1. Excusing from the panel jurors
who stood up when the Court
asked if any were in defendant's
employ held in the discretion of
the Court. Yarborough v. Co-
lumbia Ry., Gas and Electric
Co., 84 S. E. 308, 100 S. C. 33.
2. Under Civil Code 1912, sec.

4023, where a sheriff served all
those named in a venire who
could be found, Court, after the
panel was exhausted, held war-
ranted in directing the issuance
of a venire for additional ju-
rors. State v. Tidwell, 84 S. E.
778, 100 S. C. 248.

3. Under Criminal Code 1912, sec.
82, Civil Code 1912, secs. 4018,
4023, and Circuit Court rule 25,
held that it was error to call
one of additional jurors with-
out waiting until all had a rea-
sonable time to appear and with-

1. A tenant by the month with
the privilege of substitution is
liable for the rent for the en-
tire month, where the landlord
objected to the substituted ten-
ant, and no tender was made of
the rent due after the substitu--
tion. Walker v. Spartanburg
Realty Co., 84 S. E. 869, 100 S.
C. 308.

2. Property may be distrained for
rent when possession can be
peaceably acquired, and, when
so acquired, the tenant cannot
forceably retake the property.
McCraw v. Killian, 84 S. E. 868,
100 S. C. 320.

3. Where a lessor reserved a rent
lien und before the rent was due
the land was sold under fore-
closure, the rent lien passed to
the purchaser. Ex parte Owens,
81 S. E. 875, 100 S. C. 324.
4. Where before rent became due,
the land was sold under fore-
closure, the purchaser became
entitled to the entire rent re-
served. Id.

5. In an action by a mill employee
for wrongful dispossession from
a millhouse, testimony by the
employee as to the reason for
his discharge held not objection-
able. Williams V. Columbia
Mills Co., 85 S. E. 160, 100 S. C.
363.

6. In an action for wrongfu!
eviction of a tenant, testimony

by arother that she paid the
rent for plaintiff is admissible
if proof of the payment of rent
was competent. Id.

7. In an action for wrongful
eviction of a mill employee from
a mil.house, evidence that other
families which furnished only
on hand occupied similar houses
held admissible to contradict
evidence of a company rule to
the contrary. Id.

8. Under Civil Code 1912, sec.
3509, giving a tenant wrongfully
discharged an action for dam-
ages against a landlord, puni-
tive damages may be allowed.
Id.

9. A purchaser of lands at a judi-
cial sale acquires the rights to
all rents maturing, and becom-
ing due after the purchase. Ex
parte Owens, 84 S. E. 875, 100
S. C. 324.

10. Where a landlord instituted
proceedings under Civil Code
1912, sec. 4166, to seize certain
cotton, as subject to his land-
lord's lien for rent, and this
claim being denied by a sub-
tenant, the question whether or
not the landlord had waived his
lien on half of the crop in favor
of the subtenant, was submit-
ted to a jury, and a verdict ren-
dered in favor of the landlord
for only one-half of the crop;
this was in effect a verdict in
favor of the subtenant, the pre-
vailing party, for the other half
of the crop. Baird v. Weather-
ford, 85 S. E. 59, 100 S. C. 490.
LARCENY AFTER BREACH
OF TRUST.

1. Evidence held sufficient to take
to the jury the question whether
a partnership existed between
defendant and prosecutor which
would be a defense to the prose-
cution. State v. Grumbles, 84
S. E. 783, 100 S. C. 238.

LAW OF CASE.

1. A judgment on a prior appeal
is the law of the case and, where
the facts on the second trial
are the same, is conclusive.

Mims v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 85
S. E. 372, 100 S. C. 375.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS.

1. Resolutions in Senate Journal
held, in effect, to declare that
record of previous day was a
mistake, and to correct such
mistake, and hence the journal
did not show confirmation of
appointment. State v. Tollison.
84 S. E. 819, 100 S. C. 165.
2. In determining from its jour-
nal what was or was not done
by the Senate, the journal must
be considered as a whole, as any
other record would be. Id.

LICENSEES.

1. Where an employee of con-
signee engaged in unloading
cars of coal placed by a rail-
road company on a spur track
at an industrial plant is injured
in an accident occasioned by the
cars from some unexplained
cause becoming uncoupled and
running off the end of the track,
and the testimony does not tend
to support the allegations that
the defendant either negligently
provided defective stop block on
the track, negligently failed to
have the cars on engine pushing
same equipped with proper
brakes, or negligently operated
the cars on the track or did
anything which caused the un-
coupling of the cars, a nonsuit
was properly granted. Burford
v. S. A. L. Ry., 84 S. E. 712, 100
S. C. 177.

LIENS.

