Thus one is enabled to read the decisions of the courts almost as soon as they are rendered.

84. Reports-Value-Decision and dicta.41. -To the lawyer the report is valuable because it embodies a precedent, that is, a general rule applicable to all cases similar in their essential features to the one reported. But this rule is not necessarily found in the words of the report. It is in the reasoning which brought the court to its decision of the case. This is called the ratio decidendi (reason for deciding) or doctrine of the case. The opinion which constitutes the main element in the report may or may not formulate this governing principle in words. It usually attempts to do so, and often with much success. But on the other hand the principle may be left implicit, or the language in which the court tries to frame it may be too broad or otherwise inaccurate. It is not what the court says in deciding the case, but the rule by which it actually decides it, which is the precedent.

An opinion is likely to contain much more than this. In explaining or justifying its decision the court will be almost sure to use arguments, illustrations, analogies, and discussions of hypothetical cases differing in some particular from the one before it; and in such discussion it may express many opinions illuminating the principle by which it decides the case but not essential to the decision itself. Such a part of the opinion is said to be spoken by

41 For full treatment of the subjects discussed in this and succeeding sections see an especially useful book by Professor E. Wambaugh, "The Study of Cases.''

the way (obiter dictum), and is generally called a dictum. Since these dicta are not part of the doctrine of the case they are not of binding authority, but as they are the utterances of men of learning and ability they have the persuasive value of such expert opinion, especially if it can be shown that they were carefully considered by their authors.

Dicta, in the strict sense of statements made by the way in the exposition of the ratio decidendi (grounds of decision) may be distinguished from the use, in stating this governing principle itself, of language either too broad or too narrow for the issues presented for decision. Here the real principle can be found only by construing the language of the opinion in the light of the special facts of the case under discussion, and in the light of other decisions making clear the exact limits of the doctrine enunciated.

It remains to be observed that though the court may not formulate the principle which dictated its decision, yet the rule for which the case stands must be one which was in the mind of the court. If the principle which might well have formed the basis of the decision was not raised or even thought of by the court, but the case was decided on entirely different grounds, then the case is not a precedent for that principle; for the theory of the binding character of precedent rests upon the fact that the decision. according to a general rule has been the result of deliberation upon the rule.

85. The study of reported cases.-The determination of the doctrine for which a case is an authority,

and the determination of the value of that authority in its application to a particular legal problem, are the chief tasks which engage the student of the common law. This study may well begin with an analysis of the elements of the report, all of which are of importance both in arriving at the doctrine of law for which the case stands and in estimating its value as an authority. A report normally contains five parts: the title of the case, including the names of the parties, the court, and the date of the decision; the syllabus or headnote, a brief abstract by the reporter of the proposition of law for which he considers the case to stand; the statement of the case, another brief statement by the reporter of such matters of fact and procedure as are necessary to show what questions of law are involved in the case; the opinion, or, sometimes, opinions if the court is not unanimous; and finally a brief note of the disposition made of the case by the court. To these parts a sixth is sometimes added-namely, a brief summary of the arguments of counsel and citation of their authorities. The student will find it helpful to make his own summary of the case, paying particular attention to these cardinal points: who were the parties plaintiff and defendant; how did the case come before the present court; what were the essential facts in the case; what precisely was the question or questions of law which the court was called on to answer; how did they answer them; what reasons did they give for their answer?

86. Comparison of cases.-In general the study of the case aims at stripping away the non-essential

elements in the particular case and arriving, largely by a process of abstraction, at the rule which governed the decision. This can rarely be done successfully without the comparison of cases with each other. A general doctrine, particular aspects of which are involved in different cases, emerges only when these cases are brought together, compared, and combined. One must hold one's judgment in suspense until the study of a sufficient number of allied decisions makes clear the limits of the essential doctrine of them all. Thus if we find A held liable for an injury to B caused by B's falling over a barrow which C, employed by A as a gardener, had carelessly left on the street over night, we might conclude that an employer was liable for the negligent tort of his employe. But when we find from another case that A is not liable for the negligence of a builder whom he has employed to build a house for him and who has carelessly left his trestles on the street, we may re-formulate the rule to run: if the employe is a servant and not an independent contractor the employer-master will be liable for his negligent tort. Even then we should find the rule needed qualification. For instance, if A's gardener injured B by running him down with A's automobile which he had undertaken to operate at the request of A's chauffeur, A would not be liable. The rule might now appear: a master is liable for the negligent torts of his servant while the servant is engaged in the employment for which the master hired him. The doctrine might be still further pursued, but perhaps enough has been said to show that the

process of eliminating non-essentials to arrive at an accurate statement of a rule of law is often a matter which requires a patient comparison of allied cases.

87. Books of authority.-While statutes and reports are the chief forms in which the law is to be found, some treatises of long-tested value have an authority for the law of their period akin to that of statutes or decided cases. They may be cited and relied on as accurately stating the law in cases where judicial authority is not available. Of these the most noteworthy are: Glanvil's Treatise on the Laws of England, written in Henry II's time; Bracton's Laws and Customs of England, written in Henry III's time; Littleton's Book of Tenures, of the time of Edward IV; and Coke's Institutes, of the time of Elizabeth and James I. Glanvil and Bracton are useful mainly in giving a picture of the early common law; Littleton, with Coke's commentary on his book, is the great authority on the law of real property in the period when its outlines largely became fixed; Coke's Institutes cover the common law of his day.

88. Treatises and text-books.-To the work of extracting the principles of law from the primary authorities, bringing together those on related topics, and arranging them into a logical development of some branch of the law, many able and learned men have given great time and labor. Their treatises have value not only as making the law more accessible and intelligible but also as serving by criticism and suggestion to further its development. Text-books and treatises differ widely in usefulness