Two methods of amending the Constitution were prescribed by the Constitution of 1870. That instrument provided for (1) the assembling of a convention to revise, alter or amend the Constitution whenever the people voted to call such a convention and (2) authorized the General Assembly, subject to certain restrictions, to propose constitutional amendments, which could become effective, however, only upon receiving a favorable vote when submitted to the people. 5 6 In all of the essential features, save one, the convention plan of amending the constitution provided for by the Constitution of 1870 does not materially differ from the convention plans of the preceding documents. The one difference-and in view of results it can hardly be said to be a real difference-is that, while the two preceding Constitutions did not provide that the work of a convention should be submitted to the voters, the present Constitution expressly provides that the work of a convention shall not become effective until ratified by the people. All conventions since 1818, including the Convention of 1862, have submitted their work to the people. The right of the people to pass upon any Constitution or amendments to an existing Constitution proposed by a convention seems, since 1818, not to have been questioned until 1862 when a few delegates to the convention of that year expressed the opinion that it was not necessary to submit to the voters any Constitution that might be adopted by that convention. And perhaps the provision in the present Constitution is due to the fact that there was some conflict of opinion in the Convention of 1862 as to the right of the people to pass upon the work of a constitutional convention. The plan, under the Constitution of 1870, of authorizing the General Assembly to propose constitutional amendments, subject to the approval of the voters, has not proven satisfactory. The power of the General Assembly to propose amendments has been restricted. to such an extent that it has been practically impossible to secure constitutional amendments under this plan. But it must be admitted that at least one of the difficulties encountered in obtaining amendments under the legislative proposal method of amending the Constitution, has arisen since the adoption of the Ballot Law (1891), and could not have been in the contemplation of the constitutional framers. The present Constitution has been in force since August 8, 1870. In more than forty-seven years but seven constitutional amendments have been adopted, five of which were submitted to the voters prior to 1891. Since the enactment of the Ballot Law only two amendments have been adopted, and both of these would have undoubtedly failed had it not been for the vigorous campaigns conducted in their behalf. The tax amendment of 1916, which the Supreme Court, in an opinion handed down at the October term 1917, held was not ratified by a constitutional majority of the voters, failed of adoption notwithstanding a vigorous 66 Constitution 1870, Article XIV. 57 campaign by its sponsors. These facts conclusively prove that the legislative proposal plan of amending the Constitution provided for by the Convention of 1869-70 is seriously defective. The convention method of amending a Constitution is cumbersome and expensive. It is not calculated to enable immediate constitutional changes no matter how urgent such changes may be. A convention cannot be assembled and its work submitted to the electors in less than three or four years, depending, of course, to some extent on the length of timet hat the convention remains in session. Obviously the convention method should not be resorted to unless a rather thorough revision of the Constitution is deemed necessary, in which event the assembling of a body for that purpose is highly desirable. Oftentimes, however, amendments which do not involve a thorough revision of the Constitution are desired. There should be a way, less cumbersome and involving less delay, of procuring constitutional amendments of that character. For instance in 1886 a constitutional amendment making it unlawful for "the commissioners of any penitentiary * * to let by contract to any person or persons, or corporations, the labor of any convict confined within said institution" was deemed necessary. Would it not have been absurd to assemble a convention of one hundred and two delegates to propose such an amendment? A mere statement of the nature of the convict labor amendment demonstrates the need for a comparatively simple method of amending a Constitution. And there can be no doubt that in adopting the legislative proposal plan of amending the Constitution, the constitutional framers were desirous of enabling the procurement of amendments similar to the convict labor amendment without incurring the expense and delay of an unwieldy constitutional convention. They necessarily realized the absurdity of assembling a convention to obtain such amendments. That they wished to devise a rather simple method of amending the Constitution under such circumstances is apparent from the fact that although the legislative proposal plan of amending the Constitution provided for by the Constitution of 1870, in the main, was taken from the Constitution of 1848, it is decidedly less complicated than the plan provided for by the earlier document. Under the Constitution of 1848 it was necessary that a legislative proposal to amend the Constitution be approved by two successive legislatures. Under its terms a proposal to amend the Constitution which was voted upon favorably by twothirds of the members of the General Assembly was referred to the succeeding General Assembly. If a majority of the members of the succeeding General Assembly favored the proposal it was then sub 57 Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution provides that amendments proposed by the General Assembly "shall be