laws, without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation, are necessarily of little force. In speaking of the late Judge Mulkey he said: "He recognized to the fullest extent the doctrine that in a republic like ours liberty is best regulated when it is restrained within the limits prescribed by a written constitution. Only thus can the rights of the people be protected from the encroachments of partial laws and the invasion of mob violence." Judge Magruder, too, endeavored to carry out these principles in his written opinions.

He was ever and always a student. His days and nights were given to judicial labor. He never took a regular vacation, usually spending all of the summer between June and October working on his cases. Society and social amusements seemed to have little attraction for him. His books were his companions. His judicial ideals might well be summed up in the words of another: "If it shall be found that I have contributed in some measure to maintain and strengthen the authority of the law; to make it the refuge of innocence and distress, from oppression and wrong; to reconcile men to a willing submission to its authority as the legitimate arbiter of all controversies, the full measure of my ambition will be accomplished."

His character and his life were above reproach. His judicial ermine was ever unspotted. He bore with stainless hands "the unstained sword of justice." For twenty-one years, on the bench and in the conference room, with great lawyers and judges, he considered and settled questions involving the rights of citizenship and the welfare of the State. He has been called to that other bourne "where beyond these voices there is peace." That which he has written into the jurisprudence of this State will stand as a monument of wisdom, learning and justice, which neither the changes of society nor the "flight of seasons shall demolish."

CHIEF JUSTICE VICKERS: In accordance with the motions presented by the committees from these bar associations the clerk will enter these resolutions and memorials in the records of this court and the reporter will publish them in the regular volumes of our Supreme Court Reports, and as a further mark of respect and memory of the deceased judge this court will now adjourn until nine o'clock to-morrow morning.

CASES

ARGUED AND DETERMINED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

RUDOLPH WURLITZER COMPANY, Appellee, vs. Charles F. DICKINSON, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 28, 1910-Rehearing denied Dec. 8, 1910.

1. PRACTICE-municipal court of Chicago cannot extend time for filing statement after thirty days from judgment. In cases of the fourth class the municipal court of Chicago has no power to extend the time for filing the statement or stenographic report, which serves as a bill of exceptions, after thirty days from judgment, even though there is a stipulation of the parties to extend the time. (Lassers v. Steamship Co. 244 Ill. 570, adhered to.)

2. SAME-how to raise question whether point was made in Appellate Court. To enable the Supreme Court to determine whether a certain point was raised in the Appellate Court, a motion should be made, under rule 15 of the Supreme Court, for leave to file a certified copy of the briefs filed in the Appellate Court.

3. SAME when Supreme Court cannot say that question was waived because not raised in the Appellate Court. The question whether the bill of exceptions in the municipal court was filed in time may be raised in the Appellate Court in the brief and argument, and hence if no certified copy of the brief and argument used in the Appellate Court is filed in the Supreme Court upon leave granted, the Supreme Court cannot say whether such point was waived because not raised in the Appellate Court.

CARTWRIGHT, J., VICKERS, C. J. and HAND, J., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. ANTHONY J. CLARITY, Judge, presiding.

F. WILLIAM KRAFT, for appellant.

ELBERT C. FERGUSON, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action of the fourth class, brought in the municipal court of Chicago by appellee, the Rudolph Wurlitzer Company, against appellant, Charles F. Dickinson. After a trial before a jury a judgment was entered against appellant for $761.01. The Appellate Court affirmed this judgment. A certificate of importance having been granted by that court, this appeal followed.

Appellee is an Ohio corporation dealing in musical instruments, with a branch place of business in Chicago. At the time the debt was contracted the appellant was a retail dealer in musical instruments in Chicago. The judgment was founded on six promissory notes, of $25 each, given by appellant to appellee, and upon a balance due to appellee upon an open account. March 24, 1900, appellee secured a license from the Secretary of State of Illinois to carry on business in this State pursuant to the statutes then existing. The license so granted stated that the appellee company was authorized to do business in the State of Illinois "for the term of ninety-nine years, and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted to foreign corporations under the laws of this State."

Appellant contends that although appellee has paid the fee required by the law in force when the license was issued, and was entitled, under that law, to prosecute suits in this State, yet that said company may not maintain this.

suit in any court of this State because it has failed to comply with the provisions of the law that went into force in 1905 as to licensing foreign corporations. Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. Counsel for appellee insists that the bill of exceptions (called in the Municipal Court act a "statement" or "stenographic report") in this case was not filed within the time required by statute, as appears from the record, and that therefore neither of these questions, which are shown only by the bill of exceptions, can be considered by the court.

The record shows that judgment was entered in this case on June 26, 1908; that the writ of error was sued out from the Appellate Court on the next day; that July 10, 1908, an order was entered, by stipulation of the parties, extending the time to file bill of exceptions to twenty days from July 26, 1908. On August 11, 1908, a similar order was entered on a similar stipulation extending the time to file a bill of exceptions to August 28, 1908. A similar order was entered August 26, 1908, on a similar stipulation, extending the time to and including September 2, 1908, in which to file a bill of exceptions. The bill of exceptions was filed August 29, 1908.

In Lassers v. North-German Steamship Co. 244 Ill. 570, we held that under paragraph 6 of section 23 of the Municipal Court act the municipal court could not, as to cases of the fourth class, extend the time for filing the statement or stenographic report after thirty days from judgment; that the municipal court had no power to make such an order. Counsel for the appellant insists that this construction of the Municipal Court act results in great injustice. However that may be, such construction seems to be the only fair and reasonable one from the wording of the statute. If it results in injustice to litigants, any suggestions for a change must be addressed to the legislature and not to the courts.

Counsel for the appellant contends that the Lassers case does not control here, as in this case there was a stipulation. to extend the time to file the stenographic report, which was not the fact in the Lassers case. The provisions of the statute on this point cannot be waived by stipulation. The reasoning in the Lassers case is conclusive on the facts here.

Counsel further contends that this point was not raised by the appellee in the Appellate Court and therefore it was waived. Rule 15 of this court (235 Ill. 15) provides that where it is important to determine what questions were presented in the Appellate Court, certified copies of the briefs and arguments filed and used in that court may be filed and used in this court, on motion and leave granted. No certified copies of the Appellate Court briefs are on file in this court and no motion was made for leave to file them. This court, therefore, is not informed, under our rules, whether or not such question was raised in the Appellate Court. (City of Chicago v. Cook, 204 Ill. 373.) For this reason we cannot hold that the question whether the statement and stenographic report in the municipal court were filed within the time required by the Municipal Court act was waived by failing to raise it in the Appellate Court.

The statement and stenographic report, or bill of exceptions, by whichever name it may be called, cannot be regarded as a part of the record. Since no errors are complained of which appear otherwise of record, the judgment of the Appellate Court must be affirmed.

ing:

Judgment affirmed.

CARTWRIGHT, J., VICKERS, C. J. and HAND, J., dissent

We do not concur in that part of the foregoing opinion which holds that the question whether a bill of exceptions was filed in proper time can be raised in the brief and argument upon the errors assigned on the record. We think it must be presented by motion, and if not so presented it is waived.