1. Where a landlord instituted
proceedings under Civil Code
1912, sec. 4166, to seize certain
cotton, as subject to his land-
lord's lien for rent, and this
claim being denied by a sub-
tenant, the question whether or
not the landlord had waived
his lien on half of the crop in
favor of the subtenant, was sub-
mitted to a jury, and a verdict
rendered in favor of the land-
lord for only one-half of the
crop; this was in effect a verdict
in favor of the subtenant, the

prevailing party, for the other
half of the
Baird V.
crop.
Weatherford, 85 S. E. 59, 100
S. C. 490.

2. The prevailing party in pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of
agricultural liens is entitled to
recover costs, which are to be
paid out of the funds in Court,
before the net proceeds are ap-
plied to payment of the amounts
found due the parties. Baird v.
Weatherford, 85 S. E. 59, 100
S. C. 490.

3. Under Civil Code 1912, secs.
3062-3064, providing for fore-
closure of agricultural liens and
requiring the clerk to issue his
warrant and the sheriff to seize
the crop and sell it for cash and
pay over the net proceeds in ex-
tinguishment of amount due, the
officers should be paid for their
services out of the proceeds and
the balance applied to the debt
due. Id.

4. In equity and under Code Civil
Proc. 1902, sec. 326, a defendant,
in a proceeding to foreclose an
agricultural lien, who claims
one-half of the crops free from
the lien and makes out his case
and shows that he was without
fault in bringing about the liti-
gation, was entitled to his costs.
Id.

LIMITATION OF ESTATES.

1. A deed conveying land to A for
his uses and benefits, and for
the maintenance and support of
his children (he having no chil-
dren at the date of the deed)
during the term of his natural
life, and to said children imme-
diately after the death of A, to
have and to hold to the said
children, their heirs and assigns
forever, conveys the land therein
described to A for life, for his
own use and partially in trust
for the maintenance, support
and benefit of his after-born
children, with a contingent re-
mainder in fee to his after-born
children, if any, as purchasers.
Folk v. Hughes, 84 S. E. 713,
100 S. C. 220.

LOCATION.

1. In a boundary suit, testimony
of plaintiff's surveyor that, if
the boundary line claimed by
defendant were projected, it
would cut off property conced-
edly belonging to plaintiff, is ad-
missible. Holden v. Cantrell, 84
S. E. 826, 100 S. C. 265.
2. Where, in a boundary suit,
plaintiff testifies as to physical
objects outside the land in dis-
pute, which was in form a tri-
angle, to show the true boundary
line, and a plat agreed upon by
the surveyors as correctly rep-
resenting the lines as claimed
by the respective parties, and
showing the physical objects tes-
tified to by plaintiff, testimony
of the surveyors as to the loca-
tion of the physical objects was
properly received. Id.

3. Though quantity, as a matter
of description, is ordinarily one
of the lowest in the scale of im-
portance, there may be circum-
stances in which it would be
controlling. Id.

4. In an action involving the
boundary line of two tracts of
land, which were part of an
original tract containing three
tracts, testimony as to the acre-
age of the three tracts is not
error. Id.

5. In a boundary case, admission
of testimony of surveyor that he
could not run a straight line 52
chains long through hilly wood-
land without aid of an instru-
ment is not error, as it was a
fact which needed no testimony
to prove it. Id.

MAGISTRATES.

1. Mandamus will not issue to
compel a county superintendent
to honor a claim by the trustees
of a school district of another
county for the support of a
joint school, since there is an
adequate remedy by appeal to
the State board of education.
Rouse v. Benton, 84 S. E. 533,
100 S. C. 150.

2. Mandamus will not issue to

compel a county superintendent
to approve a warrant, where it
does not appear that the county
treasurer had sufficient funds to
pay it. Rouse v. Benton, 84 S.
E. 533, 100 S. C. 150.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. A complaint alleging that plain-
tiff worked with a bridge force
as bridge carpenter on an inter-
state railroad states a cause of
action, under Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. Camp v. At-
lanta &C. A. L. Ry. Co., 84 S.
E. 825, 100 S. C. 294.
2. In an action by an employee
for injuries, evidence held to re-
quire submission to the jury of
the issue of employer's negli-
gence. Camp v. Atlanta & C. A.
L. Ry. Co., 84 S. E. 825, 100 S.
C. 294.

3. Where the issue was whether
the work at the time of injury
to a railroad employee, was in-
terstate or intrastate commerce,
the Court must charge the law
as to both. Camp v. Atlanta &
C. A. L. Ry. Co., 84 S. E. 825,
100 S. C. 294.

4. In an action for injuries to an
employee by the fall of a tele-
phone pole on which he was
working, evidence held not to
show wilful misconduct of the

employer. Bridgman v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
84 S. E. 711, 100 S. C. 204.
5. In an action for injuries to an
employee, a charge on the law
of fellow servant held authorized
by pleadings and evidence.
Bridgman V. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 84
S. E. 711, 100 S. C. 204.