submitted to the electors of this State for adoption or rejection at the next election of members of the General Assembly *** and if a majority of the electors voting at said election shall vote for the proposed amendments, they shall become a part of this Constitution." The tax amendment of 1916 received a majority of all votes cast for members of the General Assembly at the general election in November, 1916, but did not receive a majority of all votes cast in the election at which it was submitted. Because section 2 of Article XIV requires amendments proposed by the General Assembly to be submitted to the people at the "next election of members of the General Assembly," it was contended that the words "at said election," appearing subsequently in that section referred to the election of members of the General Assembly, and that only a majority of the votes cast for the members of the General Assembly was required to ratify the tax amendment. A majority of the Supreme Court judges, however, held that "said election" did not refer to the election of members of the General Assembly, but to the election at which the amendment was submitted, and that the tax amendment, not having received a majority of all votes cast at the general election in November, 1916, was not legally ratified. See People v. Stevenson, 281 Ill. 17 (1917). mitted to the voters for their approval or disapproval. The Constitution of 1870 does not require favorable action by two Legislatures. Under its terms a proposal to amend the Constitution, which receives a two-thirds vote of all members elected to each house is submitted to the voters at the next election for members of the General Assembly. But, notwithstanding the apparent intention of the framers of our present Constitution to provide a comparatively simple method of amending the Constitution without assembling a convention, they failed in their efforts. For two specific reasons the legislative proposal method of amending the Constitution prescribed by the Constitution of 1870 has not produced satisfactory results. (1) The last sentence of section 2 of Article XIV of the present Constitution which denies the General Assembly the power to propose amendments to more than one article of the Constitution at the same session has operated as a very serious check on the proposal of constitutional amendments by that body. The Constitution of 1870 consists of fourteen articles, all of which are more or less closely connected. Any comprehensive constitutional change because of this more or less close relation between the several articles would undoubtedly affect two or more articles. A single illustration will serve to show the seriousness of this restriction on the power of the General Assembly. The "short ballot" idea, which, to state it briefly, contemplates the reduction of the number of elective officers, could not be adopted in this State without expressly amending three or four articles of the Constitution. The short ballot scheme embraces but one comprehensive principle. Nevertheless, because of the relation of the several articles of the Constitution to each other, it could not be put into operation without affecting three or four of the fourteen articles and for that precise reason the General Assembly is absolutely powerless to propose an amendment carrying out the short ballot plan. Almost any fundamental constitutional change would affect more than one article of the Constitution. Because the General Assembly is forbidden to propose amendments to more than one article at the same session its power to initiate constitutional changes is materially limited. As a matter of fact hardly a single far-reaching constitutional change, such as the short ballot scheme, even though it embraces but one comprehensive idea, can be attained in this State except by assembling a constitutional convention. 5 8 This provision which prohibits the General Assembly from proposing amendments to more than one article at the same session has another drawback. It leads to what has been called "competing amendments." Any constitutional amendment proposed by the General Assembly must receive a two-thirds vote in both houses. One group of legislators will favor an amendment to a certain article of the 58 The Supreme Court has taken the view that this particular provision of section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution should not be so strictly construed as to prevent an express amendment to one article of the Constitution even though the effect of the express amendment is to impliedly amend other articles. In Chicago v. Reeves, 220 Ill. 274 (1908) it was held that "section 2 of Article XIV was intended to prohibit the proposal of express amendments to more than one article of the Constitution at the same session, and was not intended to prevent implied amendments or changes which were necessarily worked in other articles of the Constitution by the express amendments of a particular article of the Constitution." It is apparent, however, that the liberal construction of this provision by the Supreme Court affords but little relief. The General Assembly may propose express amendments to but one article of the Constitution at the same session. Constitution: another group will favor an amendment to a differe article. Both amendments cannot be adopted at the same session Neither group will withdraw its proposed amendment and, consequently neither of the proposed amendments can secure the necessary t thirds vote to authorize its submission to the voters. re but (2) Section 2, Article XIV, provides that all proposals of cons tutional amendments by the General Assembly shall be submitte to the electors at the next election of members of the General Assemb It further provides that no such amendment shall become effecti unless it shall receive a majority of all votes cast at "said electica The effect of these provisions is to make it almost impossible to obt the adoption of any amendment proposed by the General Assembly It must be admitted, however, that this has been true only since enactment of the Ballot Law (1891). 