., concur.

BALTIMORE & O. S. W. R. CO. v. JUNEMAN. (No. 8,635.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. April 4, 1905.) Error to Circuit Court, Ross County. Edward Barton and J. P. Phillips, for plaintiff in error. C. R. Doll and Elijah Cutright, Jr., for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Judgment of the circuit court reversed, and judgment of the court of common pleas affirmed.

DAVIS, C. J., and SHAUCK, PRICE, SUMMERS, and SPEAR, JJ., concur.

BAUM v. FIRE CLAY CO. (No. 9.178) (Supreme Court of Ohio. June 20, 1905