mulating and rewarding the activity of its own navy by a rich harvest of prize-money. The system might be severe, and might often bear hard upon neutrals as well as on belligerents; but it was logical, consistent, and often most effective for its end. It helped us vastly in our long contest with France, and in our last war with the United States it enabled us literally to sweep American commerce from the ocean.

At the Congress of Paris, however, a modification of this law and practice was adopted and proclaimed by the great maritime powers of Europe, which would by this time have been the recognised law of nations, and have guided all future practice, had not the American government for the time withheld its consent. As it is, it is held to bind the future proceedings of the powers which agreed to it, and will ere long, no doubt, be universally recognised and acted on. In virtue of this new regulation-long contended for in vain by the weaker nations of the world, and now solemnly conceded by the strong ones "the flag is henceforth to cover the cargo;" i. e. enemy's goods in neutral bottoms shall, in all future wars, be exempt from seizure. Lord Clarendon, our representative at the Congress in question, agreed to this modification, with the sanction of Lord Palmerston, though, it is believed, against the opinion of Lord John Russell. England, therefore, is committed to it, and it cannot be rescinded. But it places the whole system of maritime capture in so illogical and unsatisfactory a position, that most men who have looked at the question are of opinion that another step must be taken, and that as we cannot go backwards we must go forward. The operation of the new concession is, that the object of stopping the commerce of the enemy has been virtually surrendered; it may now be carried on during war to any extent and in perfect security, provided only it be carried on under a neutral flag. The merchants of the belligerents may conduct their operations as before, but their shipowners alone must remain idle. The country may send out all its produce, and receive all it needs in return-may buy and sell and get gain without any interruption;-only they must cover their imports and their exports with a different piece of bunting, and consign them to vessels owning a different nationality. The gains and advantages of trade are continued as usual, with the single exception that the freights are pocketed by the shipowners of some third nation. The hope of shortening wars, by preventing our enemy from selling what he produces and importing what he wants, is therefore at an end; and with this hope, the justification of maritime capture-i. e. of seizing the private property of the mercantile subjects of either belligerent-would seem to be taken away. It is proposed, therefore, to complete and

harmonise the amendment of international law and practice inaugurated by the Paris Convention, by henceforth exempting from seizure at sea all ships and all cargoes;-in fact, to allow all peaceful traders and merchant vessels to carry on their bencficent operations during war as during peace, under their own flag. Virtually, it is said, you have already conceded this privilege to belligerents; why not do it thoroughly and simply? Having allowed the cargoes (the only important matter) to pass free, why not allow the vehicles of those cargoes to pass free also?

It is pretty well understood that, if Great Britain would consent to this further amendment of belligerent law, other countries would be only too glad to do so likewise. Great Britain has the reputation of being the most powerful naval belligerent on the face of the globe; and the point in question is simply the renunciation of a vexatious belligerent right. Obviously the sole practical question for consideration is, whether it will be for the interests of this country to abandon the last remaining shred of the right of preying on our enemy's trade-the right, viz., of capturing enemy's goods under the enemy's flags. In the great debate of last session, the question was avowedly argued on this ground only by the speakers on both sides. The Reformers contended that the proposed extension of exemption would tell in our favour. The Ministerialists contended that it would tell against us. No one who listened to the discussion could feel much doubt as to which way the balance of the argument inclined. The supporters of Mr. Horsfall dwelt on the enormous amount of our trade and the countless multitude of our merchant ships, which it was so important to exempt from risk of capture. His opponents, on the other hand, dwelt on the vast preponderance of our war marine, and the desirableness of giving it something to prey upon. The one side pleaded that, as our trade was the largest in the world, we should suffer most by the right of maritime capture being retained. other side urged that, as our naval strength was the greatest in the world, we should be able to inflict the most damage on the commerce of our foes.

The

The case, when considered in the concrete and looked at closely and narrowly, soon becomes very clear. In truth, the only practical question to decide is, how far the proposed exemption of private property at sea from capture, in any bottoms, would operate upon this country in the event of a war with France, and in the event of a war with America. Other contingencies we need not consider, if we are satisfied what would be best for us in these two cases. Under such exemption our vast commerce would go on without interruption; our gains would be as great as usual; our rates of insurance no higher;

wealth would flow in to us as in ordinary times; and whatever portion of that wealth was needed could be cheerfully paid into the treasury; we should be almost as prosperous as ever, in spite of war. We should avoid also the constant hazard we now incur of making enemies of neutrals, by vexatious interruptions, searches, and mistakes. Our merchant ships would be abroad in every sea, serving still as a nursery and training-school for sailors, whenever these were wanted for the Queen's service. Our navy meanwhile, exempted from their old task of convoying and protecting our trading vessels, would all be available for strictly warlike purposes. We should have twice as many for meeting the enemy at sea, or for blockading him at home. If we retain our maritime supremacy, or even a decided equality with our strongest possible antagonist, it is obvious that we shall be able not only to fight with our foe much more effectually, but to interrupt his commerce far more completely than we could do now; for, instead of having our cruisers dispersed over the world convoying* our own ships and seeking to make prize of his, they might all be concentrated on blockading squadrons. And by thus sealing up his harbours, we should inflict immeasurably more damage than by merely capturing his vessels on the open seas; since, in the latter case, we could stop only that portion of his trade which was carried on in his own ships in the former case, we should be able to stop what was carried in neutral bottoms as well. In the one case, many of his cargoes would necessarily elude our vigilance; for we should have thousands of miles over which to watch and chase them. In the other, we could almost preclude the possibility of access to the comparatively small portion of coast we should have to guard.