59 Under the Ballot Law propositions to be voted upon were printed on the official ballot wil blank spaces for both favorable and unfavorable marks, but with provision by which a straight party vote would count either for against such propositions. If the voter did not specially mark eit of the blank spaces before any proposition on the official ballot failed to vote at all on that proposition. As a general rule the votes paid little or no attention to the propositions printed on the off ballot. Their primary interest was in the candidates for office. The result was that during the period in which the Ballot Law as originally re enacted remained in force not a single proposition which was submitt to the voters at a general election received a total affirmative and negative vote, equal to fifty per cent of the total number of vote cast at the election at which it was submitted. All constitution amendments proposed by the General Assembly must receive a majority I of the votes cast at the election at which they are submitted. Und the original Ballot Law it was impossible to get fifty per cent of the voters to vote at all on a proposed amendment, to say nothing getting a majority of them to cast favorable votes. Every constitutions amendment submitted to the people by the General Assembly unde the original Ballot Law was defeated. 60 ment When mitte The Amen For. For these System The General Assembly in 1899 sought to remedy this situation The Ballot Law was amended by an act which provided that all prophe th upon which the names of the candidates appeared. It was though that the separate ballot would tend to call the voter's attention to the matters printed thereon and thus invite action on his part. failure of the recent tax amendment to receive a majority of the vote cast at the general election in 1916, although its proponents conducted a most thorough campaign in its behalf, seems to indicate that eve under the act of 1899 it is difficult to get the voters to act on proposed constitutional amendments. It is only fair to point out, however that two constitutional amendments have been adopted since 18 But there can be no doubt that both of them would have failed had it not been for the very vigorous campaigns waged by those who favored the amendments. Nevertheless, it is apparent that since 1891 the pro * Hurd's Revised Statutes 1915-16, Chapter 46, Sections 288-323. mittee ballot. on the could & T sion requiring constitutional amendments proposed by the Legislature receive a majority of the votes cast at the election at which they e submitted, before becoming operative, has become a serious obstacle. Under the system of voting which prevailed at the time of the sembling of the Convention of 1869-70, and which continued until 91, it was not a difficult matter to get a majority of the voters at election to take some action with reference to any proposition subitted at that election. This does not in any manner mean that the ters of that period, as compared with the voters of the succeeding riod, took a greater interest in public measures. It simply means at the system of voting in force in that period was calculated to prore the vote of non-interested voters on public measures. As a general le under that voting system the elector voted on public measures, gardless of his interest in such measures and often without even knowg that he was voting on them. From 1848 to 1891 each political rty printed its own ballots. The duty of carrying out the legal quirements concerning the submission of public measures, therefore, volved upon the political parties. To some extent the General sembly sought to regulate the manner of submitting public measures it the sum total of all these regulations, in so far as they affected nstitutional amendments proposed by the General Assembly, merely ve the political parties the option of selecting any one of three rules verning the submission of such amendments. They could (1) omit all ention of a proposed amendment on the ballot; (2) print either the irmative or the negative of the measure; or (3) print the amendment full with blank spaces in which the voter might express his approval disapproval. And in 1877, the third rule was expressly abrogated an act of the General Assembly. In actual practice the parties took advantage of the second rule. hen an amendment to the Constitution proposed by the General ssembly was to be voted on the party committee or convention dermined the party's attitude with reference to it. If the party comittee or convention favored the amendment the ballots of that party ould contain the words "For the proposed amendment to section of Article of the Constitution" and no other reference the measure. If the committee or convention opposed the proposed nendment the word "Against" would be substituted for the word For." In either event, however, the voter was bound by the action his party. committee or convention unless he took the precaution scratch the measure as printed. If his ballot contained the words For the proposed amendment" and he failed to draw a line through lese words he voted for the amendment, although as a matter of ct he may not have known anything at all about it. Under this ystem all straight party votes were cast either for or against a proosed amendment, depending on the manner in which the party comittee or convention had determined to print the measure on the allot. It was not difficult to get a majority of the voters in an election t which an amendment was submitted to vote one way or the other n the proposed measure; in fact there was no way in which the elector ould avoid registering either his approval or disapproval. If he did |