6. Where contract relations exist
between an active corporation
and a passive corporation, and
where both have servants, the two
corporations may not contract
to relieve active corporation
from responsibility for injury
from its negligence to servants
of passive corporation. Carter
v. Southern Rwy.-Carolina Di-
vision, 84 S. E. 999, 100 S. C.
403.

7. Contract of Pullman employee
ratifying contracts of Pullman
company with defendant road
and agreeing to hold road harm-
less for any damages it might
have to pay him for injury, held
invalid, so that for injury from
road's negligence employee might
recover. Id.

8. Evidence, in action for services
under contract to buy cotton
seed oil at instructed prices,
held to make rescission of con-
tract question for jury. Moore
v. Marion Cotton Oil Co., 85 S.
E. 52, 100 S. C. 499.

9. In action for services under
contract to buy cotton seed oil
at instructed prices, evidence
held to make plaintiff's excuse
for nonperformance question for
jury. Id.

10. Where plaintiff alleged con-
tract for services, and defendant
alleged rescission, burden was
upon defendant to show rescis-
sion, and, if he failed, verdict
should be for plaintiff. Id.
11. In action for services under
contract to buy cotton seed oil
at instructed prices, it was only
necessary, to enable plaintiff to
recover, for him to show sub-
stantial performance. Id.
12. When the pleadings show facts
bringing an action within the
Federal Employers' Liability
Act, it must be tried under that

Line R. Co., 85 S. E. 372, 100
S. C. 375.

13. On the second trial of a death
action, defendant cannot, after
the close of plaintiff's evidence,
show, without amending, that
deceased was engaged in inter-
state commerce at his death, so
that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act was applicable.
Mims v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 85 S. E. 372, 100 S. C. 375.
14. Testimony of a servant that
he quit his master's work to at-
tend to his personal enterprise
is not prejudicial to the master.
Williams v. Columbia Mills Co.,
85 S. E. 160, 100 S. C. 363.
See Evidence. Smith v. Union-
Buffalo Mills Co., 84 S. E. 422,
100 S. C. 115.

MISTAKE.

1. The Court will reform an in-
strument where there is a mu-
tual mistake as to the facts on
which it is based, or as to the
stipulations therein, or where
one of the parties acted under a
mistake induced by the fraud,
deceit, or imposition of the
other. Forrester v. Moon, 84
S. E. 532, 100 S. C. 157.

2. Where only one of the parties
to an instrument was under a
mistake as to the facts or stipu-
lations in the instrument, equity
will not reform it except under
very strong and extraordinary
circumstances showing imbecility
or something which would make
it a wrong to enforce the agree-
ment. Forrester v. Moon, 84
S. E. 532, 100 S. C. 157.
3. Where a grantee bargained for
the land actually conveyed by
the grantor and the grantee
acted in good faith and was in
no way responsible for an error
of the grantor who possessed
capacity, equity would not re-
form the deed at the suit of the
grantor. Forrester v. Moon, 84
S. E. 532, 100 S. C. 157.
4. A telegraph company is liable
for damages growing out of its
mistake which occurred in trans-
mitting a message, or out of an

erroneous publication of the
message by an unauthorized
person to whom the company en-
trusted it for delivery to ad-
dressee. Painter v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 84 S. E. 293, 100 S. C. 65.
MORTGAGES.

See Chattel Mortgages.
1. Where a note secured by a
mortgage bore eight per cent.
interest, it was error to compute
interest at that rate after matu-
rity in a suit to foreclose.
Gibbes Machinery Co. v. Ham-
ilton, 84 S. E. 296, 100 S. C. 57.
2. Where a lessor reserved a rent
lien and before the rent was due
the land was sold under fore-
closure, the rent lien passed to
the purchaser. Ex parte Owens,
84 S. F. 875, 100 S. C. 324.
3. Where before rent became due,
the land was sold under fore-
closure, the purchaser became
entitled to the entire rent re-
served. Id.

4. A conveyance intended as a se-
curity for a debt is a "mort-
gage," whatever may be its
form. Bryan v. Boyd, 84 S. E.

992, 100 S. C. 397.

5. A conveyance absolute in form
is presumed to be an absolute
conveyance, and, to establish its
character as a mortgage, the
evidence must be clear, unequivo-
cal, and convincing. Bryan v.
Boyd, 84 S. E. 992, 100 S. C.
397.

6. Evidence, in a mortgagor's
action to redeem land purchased
by a mortgagee on foreclosure,
held not sufficient to show that
the sheriff's deed was a mort-
gage, so that plaintiff might re-
deem. Bryan v. Boyd, 84 S. E.
992, 100 S. C. 397.

7. A written agreement reciting
a purchase of preferred stock
and agreement by the corpora-
tion to pay interest to the
holder on the purchase money;
and providing that at a time
named, either party might, after
thirty days' notice, terminate
the contract, and thereupon the
purchase money shou'd be re-
paid holder on surrender of the