*The following very practical view of the exemption from capture of private property at sea was given at the late meeting of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce by S. R. Graves, Esq., the late Mayor of Liverpool: "It has been urged that, by extending to the ship that exemption which has by the Treaty of Paris been conferred upon cargo, we should be weakening our maritime supremacy. Now, if this be correct, there would be strong ground for hesitation in the course we should adopt; but is it so? The first effect of war would be, if not to shut up the shipping of the belligerents in their ports, and to leave to neutrals the carrying trade of the ocean, to place the shipping under such disabilities that employ ment would be difficult; half-a-dezen Alabamas sent out by any state, however insignificant, would keep the seas clear of the belligerent flags, for no one would employ them. The old system of convoys is out of the question; and no one can suppose that with our empire of colonies, our own shores to defend, and belligerent ports to blockade, we can hope to protect a commerce which has increased from 31 million tons in and out in 1814 to 15 millions in 1861. It is simply impracticable; and therefore I say that the trade and the shipping of England will suffer more than any other belligerent in the proportion that its extent bears to the trade of its opponent. Again, if we regard our ability to protect our commerce, we cannot fail to come to the conclusion that it is simply impossible. With the view of drawing comparisons, I have taken the trouble to look up our compara

It is obvious that, as soon as war breaks out between two great powers, each will proceed instantly, and as far as possible, to carry on their habitual trade in neutral bottoms. They will charter neutral ships, and will sell their own ships to neutral nations. It is obvious, too, that if both parties can do this completely, there will be no ostensibly belligerent commerce left to prey upon, and the right of capturing such will be a mere nominal privilege. The really significant question then is, "Which nation will be able to place the least proportion of its trade under the protection of neutral flags?"-for that nation clearly must be most liable to suffer loss. The nation with the largest commerce must have the largest vulnerability—the greatest exposed surface-the smallest relative protectible surface, and that nation is England. Let us suppose that we are involved in a war with France, which has a very powerful war navy, and, in comparison, a very moderate mercantile marine. Already a large proportion of her commerce is carried in foreign ships; the moment war is declared, the whole of it will be so carried on. Her goods, freighted in Spanish, Dutch, or American bottoms, will be secure from molestation, and our cruisers will have nothing to prey upon. Our mercantile marine is

tive naval power during the year of greatest strength ever put forth by England with its strength in 1858, and will give you the result:

"COMPARISON of the NAVAL FORCE of GREAT BRITAIN at the present time with that of 1809, in which year the Navy appears to have been at its greatest nominal strength, as it consisted of a larger number of ships and guns than at any other period.

By these figures it will be seen that while our empire, our wealth, our commerce have increased to such a fabulous extent, our power of protection has not materially increased; and I know it to be the opinion of our highest authorities that convoys will be impracticable, and that commerce must be left in time of war to its own devices."

enormous and unequalled; its tonnage amounts to 5,000,000; we are the carriers for the whole world, as well as for ourselves; and the proportion of our trade which we could carry on in neutral bottoms would be comparatively small: not to mention that these neutral bottoms would be already to a great extent engaged in the service of our antagonists. For one French merchant ship which we could capture, the French cruisers would probably capture fifty of ours; not because their navy was more powerful or more energetic than our own, but simply because our trading vessels would be so incomparably more numerous. The relative degree of vulnerability, so to speak, of the two nations under the existing international law, as modified by the Convention of Paris, may be gathered from the following figures:- Of British commerce, 58 per cent is carried on under the British flag; of French commerce, only 43 per cent is carried under the French flag. The aggregate registered tonnage of British merchant ships is 5,675,000; that of French merchant ships is 1,025,000. The total tonnage of vessels entering inwards and outwards in Great Britain is 26,000,000: the total tonnage entering inwards and outwards in France is 6,600,000. That is, France, with equal power of inflicting damage, has only one-fifth of our liability to suffer damage.

The operation on this country of a war with America would be nearly the same in kind, though less mischievous in degree, especially at first, inasmuch as the war navy of the Americans is comparatively insignificant. Their foreign trade is very large, but not as great as that of England. Their tonnage inwards and outwards is 17,065,000, against our 26,000,000. About 67 per cent of their foreign trade is carried on under the national flag. The total of their mercantile marine is, nominally, not far short of ours, being 5,354,000, against 5,675,000 tons; but as nearly half of this (2,480,000) was exclusively engaged in their coasting and inland navigation, the comparison is not an accurate one. As soon as war broke out between England and the United States, the chief portion of their trade would be carried on in French, Dutch, Brazilian, and Danish bottoms, and would enjoy a perfect immunity from our men-ofwar; while their cruisers and privateers would prey upon that large residue of our commerce which, from its mere magnitude, could not seek similar exemption. In fact, to sum up the whole in a single sentence:-The resolution adopted at Paris, which exempts from capture enemy's goods in neutral bottoms, will operate far more beneficially and effectually for every other nation than for England; or to speak broadly, will exempt the commerce of other countries wholly, and that of England only partially, from the risks of war.

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