CHAP. I. General considerations relative to Elocution. . . . 389 II. The Artificial and Natural modes of Elocution compared 399 A. Extracts from Bacon's Rhetoric, of some of his Antitheta 447 C. Extract from Lecture V. on Political Economy, concern- D. Grounds of men's belief in the genuineness of the sacred Scriptures; from Dr. Hinds's Treatise on Inspiration. 469 DD. Reasons for believing that Savages have never civilized themselves; from Political Economy, Lecture V. . . 473 DDD. Extract from the Edinburgh Review, on German Criminal E. On Analogies; from Bishop Copleston's Discourses . . 492 RHETORIC. INTRODUCTION. Various defi nitions of Rhetoric. 1. OF Rhetoric various definitions have been given by different writers; who, however, seem not so much to have disagreed in their conceptions of the nature of the same thing, as to have had different things in view while they employed the same term. Not only the word Rhetoric itself, but also those used in defining it, have been taken in various senses; as may be observed with respect to the word "Art" in Cic. de Orat., where a discussion is introduced as to the applicability of that term to Rhetoric; manifestly turning on the different senses in which " Art" may be understood. To enter into an examination of all the definitions that have been given, would lead to much uninteresting and uninstructive verbal controversy. It is sufficient to put the reader on his guard against the common error of supposing that a general term has some real object, properly corresponding to it, independent of our conceptions; that, consequently, some one definition in every case is to be found which will comprehend every thing that is rightly designated by that term; and that all others must be erroneous: whereas, in fact, it will often happen, as in the present instance, that both the wider, and the more restricted sense of a term, will be alike sanctioned by use, (the only competent authority,) and that the consequence will be a corresponding variation in the definitions employed; none of which perhaps may be fairly chargeable with error, though none can be framed that will apply to every acceptation of the term. It is evident that in its primary signification, Rhetoric had reference to public Speaking alone, as its etymology implies. But as most of the rules for Speaking are of course applicable equally to Writing, an extension of the term naturally took place; and we find even Aristotle, the earliest systematic writer on the subject whose works have come down to us, including in his Treatise rules for such compositions as were not intended to be publicly recited.* And even as far as relates to Speeches, properly so called, he takes, in the same Treatise, at one time, a wider, and at another, a more restricted view of the subject; including under the term Rhetoric, in the opening of his work, nothing beyond the finding of topics of Persuasion, as far as regards the matter of what is spoken; and afterwards embracing the consideration of Style, Arrangement, and Delivery. The Invention of Printing,t by extending the sphere of *Aristot. Rhet, Book III. † Or rather of Paper; for the invention of printing is too obvious not to have speedily followed, in a literary nation, the introduction of a paper sufficiently cheap to make the art available. Indeed the seals of the ancients seem to have been a kind of stamps with which they in fact printed their names. But the high price of books, caused by the dearness of paper, precluded the sale of copies except in so operation of the Writer, has of course contributed to the extension of those terms which, in their primary signification, had reference to Speaking alone. Many objects are now accomplished through the medium of the Press, which formerly came under the exclusive province of the Orator; and the qualifications requisite for success are so much the same in both cases, that we apply the term "Eloquent" as readily to a Writer as to a Speaker; though, etymologically considered, it could only belong to the latter. Indeed "Eloquence" is often attributed even to such compositions,-e. g. Historical works, -as have in view an object entirely different from any that could be proposed by an Orator; because some part of the rules to be observed in Oratory, or rules analogous to these, are applicable to such compositions. Conformably to this view, therefore, some writers have spoken of Rhetoric as the Art of Composition, universally; or, with the exclusion of Poetry alone, as embracing all Prose composition. A still wider extension of the province of Rhetoric has been contended for by some of the ancient writers; who, thinking it necessary to include, as belonging to the Art, every thing that could conduce to the attainment of the object proposed, introduced into their systems, Treatises on Law, Morals, Politics, &c., on the ground that a knowledge of these subjects was requisite to enable a man to speak well on them; and even insisted on Virtue * as an essential qualification of a perfect Orator; because a good character, which can in no way be so surely established as by deserving it, has great weight with the audience." small a number that the printing of them would have been more costly than transcribing. * See Quinctilian. ecessors. These notions are combated by Aristotle ; Aristotle's cen- who attributes them either to the ill-cultivated sure of his pred- understanding (naidevola) of those who maintained them, or to their arrogant and pretending disposition (alatovela); i. e. a desire to extol and magnify the Art they professed. In the present day, the extravagance of such doctrines is so apparent to most readers, that it would not be worth while to take much pains in refuting them. It is worthy of remark, however, that the very same erroneous view is, even now, often taken of Logic; * which has been considered by some as a kind of system of universal knowledge, on the ground that Argument may be employed on all subjects, and that no one can argue well on a subject which he does not understand; and which has been complained of by others for not supplying any such universal instruction as its unskilful advocates have placed within its province; such as in fact no one Art or System can possibly afford. The error is precisely the same in respect of Rhetoric and of Logic; both being instrumental arts; and, as such, applicable to various kind of subject matter, which do not properly come under them. So judicious an author as Quinctilian would not have failed to perceive, had he not been carried away by an inordinate veneration for his own Art, that as the possession of building materials is no part of the art of Architecture, though it is impossible to build without materials, so, the knowledge of the subjects on which the Orator is to speak, constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be essential to its successful employment; and that though virtue, and the good * Elements of Logic, Introd. |